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 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide insight into an individual family’s 
fertility response to a short term financial shock. As economies develop, the number 
of children born in a household decreases at both the inter and intra-country level. 
This paper examines a household’s fertility response to a short run financial shock 
where there are no confounding effects of economic development present in the 
decision making process. Micro-economic theory defines income elasticity as: the 
percentage change in the quantity of a good given a percentage change in income, 
holding all else constant; previous examinations of income elasticity of the demand 
for children fail to hold child quality constant.  
 I develop a theoretical economic framework to motivate an empirical model 
containing seven equations which predict the probability of conception while 
controlling for family size, women’s education and employment, marital status, 
income, and consumption. The model is estimated using longitudinal data from 
waves 2 and 3 of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which spanned the 
Asian financial crisis. With this micro-level economic and socio-demographic data, I 
identify changes in fertility behavior in response to individual and household financial 
shocks, measured by changes in per capita expenditure and household income. 
 iii
 Results indicate a slight decline in fertility at the onset of the crisis, followed 
by an increase in fertility during the crisis. Household income exerts no effect on the 
probability of conception, while per-capita consumption exerts a negative, but 
insignificant effect. Households which experience some hardship show declines in 
the probability of conception. Over the four years spanning the Asian financial crisis, 
children are indicated as neither inferior nor normal goods. The effects of other 
children in the household, the mother’s age, and marital status are the more 
dominant predictors of fertility; therefore, I conclude that although household 
economy changes impact fertility, cultural factors and permanent economic factors 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation will explore the impact of short term economic shocks on the 
fertility of Indonesian women. Trends in fertility rates both across and within 
countries show a negative relationship between fertility rates and income, giving the 
impression of children as inferior goods. Previous studies on the economic impact of 
fertility have produced inconclusive or conflicting results. The problems these 
analyses face is as incomes rise, expenditures on children also rise, resulting in 
changes in child quality not controlled for within these analyses. The Asian Financial 
Crisis, which began in 1997, provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
immediate effects of an unanticipated, short duration macroeconomic shock on a 
woman’s fertility while child quality remains relatively constant. 
Following the literature review, I present a theoretical model where women 
maximize utility by choosing the number of children to have, the quality at which to 
raise those children, and the family’s consumption, subject to time and budget 
constraints. This theoretical model motivates an empirical analysis using full 
information maximum likelihood and the discrete factor method on a system of 
seven equations controlling for the endogeneity of women’s education, employment 
status, income, consumption, marriage, and family size to determine the effect
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economic shocks have on a woman’s fertility. In the empirical analysis I use the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey collected before and after the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997, which offers extensive information on individuals, households, and 
communities. Following the analysis, I run simulations to give relative context to the 
parameter estimates. Finally I conclude with a discussion of the results and 
implications of this work. 
  
 CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVATION 
 
At the macro level, researchers observe a decrease in the average fertility 
rates of women as per-capita Gross Domestic Products (GDP) rise. If a household’s 
income increases, do we observe a decrease in the demand for children?  Does this 
imply that children are inferior goods?  
Parents derive utility from having children, but children are costly to the 
household’s limited resources. Richer societies have lower fertility rates, and 
Bollen(2002) refers to this as the negative inter and intra-country fertility-income 
gradient. Fertility at the household level can be a factor of many things, including 
biology, economic factors, religion, family, peer, and community influences, personal 
preferences of the husband and wife, and random events such as contraceptive 
failure, pre-natal and infant mortality, along with others. Studying the affect of 
economic factors on fertility is a worthwhile exercise for three main reasons. First, 
the majority of world population growth will occur in the developing world,  
contributing nearly 2 billion people to the world population by 2125 (Bongaarts, 
1998). Countries with fewer resources are those that have higher fertility, causing 
thin resources to be spread thinner across growing populations, limiting 
opportunities for economic growth through capital accumulation. Second, 
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childbearing is a major event that affects the entire household, including maternal 
and child health, maternal labor supply, and thus income and consumption. Third, 
studies on the impact of income on fertility have yet to produce conclusive results or 
a clear understanding of the root causes of the negative inter / intra-country income 
fertility gradient (Bollen, 2002). 
No discussion concerning income elasticities of children is complete without 
considering child quality. Quality can be measured by the human capital investment 
in education, the physical investment in nourishment and health, and the time spent 
by the parent or proxy on child care and education. Razin and Sadka (2005) discuss 
the endogeneity of fertility where the higher value (opportunity cost) of time makes 
raising children relatively more expensive in more productive economies. In addition, 
the importance of education and training in these countries will further raise the 
costs of children. In poorer economies, the economic costs of children are relatively 
lower due to lesser human capital investment, whereas the economic benefits are 
higher in the short term through labor, and in the long term through support of the 
parents in old age, thus demanding larger families. 
This project focuses on the impact of economic variables on fertility. The  
economic shock experienced in Indonesia in 1997 was devastating for its residents, 
but fortuitous to social scientists, as the unanticipated, short duration financial crisis 
allows scientists to study how Indonesians reacted to a changing economic climate. 
By using the detailed economic and demographic data contained within the IFLS 
from before and after the crisis, I can determine how households in Indonesia 
reacted to economic shocks with regards to their fertility. 
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Policy-makers concerned with populations in developing countries are 
generally interested in two initiatives. First are those policies which reduce mortality, 
allowing those born to live longer healthier lives, and second are those policies 
intended to reduce total fertility rates. The total fertility rate (TFR) is defined as the 
number of live births an average woman has over her lifetime. The “Replacement 
TFR” is defined as the average number of children a woman bears to keep the 
population level constant. This number is considered to be very close to 2.1 children 
per woman, slightly greater than two since a certain proportion of female children will 
not survive to reproduce. Populations grow when total births exceed total deaths, 
and since all people inevitably die, mortality declines do not reduce total deaths, but 
merely postpone them, resulting in small, one-time increases in population counts. 
The larger impact on population growth comes from reducing total births, which has 
an exponential impact on population growth.  
Indonesia has made incredible progress on reducing its TFR over the last 45 
years from 6.0 to 2.4 children per woman. The root cause of this reduction has been 
the subject of many research projects over the last two decades (Pitt, Rosenzweig, 
and Gibbons, 1993) (Gertler and Molyneaux, 1994) (Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz, 
2005). Government programs not only to incorporate contraceptives into society but 
also to educate women on the importance of smaller families began in the early 
1960’s. This increased the awareness and availability of contraception and resulted 
in improved education opportunities for women. Increased education of females led 
to higher female labor force participation rates, which further led to higher household 
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income and consumption. Infant mortality fell (World Bank, 1993), and access to 
health care has improved throughout the entire country. 




Fertility within the household can be investigated as a rational economic 
decision, and one can investigate both the supply of and demand for children. 
Ultimately, fertility is constrained by a biological upper limit known as a reproductive 
couple’s fecundity, or in economic terms, the available supply of household births 
even if endowed with unlimited resources. To a first approximation this fecundity will 
be distributed randomly across a population (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985). We 
have every reason to believe the supply of births per woman has increased over 
time due to advances in modern science. Women previously unable to bear children 
have access to new methods of fertility treatments which can increase the probability 
of having live births, as well as increase years of fecundity.   
With some minor exceptions, couples choose, or demand, some amount of 
children less than the available supply (Rozenzweig and Schultz, 1985, T P Schultz, 
2005). There are many reasons documenting this phenomenon: 1) Improved 
accessibility, quality, knowledge, and acceptance of contraceptives, sterilization, and 
abortion,  2) reduced child mortality, 3) high rates of urbanization, 4) increases in the 
cost-benefit ratio of children, 5) increased education of women has raised their 
earning power and increased the opportunity cost of child bearing and child rearing, 
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6) rapid technological change has raised the rate of return to human capital and 
education, and 7) increases in the standard of living of parents (Butz and Ward, 
1979). I will discuss each individually and examine the mechanisms through which 
they operate to impact fertility choices at the individual level, keeping in mind in fact 
many of these phenomena are interrelated and may jointly impact fertility. 
Contraception gives women greater control over their reproductive destiny, it 
allows them to delay the birth of their first child, pursue additional years of education, 
work more, and live independently longer. Improved contraceptive techniques 
became readily available in much of the world following World War II. The pill first 
became available in the US in 1960, and quickly spread throughout the world. 
Today, over 100 million women of childbearing age take the pill as their primary 
method of birth control (Hatcher, 2004).  
Abortion is available to many women as a means to prevent childbirth. 
Sterilization is encouraged by many societies for couples who have achieved their 
target family size and desire no further children, and is considered a safe and 
reliable method of birth control. Bongaarts, Mauldin, and Phillips (1990) find fertility 
is negatively associated both with development and family planning program effort. 
Government sponsored family planning programs legitimize the usage of 
contraception which then allow individuals to convert latent demand for lowered 
fertility into a physical demand for contraception (Ronald Freedman, 1994). For 
example, Miller (2005) finds the PROFAMILIA program sponsored by the 
government in Columbia was responsible for a one-half child reduction in the total 
fertility rate. 
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Healthcare advancements in developed countries improved mortality 
outcomes over the entire range of the life course, and naturally, these improvements 
spilled over into the developing world as well. Lower child mortality directly reduces 
fertility since parents can achieve their target number of surviving children with 
greater certainty and fewer births (Wolpin, 1997). 
The cost-benefit ratio of children has increased due to increased costs and 
decreased benefits stemming from children. The most relevant cost to obtaining an 
additional child is the loss of the maternal income from the labor market (Ohlsson, 
1994). As real wages have risen, this cost has risen accordingly. Increasing rates of 
return to human capital and education have raised the incentives of parents to invest 
more in their children's education. At the margin, additional years of education add 
additional educational expenses as well as an increase in the duration of parental 
dependence. This detraction from current production in the labor force resulting in 
opportunity costs explains the negative relationship between the number of children 
in a family and the children’s education (Schultz, 1997). Finally, the physical 
investment in health and nourishment of children accounts for a larger portion of the 
household’s budget constraint. These factors are responsible for raising the relative 
costs associated with children and have led to a substitute of quality for quantity in 
family size decisions (Becker, 1960). 
Meanwhile, the benefits of having children have decreased. The most obvious 
decrease in the benefit of many children lies in urbanization, where financial benefits 
from children do not materialize until they enter the labor force. In agrarian societies, 
children are relatively more productive earlier in their lives as laborers on the family 
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farm and participants in home production when compared to non-agrarian societies, 
thus the economic benefits from children are more immediate and transparent. 
Children also provide a natural insurance mechanism for aging parents. In the 
absence of social programs aimed at the elderly, parents turn to their children for 
physical and financial support in their old age. Thus, children acted as a physical 
investment in retirement security; the greater the investment, the greater the 
security. In less developed societies, most households face significant income risks, 
but have very few means of mitigating these risks or responding to shocks. Hence, 
these households must rely on self insurance and coping mechanisms that may be 
suboptimal in the long run, especially for the poorest households (Portner, 2005). In 
this case, having more children is a natural insurance mechanism for these poor 
households (Khoo and Dennis, 1999). In turn, this insurance mechansim creates a 
larger unskilled workforce, capital dilution, and ultimately stunts economic growth 
(Khoo and Dennis, 1999), (Keane and Chen, 2002). Portner (2005) presents a 
hypothesis where children may act as imperfect substitutes for insurance. By 
estimating the effects of the risks of various natural disasters on fertility and 
education using data from Guatemala, Portner shows how increased risk of 
disasters boosts fertility and lowers the education of children. It is often noted larger 
families are more likely to be poor, which is consistent with families giving up the 
possibility of higher per capita consumption for a more secure, substantially lower 
consumption.  
As women became more prevalent in the workforce, the need for human 
capital accumulation amongst females fueled an increase in desired education, 
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furthering women’s position in the workforce through a simple feedback mechanism 
(Barro and Lee, 1994). Contraceptive availability encouraged women to plan the 
timing of births as well as family size, helping them invest in careers both in the 
home and outside of their family. Women's increased education, access to new 
family-planning technologies, and accumulation of work experience outside of the 
home increased the share of women's earnings in total family income. Studies 
suggest this redistribution of economic power [from men] to women is associated 
with a reallocation of family expenditures toward children, while helping women with 
dependent children to head their own households if necessary, and further 
strengthening women's incentives to have fewer children over their lifetime because 
they expect to bear more of the cost of children (Becker, 1981; P. Schultz, 2001). In 
many studies conducted in a wide range of contexts, it has been shown relative to 
the education of the mother, her husband’s schooling has a smaller effect on both 
the quantity and quality of her children, as indicated by, for example, survival rates 
and health status (Thomas, 1999). Higher educated women spend more time in the 
workforce, causing a delay in the age of marriage, which in turn leaves the woman 
unmarried during a greater proportion of her fertile years, possibly adding to the 
decline in fertility. 
Part of the association between education and fertility appears to have 
nothing to do with the education production function, but reflects how education is 
endogenous to the fertility decision. Specifically, women and their families choose 
their educational attainment given the opportunities and constraints they face, so the 
better educated are a self selected sub-sample of the underlying population. This 
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implies the relationship between education and fertility is not entirely causal, and 
could overestimate the impacts of programs designed to increase female 
educational attainment (Thomas, 1999). A simple example of this is a poor family 
with low aspirations and several children. One of those children grows up and 
marries. Most likely, this man is poor since he is poorly educated. Further, he 
married a poor woman since people tend to marry within their socioeconomic group. 
When they have children, they will probably have several children since both came 
from large families, and won’t have the desire or means to push those children to 
high educational attainment, thus continuing the cycle. 
Increases in the standard of living operate in conjunction with many of the 
other mechanisms mentioned. Female labor force participation led to dual income 
households, leading to a preference of increased consumption of other goods rather 
than children, which in turn raised the standard of living of parents (Barro and Lee, 
1994) (Butz and Ward, 1979). Fertility decisions are based in part on expected 
lifetime income relative to material aspirations formed in childhood. In a steadily 
growing economy successive generations are raised in increasingly affluent 
households, hence they develop successively higher living aspirations in the course 
of their normal upbringing. Therefore, even though each generation normally has 
more resources at its command upon reaching adulthood, it also has greater goods 
aspirations to satisfy (Easterlin, 2000).  
Another study examines the relationship between income relative to one's 
socioeconomic group and fertility. Relative income is more closely related to birth 
spacing than to cumulative fertility, and the relationship between relative income and 
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fertility is strongest among those couples who plan their life ahead and have a high 
level of education and occupation (Chaudhury, 1977). This indicates certain peer 
effects existing in the fertility decision will most likely spill over into future decisions 
relating to child quality, such as education expenses. In a dynamic framework, 
existing children and previous labor supply decisions constrain future choices 
regarding additional children and labor supply decisions (Ermisch, 1991). 
 
3.2 Income and Fertility 
At the individual level, researchers want to understand the effect of changes 
in household income on fertility. Across time and populations, per capita income 
exerts an ambiguous effect on fertility. Some studies find the relationship to be 
positive, implying children to be normal goods, while others contend it is inverse, 
implying children to be inferior goods. Analytical models based on economic theory 
have not provided an unequivocal answer to this apparent puzzle (Nagarajan, 1980). 
Reproductive demands are likely to be coordinated with other family time and 
resource allocations, and reflect not only socioeconomic constraints on choices, but 
also parents' heterogeneous preferences among various goals and outcomes 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985). This also implies the binding constraint on fertility 
is demand side driven. Household income is endogenous because it is influenced 
directly by a woman’s choice to work as opposed to bearing and caring for children. 
Docquier (2004) finds the two appear to be negatively correlated. Thomas (1999) 
finds current income does have a significant, but small, negative effect on fertility: A 
three-fold increase in current income would predict a 20% decline in fertility. The 
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estimated effects of income on fertility reflect a combination of two mechanisms. 
First, better educated people tend to earn higher wages, implying a higher market 
value of their time, and assuming child rearing is time-intensive, a reduction in the 
number of children a woman will want to have. Second, higher income implies more 
resources for the family to spend on consumption goods, and assuming children are 
valued and hence normal goods, raising the demand for children. The impact of 
income being negative suggests the first effect, the substitution effect, dominates 
(Thomas, 1999). The problem with this analysis is the data is constrained to a simple 
cross-section, implying no forward-looking expectation or dynamic component to the 
model. 
Increases in income may induce parents to spend more money on quality 
instead of quantity. This results in an increased cost per child and reduced desired 
quantity, giving the incorrect impression children are inferior goods. A true inferior 
good requires the quantity of children to decrease when income increased, holding 
all else constant, including quality. Since quality is constantly changing, the children 
purchased before and after an income increase are not homogenous goods. The 
overall effect seems to be as income rises, higher quality of children is substituted 
for quantity of children. 
There are multiple mechanisms by which income shocks affect fertility in the 
short run. First, potential parents may delay child rearing during times of hardship to 
avoid the direct and immediate costs of an additional child through a simple income 
effect. An extreme response to a short run negative economic shock is to decrease 
target family size to permanently avoid the marginal cost of an additional child.  
15 
The second response is to increase fertility during times of economic hardship 
when the opportunity costs of time are lowered and may present relatively less 
costly time commitments to child rearing. This inter-temporal substitution of births 
does not necessarily change total fertility at the household level. There are 
numerous studies that present arguments for each mechanism. I will summarize 
some of the key findings here.  
Butz and Ward (1979, 1980) estimate a forward looking dynamic model of 
expected employment and wages in order to determine if reductions in the U.S. 
fertility rate reflected a structural decrease in target family size (a permanent 
decrease in the TFR), or an intertemporal substitution of births (a temporary 
decrease in the TFR). Further, current period fertility decisions and completed family 
size are both part of the same optimization problem, since completed family size is 
simply a consequence of period specific decisions, and at all periods during the 
fertile years, fertility plans are upwardly revisable. They hypothesize current period 
wage increases will depress current fertility, and likewise, expectations on future 
wage changes will shift fertility into earlier periods. The traditional model predicts 
changes in the husband’s wage and income are associated only with income effects, 
since men tend to bear less of the time burden associated with childbearing 
(Thomas, 1999), whereas changes in the wife’s wage and income are associated 
with both income and substitution (price) effects in the derived demand for child 
services under the presumption children are wife’s time intensive. They find 
empirical evidence that expected wage increases in the near term depress fertility, 
conditional on the wife’s intention to work in the current time period. As the time 
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horizon for expected wage increases extends further into the future, the effects are 
mitigated until a horizon around ten years is reached, where a switch in the 
coefficient sign indicates an increase in fertility. They claim this is evidence of some 
inter-temporal substitution of births, although the main result states the decline in 
total fertility rates in the US during the 1960’s was a structural downward revision in 
couples’ total lifetime fertility. 
Docquier (2004) derives a model where a positive income shock has an 
immediate effect on the desired educational attainment of children as a shift in child 
quality. He models two effects, the first being a within group effect, where the 
individuals within a group can not increase their child’s educational attainment, so 
they alter fertility directly based on income effects. The second is a between group 
effect, where a negative income shock causes a decrease in desired child quality, 
causing an increase in fertility. He finds the total fertility rate can increase or 
decrease with income, depending on the income distribution of the population and 
the private cost of education. 
Eberstadt(1994) examined fertility in Eastern Germany during the fall of the 
Soviet Union. He notes declines in fertility during this course are comparable to 
nations in war, plague, or famine. He attributes this in large part to the tremendous 
economic uncertainty during that period. Ranjan (1999) examines the link between 
this economic uncertainty and the timing of childbearing using a two-period 
stochastic model of fertility behavior, and finds when agents lie below a certain 
income threshold increases in economic uncertainty theoretically predict a 
postponement of the childbearing decision until the uncertainty is removed. The 
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higher the uncertainty, the higher the income threshold. Due to the irreversibility of 
the childbearing decision and the option of postponing childbearing for a later time, it 
may be optimal for individuals to postpone childbearing during increased income 
uncertainty. 
Income can come from different sources in the household, and may 
encourage or discourage fertility (Mincer, 1963). For example, if an increase in 
family income is due to the women's income contribution, this not only expands 
income opportunities of the family, but also raises the effective price of children to 
the family. Because it is empirically observed that higher values of women's time are 
associated with lower levels of lifetime fertility (P. Schultz, 1981, 1994), it is also 
inferred the price effect of women's wages outweighs its income effect on fertility. In 
contrast, if an increase in total family income is due to an increase in the husband’s 
income, returns to physical assets, financial assets, business assets, land, or natural 
resources, this adds to family endowments while not necessarily affecting the 
relative opportunity cost of children to parents, in which case these income sources 
are expected to be associated with higher fertility, other things being equal (P. 
Schultz, 1981, 1994).  
Ohlsson(1994) shows anecdotal evidence in Scandinavia of increased fertility 
when the labor force is less receptive to females. If the relative wages of wives to 
their spouses falls, then women take the opportunity to exit the labor force to have 
children, possibly to reenter during a more appealing time.  
Nagarajan(1980) suggests the true relationship between income and fertility 
may be nonlinear, rising together up to some income level and diverging beyond that 
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level. In the empirical part of the paper, a quadratic functional form of the 
relationship between per capita income and birth rates is specified and estimated. 
Data used in the analysis span the period from 1909-1957 for the United States. Her 
results confirm the existence of the hypothesized nonlinear relationship.  
 
3.3 Indonesian Fertility 
 Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world with 242 million 
inhabitants on an archipelago of over 13,000 islands. With 88% of the population 
Muslim, Indonesia contains the most Muslims of any nation, while the remainder is 
5%Protestant, 3%Roman Catholic, 2%Hindu, 1%Buddhists, and 1% undefined  
(2005). 
Indonesia has had its share of successes and failures over the past few 
years. The terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002 and October 2005 indicate the 
struggle between conservative Islam and the liberal westernization occurring 
throughout Asian societies. The most horrific tragedy to hit Indonesia was the 
tsunami of December 2004. Of the 216,000 total casualties, Indonesia sustained 
close to half, with over 104,000 lives lost. More recently, additional earthquakes and 
tsunami threats continue to ravage the volcanic island chain. On the positive side, 
Indonesia experienced consistent economic development over the past 50 years. 
The country has averaged GDP growth of 4.5 % per year over the 30 years prior to 
the financial crisis of 1998.  
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Indonesia’s total fertility rate decreased at astounding levels compared to 
other developing countries. Table 3.1 illustrates the decline in the total fertility rate in 
Indonesia over the past 46 years. 
Table 3.1 Fertility Rates in Indonesia: Last 45 Years 
Year 1961 1970 1975 1980 1985 1998 2006 
TFR 6.1 – 5.7 5.6 4.9 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.4 
Source: Hull, 1980, Encyclopedia, Nationmaster Statistics 
 
 Hull (1980) notes prior to 1970, it is likely a secular rise in the age of marriage 
that had the major influence on fertility, while after 1970, the BKKBN (National 
Family Planning Coordinating Board) played an increasing, though not exclusive role 
in the process by providing access to inexpensive and reliable contraceptives and 
sex education to Indonesian women. This decline is attributed to increased 
contraceptive use (Gertler, Molyneaux, 1994) and female education, leading to 
increased female labor force participation, increased age of marriage, urbanization, 
and other improvements in proximate determinants(Angeles, Guilkey, Mroz, 2005). 
Indonesia is subject to many of the same economic, social, and cultural forces 
driving the decline in fertility in the remainder of the developed world. 
Because of the dramatic decline in fertility rates in Indonesia, there has been 
substantial work done by demographers and economists to determine the root 
causes. Several social and economic trends have emerged as a result of the fertility 
declines, and different researchers have found different causes over different time 
periods. Demographic studies, as opposed to economic studies, focus on behavioral 
mechanisms through which couples limit fertility and are less concerned with 
measuring the effects of factors that motivate reductions in fertility(Gertler and 
Molyneaux, 1994).  
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Many governments have established explicit policies designed to reduce 
population growth. These include aggressive family planning programs as well as 
improving women’s general education and economic opportunities. The Indonesian 
government embarked on an aggressive campaign of health care reform in 1968, 
funded by revenues from oil exports as a good faith signal to the people from the 
newly elected president Suharto. In 1970, the BKKBN (National Family Planning 
Coordination Board) formed and was tasked with providing contraceptive education 
and supplies throughout the country, with the most targeted placement in areas of 
the highest fertility. BKKBN activities focused most intensively in Java and Bali from 
1970 to 1974.  
BKKBN is responsible for coordinating government funding to local level 
distribution channels through local governments, health care clinics, and volunteers. 
After making contraception available, they promote two child families by informing 
women on the importance of education, postponing marriage and using 
contraceptives. By 1980, BKKBN activities spread to all areas of the Indonesian 
archipelago. 
Because of this intentional program placement, program inputs are correlated 
with unobserved tendencies towards higher fertility, and are therefore endogenous 
to the fertility decision. Empirical work not accounting for this potential endogeneity 
suffer from biased estimates on the effects of inputs on contraception and fertility 
(Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons, 1993) (Gertler and Molyneaux, 1994) (Angeles, 
Guilkey, and Mroz, 2005).   
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Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1993) use a fixed effects model to control the 
endogeneity of family planning programs and education program placement. They 
examine the determinants of school attendance, fertility, and child mortality. In an 
uncontrolled model, family planning programs significantly increase fertility. 
However, when using the fixed effects model, the sign on the coefficient takes the 
expected negative value. They find the presence of middle and high schools exerts 
no influence on fertility when using the fixed effects model. The most significant 
finding is the enormous negative impact a mother’s education has on fertility.  
Gertler and Molyneaux (1994) examined fertility declines from 1982 to 1987, 
where over this short time span, average fertility in Indonesia declined by almost an 
entire child per woman. Fertility reductions have been associated with general 
economic development, but Gertler and Molyneaux go one step further to show the 
most consistently observed fertility reducing factors are: 1) those which increase the 
cost of children by increasing the value of a woman’s time by creating opportunities 
for education, thus improving female wages and increasing the attractiveness of 
participating in the labor force, and 2) reducing the costs of contraception price and 
the accessibility of contraception by decreasing the travel time necessary to obtain it. 
After controlling for program endogeneity, Gertler and Molyneaux’s major conclusion 
is program effects on fertility are not significant even though simple methods not 
controlling for endogeneity indicate a significant negative impact on fertility for health 
centers. 
Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz (2005) recently presented results comparing the 
estimated impacts of education on fertility from a simple model assuming the 
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exogeneity of education to the results from an unobserved factor model allowing for 
the endogeneity of schooling. Their empirical results provide key evidence showing 
the importance of female education as a means of reducing fertility would be 
overstated for Indonesia if one uses a naive empirical model which does not control 
for endogeneity due to the self-selection of a woman’s educational status. Further, 
through simulation studies they find family planning programs had a much larger 
effect on reducing fertility than the improved school quality when controlling for the 
endogeneity of schooling and spousal selection. 
The INPRES (Presidential Instruction) program, implemented between 1973 
and 1978, was a combination of specific purpose and block grants used for 
construction of and improvements in education and health care facilities, 
reforestation, and other projects to benefit the Indonesian people. A major result was 
the construction of 61,000 primary schools, equaling 2 schools per 1000 children 
aged 5 to 14. Moreover, primary school enrollment rates increased by between .12 
and .19 years per child, thus completed education levels rose.  
Duflo (2001) examines the effect of Indonesia’s INPRES program on 
educational attainment. (Overall macroeconomic effects of increased human capital 
were not examined, but would be expected to increase overall productivity and GDP 
per capita.)  This research is relevant because the INPRES directly impacted the 
women in this study cohort. The younger the woman, the higher the magnitude of 
influence the INPRES program had on her educational attainment. Woman aged 5 in 
1973 would reach 25 in 1993, the first year of the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS), and were around 30 at the height of the financial crisis, conceivably still in 
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their prime reproductive years. Thus, women giving the most recent and thorough 
retrospective fertility histories are the same as those most impacted by both the 
BKKBN and the INPRES programs. 
Krishnamurty (2000) examines patterns of fertility and consumption in 
Indonesia using data from the 1990 census. She designs an economic model where 
utility is a function of both consumption and number of children and obtains a 
relationship under a spatial risk-sharing model. She finds income does not affect the 
number of births per woman at risk of pregnancy at the Kabupaten level, suggesting 
evidence of fertility smoothing. This could mean births respond only to drastic 
changes in income such as floods or famines and not to small fluctuations in income. 
Second, income fluctuations could affect parent’s investments in the quality of 
children rather than change the quantity. Third, it could mean the number of births is 
smoothed, either spatially by risk sharing or inter-temporally. Fourth, it is possible 
income is mis-measured and there is downward attenuation bias on income 
coefficients. 
Becker (1960) theorizes the purchase of children is less likely to be 
postponed than the purchase of other durables during economic uncertainty or 
depression. The initial cost of children is a small fraction of total cost, as costs are 
naturally spread out over long periods, requiring less borrowing to enter into the 
purchase. The  period required to construct a pregnancy added to the 9 month 
gestation period is sufficiently long to reduce the impact of temporary movements in 
income. If agents are truly forward looking they should ignore temporary shocks. 
Becker does put forth a counter argument as to why children may be postponed 
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during times of uncertainty. Children are not liquid assets. They represent a lifetime 
of expenditure, and times of economic uncertainty increase the desire to hold more 
liquid assets. 
 
3.4 Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis began in Thailand in July 1997, and quickly spread 
to currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices of several Asian countries. 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were most affected by the crisis, while Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were moderately affected. The key 
domestic factors leading to the crisis were: 1) the failure to dampen overheating 
pressures manifested in large external deficits, property, and stock market bubbles, 
2) the maintenance of pegged exchange rate regimes for too long, and 3) lax 
financial oversight leading to a decline in the quality of banks' loan portfolios. Until 
1996, Asia attracted almost half of total capital inflows to developing countries, 
totaling close to $100 billion per year. However, Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea had large private current account deficits due to the maintenance of pegged 
exchange rates. This encouraged external borrowing and led to excessive exposure 
to foreign exchange risk in both the financial and corporate sectors. 
In June 1997, Indonesia had low inflation, a trade surplus of more than 900 
million dollars, foreign exchange reserves in excess of 20 billion dollars, and a solid 
banking sector. However, a large number of Indonesian corporations borrowed in 
U.S. dollars. In July of 1997, Thailand changed currency policies and floated the 
baht. In response, Indonesia's monetary authorities widened the rupiah trading band 
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from 8 percent to 12 percent. The rupiah came under severe attack in August 1997 
when the managed floating exchange regime was replaced by a free-floating 
exchange rate, and the rupiah dropped further. The IMF came forward with a rescue 
package of 23 billion dollars, but the selloff of rupiah continued amid fears over 
corporate debts and strong demand for dollars. The rupiah and Jakarta Stock 
Exchange fell to a historic low in September 1997. The crisis intensified in November 
when markets realized many corporations who borrowed dollars were facing higher 
repayment costs due to the rupiah's decline.  
The rupiah’s inflation and the resulting steep hikes in the prices of food 
staples led to riots throughout the country. In February 1998, president Suharto 
relieved the governor of Bank Indonesia. This gesture and the IMF’s loan package 
proved insufficient to quell the crisis and the political fallout. Suharto was forced to 
resign in May of 1998 after 31 years as Indonesia’s president. 
Before the crisis, the exchange rate between the rupiah and the dollar was 
roughly 2000 rupiah to 1 U.S. Dollar (USD). The rate plunged to over 10000 rupiah 
to 1 USD during the crisis. Indonesia’s GDP declined 13.5% in 1998, and real gross 
domestic fixed investment declined 35.5%.  
At the individual level, households felt rapid and large swings in prices, 
resulting from exchange rate volatility. Most imported goods experienced sharp 
relative price increases. From January 1998 through March 1999, nominal food 
prices increased three-fold. Nonfood prices also increased, but relatively less. Since 
the typical Indonesian’s budget allocates 50% of resources to food (Strauss et al., 
2004), this increase was substantial with magnified effects on the poor. This price 
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increase caused a decrease in real incomes for net food consumers. Rice 
consumption fell from 14% of budget expenditure in 1997 (20% for the poor) to 
11.6% in 2000, due mostly to the relative price increase in rice as opposed to other 
goods (Strauss et al., 2004). Poverty increased sharply from late 1997 through 
March of 1999, and was correlated strongly with the food price index, indicating the 
importance of food expenditures to a household’s budget constraint (Strauss et al., 
2004). Nominal wages increased, but real wages decreased: data from the IFLS 
sample indicate real wages declined 22% from 1997 to 1998, and a further 1% by 
1999 before increasing again in 2000.  
 
3.5 Crisis Effects on Fertility 
Frankenberg (2003) finds no difference in contraceptive prevalence or 
method choice before, during, or after the financial crisis. This indicates there were 
neither shortages of supplies nor changes in demand for contraceptives. From this 
data, Frankenberg concludes couple’s fertility plans were well established and did 
not change significantly during the economic crisis. BKKBN was mostly successful in 
maintaining a continuous supply of condoms and pills in the marketplace throughout 
the crisis. There was, however, a shift in the choice of supplier, indicating health 
centers were impacted differently by the crisis (Lance and Farkouh, data on file). 
With the onset of the crisis, the price of contraceptives rose because contraceptives 
are typically imported or produced domestically with imported inputs. Contraceptive 
demand may not be highly sensitive to changes in price, since contraceptives are 
typically quite inexpensive, amounting to about 1% of monthly per capita household 
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expenditure for a typical Indonesian. As part of a more general social safety net 
program, poor households were issued cards providing access to free health and 
family planning services. These social safety net measures were funded by loans 
put in place during the 1998/99 fiscal year but were slow to get off the ground 
(Sumarto et al., 2001). 
 The Frankenberg study shows contraceptive supplies were little impacted by 
the financial crisis, but behaviors did change as some couples found it necessary to 
travel to different health care providers to obtain their chosen method of birth control, 
or even to change method if supply was unattainable. The Frankenberg study does 
not imply fertility is unaffected by the financial crisis.   
As discussed above, studies show changes in income affect fertility in other 
settings. The remaining empirical question is how this particular financial crisis 
impacted couples’ fertility decisions. The first mechanism is one where women 
observed unfavorable economic conditions as the crisis began, took the opportunity 
to exit the workforce to have a child, resulting in an increase in fertility. An alternate 
mechanism hypothesizes that couples choose to cancel or delay intended births 
during times of economic uncertainty. Since the financial crisis was largely 
unforeseen, there was no expectation of wage decreases leading up to the crisis. 
However, during the crisis couples may have decided to avoid the immediate and 
long term expenses associated with an additional child. Further, the financial crisis 
may change expectations of future economic shocks and wage increases, also 
having the effect of reducing fertility, assuming that children in Indonesia are normal 
goods, as found by Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz (2005). 
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 Ruhm (2005) presents a survey of how macroeconomic conditions effect 
other microeconomic decisions and outcomes, such as mortality, morbidity, and 
health care utilization. He finds, as others did before him, inconclusive results as to 
how outcomes change in the face of adverse economic conditions both in developed 
and developing countries. Brenner (1979) argues sources of economic instability 
increase overall mortality, infant deaths, and fatalities from cardiovascular disease, 
cirrhosis, suicide, and homicide, as well as morbidity, alcoholism, and admission to 
mental hospitals. Others (Gravelle, 1981; Stern, 1983; Wagstaff, 1985; Cook and 
Zarkin, 1986) disagree with Brenner’s analysis and offer evidence disputing his 
findings. They claim economic downturns improve health and reduce mortality.  
 Regardless of past studies, the financial crisis is a unique event which 
informs us of how Indonesians react to sudden financial changes at the household, 
community, and national level. The remainder of this paper is devoted to generating 
and executing an empirical analysis to determine how Indonesians reacted to the 
Asian Financial crisis with regards to their fertility. 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 This chapter presents a theoretical model motivating the empirical model in 
Chapter 5 and the empirical analysis in Chapter 7. Here I propose a model 
incorporating critical aspects of the fertility decision process, including the mother’s 
education, timing of marriage, labor force participation, the quantity and quality of 
children, and time and budget allocations. The model follows women from the time 
women enter school, typically age seven, until the loss of fecundity through 
sterilization or menopause, thus capturing an entire fertility history. 
 Some critical assumptions of the model are: 
• All pregnancies are planned, successfully gestate, and result in live births 
• Women are the primary and only caregivers to their children  
• No social safety nets or methods of savings between periods exist 
• Unlimited demand in the labor market implies workers may enter and exit 
the labor force at will 
• Women know their fecundity with perfect foresight   
• All consumption is evenly distributed across all household members. 
30 
 A time period is one year, enough time to conceive and birth a child. The 
timing of the decision process is as follows: 
 First, a woman who is in school at age seven decides whether or not to 
remain in school for an additional year. When in school, a woman is constrained to 
be unmarried and unemployed, and receives a transfer CG from an exogenous 
outside source. The second decision a woman makes is when to marry, which 
occurs after the woman exits school. Leaving school and getting married are 
absorbing states: This model makes no attempt to model school re-enrollment, 
divorce, separation, or death of a spouse. The benefit of the marriage union is the 
additional income from the husband and the opportunity to bear children, at the cost 
of the husband’s consumption.  
Once married, the available supply of births is 1+−= MB ATS , where AM is 
the age of marriage and T is the age of the woman in her final fertile period. The 
demand for children is given by a couple’s target family size, denoted NT. The target 
is a choice variable in the model, revisable each period in either direction, but 
obviously constrained in the downward direction to be greater than or equal to the 
current number of children, denoted Nt. From this point, the woman can begin to 
choose whether or not to conceive, indicated by the decision to have a child, 1=tn , 
in period t.  
The final decision a woman must make is how to allocate her time towards 
the labor market. More children in the household requires more resources, 
increasing the demand for income. However, the mother also devotes more time 
towards the children within the household, leaving less time available to devote to 
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the labor market. The child quality choice is endogenously determined by the 
mother’s allocation of time, which determines total household income and ultimately 
per-capita consumption. The husband’s labor force participation and wage are 
exogenously given. 
 Utility ( )mtU  is an increasing function of the number of children ( )tN , the 
quality of those children ( )ktQ , the consumption of the woman ( )mtC , and the leisure 
of the woman ( )LmtT .  
(4.1)  ( )Lmtmtkttmt TCQNUU ,,,=  









Ud . The utility framework 
considers only the utility of the altruistic mother, where children are valued through 
the quality argument. The woman’s husband’s utility is exogenous to this model, 
however, per-capita consumption will enter both the woman’s and husband’s utility 
simultaneously, causing a positive relationship between the two functions. 
A child’s quality is a function of the education and the health of the child.  
(4.2)  ( )( )ttktttkt NICEaQQ ,,,=   
In the empirical model, data restrictions limit the modeling of specific child outcomes 
such as education, health, or consumption. Quality of children is instead represented 
as a function of the mother’s per-child time commitment (at), the mother’s education, 
(Et), and per-capita consumption ( )ktC . Per-capita consumption is a function of 
household income (It), and the household size (Nt + 2). Per-capita consumption 
correlates negatively with education through direct costs of schooling, such as 
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tuition, supplies, and transportation, and positively correlates with child health 
through nutrition, quality of clothing, and quality of residence. I restrict all children 
within a single household to be homogenous in everything except age.  
 The woman allocates time to the following three tasks: Leisure, labor force 





mtmt TTTT ++=   
where mtT  is the total time available to the mother in each period, 
L
mtT  is the time 
devoted to leisure, WmtT  is the time devoted to the labor market, and 
H
mtT  is the time 
devoted to child rearing. 
 If there are no children in the household, then no time is required of the 
woman for child care. Once a child is born to a couple, the woman is required to 
devote some time to child rearing, denoted 
(4.4)  tt
H
mt aNRT *+=   
where R  is the parameter defining a baseline amount of household work required in 
the children’s presence and ta  is a choice of how much time to devote per child. 
There is some minimum subsistence level of ta , denoted 
mina , required of the 
woman to keep her children alive. Women must choose minaat ≥ . 
 The household income equation is given by  
(4.5)  tftmt
W
mtt IWTI ν++= *  
where tν  represents a shock to household income in period t with mean tν  and 
variance vσ . The wage of the woman is defined by  
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(4.6)  ( )tmttmt XEWW ν,,=   
The woman’s wage is a function of her education and other individual characteristics 
such as age, health, and experience in the labor force, all contained in the vector of 
individual characteristics, mtX . Education and age are positively correlated with 
wages. This model naturally biases the father towards the labor market since the 
burden of childcare falls on the mother. However, the mother has the option to work 
as well, indicated by 0>WmtT . 
 Income from equation 4.5 is divided evenly across all household members 
and denoted PCtC . That is 
(4.7)  ( ) ( )( ) ( )2,*2 +++=+= ttftmttWmtttPCt NIXEWTNIC ν  
The woman makes her fertility and labor market decisions after the realization of tν . 
The budget constraint of a student, unmarried, and married woman respectively are: 
(4.8)  Gmt CC =  if te  = 1 and tM  = 0. 
(4.9)  ( )( )tmttWmtmt XEWTC ν+= ,*  if te  = 0 and tM  = 0  
(4.10)  ( )( ) ( )2,* +++= ttftmttWmtmt NIXEWTC ν  if tM  = 1 and 
   ktftmt CCC == , ∀  tNk ,...,1=  
 The evolution of the education state variable for the woman is defined by 
(4.11)  ttt eEE += −1   
where te  is 0 if the woman is not in school in period t, or 1 if she is. Exiting school is 
an absorbing state, thus the decision to exit school effects the wage profile and 
quality of her children for all future periods.  
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 Marriage ( )tM  , takes on values of 0 if unmarried and 1 if married. If tM   = 0, 
then ftI = 0, and ftC  = 0. Once the woman exits school, she must begin working in 
the absence of a husband to provide income for her own consumption. In this state 
where tM  = 0 and et = 0 her only decisions each period are mt and 
W
mtT  and her 
consumption is given by equation 4.9.  
 The woman seeks out a husband to provide income to the household and to 
father her children. Upon entering the married state, the couple has the option to add 
one child to the household per period. The number of children in the household is 
represented by  
(4.12)  ttt nNN += −1  where tn  = {1 if birth at t, 0 if no birth}  
tn  must equal zero if the woman is unmarried ( tM   = 0 and mt  = 0), however, the 
woman may have a child in the first period she is married. 
 At the beginning of each period, a woman realizes the economic environment 
by observing tν . The mean of tν  is negative during the crisis years. She then 
chooses whether or not to leave school conditional on being in school last period, 
when to get married conditional on not being married last period, and if she is 
married she will choose whether or not to conceive a child. Once these decisions are 
made, the woman must decide how to allocate her time across leisure, labor, and 
child care. Finally, the couple has the opportunity to reevaluate their target fertility.  
 The state at time t is represented by the vector St:   
(4.13)  { }mttTtttttt XNNmMeES ,,,,,,, 111 −−−= ν  
where mtX  also contains a complete history of all past employment decisions. 
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Evaluation of the optimization problem requires a terminal utility function to 
close the system at the end of the couple’s fecundity. I define this terminal utility to 
reflect a one-time modification to the total lifetime utility based on achieving, 
underachieving, or exceeding a couple’s target fertility. This value is normalized to 
zero if the couple hits it’s target, and is negative if the couple misses the target. If the 
couple does not behave according to the target fertility hypothesis, this component is 
zero. The disutility is represented by:  
(4.14)   ( )TT NND −  where ( ) 00 =D  and ( ) 00 <≠D . 
The discounted present value of lifetime utility conditional on all past decisions in 
period t where 7 ≤ t ≤ T is given by:  









where tE  is the expectation of future wage disturbances ( )sν , for s > t, and * 
represents all previously stated arguments in the utility function. The present value 
of lifetime utility in the final fertile period T is given as  









 Notice the number of children enters the utility function in several different 
places. While additional children provide positive utility to their mother through the 
normal biological family concept of caring and nurturing, they negatively impact the 
mother’s leisure time, the mother’s ability to work (negatively impacting the mother’s 
future wage potential by decreasing her current workforce experience), household 
income, per-capita consumption, and sibling quality.  
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The model contains many defining factors responsible for driving down fertility 
in much of the developed world. Higher educated women may have higher marginal 
production in the labor force than in household tasks including child rearing. 
Households where the woman participates in the labor force have fewer children and 
more resources as a result of these efforts. The second income from the laboring 
woman has increased household resources resulting in increased per-capita 
consumption, both through declining household size and higher household income. 
The impact of the financial crisis may exhibit two conflicting effects. First, a 
reduction in household income may cause a reduction in fertility during the crisis by 
decreasing household resources. This mechanism is a standard income effect, 
assuming children are normal goods. This reduction in fertility may be a short term 
reduction, resulting in latent demand for children, which may either (1) be postponed 
until a later period when economic conditions improve, or (2) cause a structural 
decrease in desired future fertility by changing expectations concerning the future 
wages draws or offsetting the previously planned timing of children.  
The second effect exhibits an increase in fertility when real wages diminish as 
a result of the crisis. Fertility may increase if women choose to exit the labor force 
when the opportunity cost of doing so is low relative to periods of better economic 
conditions. The opportunity cost of lost wages is one critical factor in the fertility 
decision, and the marginal product of raising children may be greater than the 
marginal product of labor when real wages are temporarily depressed. Since women 
are forward looking, they should anticipate the financial shock to be temporary. 
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I leave the question to be answered empirically. The next chapter develops 
the empirical model, motivated by this theoretical discussion, and uses it to test 
which responses are observed in Indonesian women during the financial crisis. 
 




 In this chapter, I derive an empirical model to be combined with Indonesian 
Family Life Survey (IFLS) data to determine the impact of economic shocks on 
fertility. Specifically I examine how changes in consumption impact the probability of 
conceiving a child from 1996 through 1999, the time period immediately surrounding 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Other studies (Strauss, 2002, Frankenberg, Thomas, and 
Beegle, 1999) have shown most households within Indonesia experienced massive 
inflation, and those in urban centers felt a greater impact than those in rural areas. 
The financial crisis left some households worse off, some better off, and others were 
not impacted. I exploit this variance in the crisis effects to determine impacts on the 
demand for children during times of economic hardship. 
The IFLS only contains longitudinal economic data in the years immediately 
surrounding the financial crisis, therefore, instead of a single hazard model 
predicting the probability of conception throughout a woman’s entire fecundity, I 
divide her reproductive years into two distinct periods, encapsulated in two separate 
equations. The first equation captures all live births from 1995 retrospective to age 
seven with no economic variables included. The second equation, the equation of
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interest, captures all conceptions between 1996 through 1999 while including the full 
set of economic variables. The IFLS includes data for the year 2000, but it must be 
omitted from the analysis since births and pregnancies reported in 2000 most likely 
resulted from conceptions in 1999. This results in an extremely low count of such 
events occurring in 2000 (current early pregnancies only) relative to the other years 
in the analysis. 
In addition to the conception and birth equations, 5 additional equations are 
simultaneously estimated to control for endogeneity, sample selection, and initial 
conditions. These are discussed in detail below. The remainder of this chapter 
discusses the empirical model, with emphasis placed on the specification of each 
equation motivated by the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter.  I 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of the discrete factor method and estimation 
procedure. 
 
5.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity, Endogeneity, Sample Selection, and Initial 
Conditions 
 Individual data observations possess time invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
at the individual and community level which impacts one or more of the seven 
equations in the model. Individual heterogeneity comes from such sources as 
individual fecundity, family history, preferences for family oriented tasks versus labor 
market oriented tasks, preferences towards the timing and spacing of births, and any 
other unobserved characteristics effecting when and how many children a women 
will conceive. Community level time invariant influences come from sources such as 
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an influential religious leader, peer effects and group preferences for family size, 
societal norms concerning child quality, and expectations for schooling and career 
choice. 
 This community and individual level unobserved heterogeneity could cause 
biased coefficient estimates in a maximum likelihood estimation of the conception 
equation. Theoretically and probabilistically, the same unobserved factors which 
affect a woman’s choices regarding fertility in the time period from 1996 to 1999 
affect her decisions regarding education, marriage, and labor force participation 
throughout her entire life. The inclusion of the six additional equations controls for 
the potential bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection, and 
measurement error. Table 5.1 displays all seven equations contained within the 
empirical model. The specification of each equation is discussed in detail in section 
5.3 and the purpose of each equation’s inclusion in the model is presented here. 
Table 5.1: List of Equations 
# Abbreviation Name of Equation Purpose 
1 F Conception Predict the probability of conception 
2 E Women’s Education Control for Endogeneity 
3 M Age of First Marriage Control for Sample Selection 
4 B Previous Births Control for Initial Condition 
5 W Woman’s Labor Force Participation Control for Endogeneity 
6 I Household Income Control for Endogeneity 
7 C Household Consumption Control for Endogeneity 
 
 The conception equation, also referred to as the “Main Equation”, contains 
those economic variables which identify the effect the financial crisis had on 
women’s fertility. The remaining six equations reflect other choices the woman 
makes before or during her fertile years which relate to the fertility decision. These 
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choices are endogenous within the model for many reasons, discussed in the 
following sections. Each equation other than the main equation contains a vector JitZ  
of exogenous, time varying exclusion restrictions. These are supportive in obtaining 
additional identification of the complete model (Bhargava, 1991), even though the 
non-linear model is in itself identified without exclusion restrictions (Mroz, 1999). 
 Women’s education is endogenous because fertility intentions affect the 
demand for education. A woman who desires a large family most likely avoids the 
opportunity costs of additional education (time and resources) knowing her time will 
be better utilized within the household to raise the children instead of capitalizing on 
her education in the workplace.  
 The marriage equation controls for the sample selection of the IFLS survey. 
Only women whom have ever been married at some point in their lives are 
presented with the conception, marital, and breastfeeding related questions 
contained within “Book 4”1. The dependent conception and birth variables are 
derived from this survey module. 
 It is necessary to model the number of live children a woman has prior to 
1996 since the theoretical model predicts the decision to have a child depends on 
the number of pre-existing children. The previous births equation corrects for 
selectivity into the period of interest (covered by the main equation). Approximately 
half of the women in the sample report a specific target fertility level, implying some 
ideal number of children in the household, thus existing children impact the 
probability of additional births. By modeling all births in a woman’s life, the initial 
                                                 
1 The IFLS and Book 4 are discussed in detail in chapter six 
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condition of the number of children present in the household is accounted for in the 
main equation.  
 A women’s participation in the labor force increases her financial 
independence and delays the age of first marriage, thus the woman’s decision to 
work must be modeled endogenously. The woman’s participation in the labor force 
impacts her decisions to marry and have children, the amount of income she brings 
in to the household, and the time she is able to devote to child care and household 
tasks.  
 Income is endogenous because household income is impacted by the 
woman’s decision to work, which is determined by the number of children at home, if 
she is planning to have any additional children, and her husband’s income. Per-
capita consumption is endogenous in this model because it is a function of the 
income brought in by both the husband and the wife and the number of children in 
the household, implying the decision for the wife to pursue education and work are 
all impacted by the same unobserved heterogeneity which impact the amount and 
timing of children.  
 
5.3 Empirical Equation Details 
In this section, I discuss the categories of regressors in each equation. A 
complete list of variables in each equation may be ascertained from the complete 
results table available in Appendix A. Let X represent a vector of exogenous 
characteristics for the woman and her husband including age of the woman, age of 
her husband, religion of the woman and husband, literacy of the woman and 
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husband, the education of the husband, an urban indicator, province indicators, and 
urban-province interactions. Religions included in the analysis are: Islam, Protestant, 
Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhist. Islam is the omitted category, as Indonesia is 
predominantly Muslim (90%). Religion indicator variables are included to control for 
any religiously motivated preferences for family size and family planning 
methodology, and any other unobserved preferences consistent within a religious 
group.  
Previous studies by Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz (2005) found within a very 
similar sample (IFLS1), controlling for the endogeneity of the husband’s education 
had very little impact on coefficient estimates, thus the husband’s education is 
treated as exogenous. An individual enters school at the age indicated or at age 
seven if not indicated. Schooling is assumed to be continuous and exiting school is 
an absorbing state. No attempt to model repeated grades is made. The set of 
education variables contains whether the individual is currently attending school, 
attended school last year, and indicator variables for specific attainment levels:  
Attended primary school but did not graduate, graduated from primary school, 
graduated from junior high school, graduated from senior high school, and 
graduated from university. The omitted category contains those who never attended 
school. 
Each IFLS household is located in one of thirteen provinces in either an urban 
or rural setting. These location factors are controlled by a complete set of province 
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dummies interacted with an urban and rural indicator.2   These community specific 
characteristics are intended to control for region specific effects such as: Underlying 
structural beliefs about family size and family dynamics, socially accepted roles of 
women, the available employment opportunities within different provinces, and most 
importantly, the effects of government placement of education and family planning 
programs. 
 
5.3.1  Main Equation: Conception 
  The probability of woman i conceiving a child in year t for t = 1996 through 
1999 is modeled as a multiple spell hazard model: 




















+==== 1|1Pr,,,|1Pr ε  
The dependent variable, Fitn , equals one if woman i conceived a child in year 
t. Planned pregnancies were decided a minimum of nine months prior to the birth of 
the child. If the month and year of the birth is known, nine months were subtracted 
and the year of conception is known. If the month of birth was not reported, then the 
month of birth is drawn from a uniform distribution and the year of conception is 
interpolated. Due to the short duration of the time period encompassed by this 
equation, the decision to have a child is the critical decision in the model, therefore 
the outcome of the pregnancy is not relevant. 
                                                 
2 All interviews conducted in the Jakarta Province took place in an urban setting, therefore no rural 
counterpart for that term exists. 
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The vector FitE  contains endogenous and exogenous household and 
community level economic variables. This includes community level subjective 
wellbeing, household expectations, community level income changes from the 
financial crisis, the husband’s employment status, household income, log per-capita 
consumption, and the incidence of any hardships such as death, job loss, or 
sickness. The endogenous economic variables are controlled by the income, 
consumption, and labor force participation equations. 
Expected subjective wellbeing is included to indicate the overall economic 
morale of a household. Individuals are asked whether or not they expect themselves 
to be better off, worse off, or the same a year from the time of their interview. 
Community subjective wellbeing obtained from community leaders through 
interviews concerning the effects of the financial crisis on their village’s inhabitants 
gives an exogenous perspective of the financial crisis effects at the local level. 
The set of employment status variables for the husband includes indicator 
variables for whether the husband is an unemployed family worker, self employed, 
government employee, or working for a corporation. The omitted category is 
unemployment. This data is only available in the same periods as the income data, 
thus is restricted to appear only in the main, income, consumption, and woman’s 
employment equations. 
The vector FitQ  contains endogenous sets of variables: Education attainment 
(whether or not the woman is currently attending school, if the woman attended 
school in the previous period, indicators for her educational attainment), marital 
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status (whether or not the woman is currently married, if the woman has ever been 
married), previous births (a set of dummy variables indicating discrete numbers of 
children present in her household), labor force participation (whether or not a woman 
works for a wage, or is an unpaid family worker), total household income, and per-
capita consumption. In addition, this vector contains variables indicating the 
presence of family planning facilities when the woman was age seven and the 
presence of family planning facilities at the year of the observation. 
Each of these endogenous variables contained in FitQ  has a separate 
equation to control for the bias the endogeneity causes in the coefficient estimates. 
The construction of each endogenous variable is discussed in the context of the 
relevant equation below. 
 
5.3.2 Woman’s Education 
 According to the theoretical model the first choice a woman makes is the 
amount of schooling to obtain, represented here by the decision to exit school. The 
probability a woman exits school in year t is given by the following logistic 
regression: 
















− +===== 1|0Pr,,,1|0Pr 1 ε  
where ite = 0 if the woman remains in school, and ite = 1 in the period during which 
she terminates her education attainment. The probability of remaining in school is 
then ( )itit Ee |0Pr1 =− . The duration of schooling defines the total level of attainment. 
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Some women never enter school, denoted by the decision to exit school in the first 
period.  
 Let WitX  represent the characteristics of the woman in the absence of her 
husband and EitZ  represent a vector of identifying instrumental variables. The 
equation includes woman year observations from the year a woman enters school 
(or the year she is age seven if no response was provided) until she exits school. In 
1999  some younger women still remain in the school. No endogenous variables 
appear in this equation because the reduced form specification of the theoretical 
model states no previous choices affect the decision to exit school. 
 This equation requires an instrumental variable which is correlated with being 
in school, but is uncorrelated with the decision to conceive a child. EitZ contains the 
four average student-teacher and student-school ratios in the primary and secondary 
schools in the woman’s community. These values are collected during survey years, 
and linearly trended during off-survey years. EitZ  also contains an indicator for the 
availability of a school in the woman’s community, indicated if a woman had an 
appropriate school type open and available to her in the appropriate year. 
 
5.3.3 Age of First Marriage 
The woman also decides when to marry. This equation controls for the “ever 
married” and “currently married” variables. The probability of getting married for the 
first time is given by 
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where itm  = 0 if never married, and itm  = 1 if ever married. Though some women will 
marry before finishing school, on average, there is a three year lag between finishing 
school and getting married. Theory predicts the woman’s education level has an 
effect on timing the decision to get married for the first time, and so the endogenous 
variables contained in MitQ  include the complete set of education variables for the 
woman. Women enter this sample at age seven, making the assumption that the 
probability of marriage younger than age seven is zero. The sample for this equation 
includes an additional sample of never-married women in the IFLS between the 
ages of 14 and 38 in 1999 to more accurately predict the transition into the married 
state. 
 MitZ  is a vector of time varying, exogenous education and health care facility 
instrumental variables. Within MitZ  is the same “Availability of schools” variable from 
the schooling equation, the presence of family planning facilities when the woman 
was age seven, and the presence of family planning facilities in the year of the 
observation. Other exclusion restrictions included in this equation are the fertility of 
the mother, indicated between the timing of menarche and menopause, and an 
indicator for if the married couple moved outside the community, a proxy for whether 
or not they live near parents implying access to childcare. 
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5.3.4 Previous Births 
To account for the existing children in the household at the beginning of each 
period, I model all previous births using a multiple spell hazard model where the 
dependent variable ( Bitn  = 1) indicates a live birth. The specification of the equation is 
almost identical to the main equation, with the exclusion of the vector of economic 
variables, and the inclusion of time varying exogenous instrumental variables 
contained in BitZ : 




















+==== 1|1Pr,,,|1Pr ε  
where t ranges from 1968 to 1995. Miscarriages and stillbirths must not be counted 
as births contributing to family size. Most of these adverse events have occurred far 
enough in the past that any residual emotional or physical effects have diminished to 
negligible amounts by 1996. 
Exogenous time varying instrumental variables further identify this equation. 
From the work of Jeff Rous (2001), two instruments for this initial condition are 
contained in the vector BitZ . They are fertility of the mother, indicated between the 
timing of menarche and menopause, and whether or not the married couple moved 
outside the community, indicating whether or not they live near parents and have 
access to childcare.  
The vector BitQ  contains the endogenous variables for the woman’s education, 
if she is currently married, the duration of the current marriage, and the set of 
dummy variables indicating discrete amounts of children present in the household. 
50 
These indicators for children present give probabilities of having additional children 
given how many children are already present. In addition, this vector contains 
variables indicating the presence of family planning facilities when the woman was 
age seven and the presence of family planning facilities at the year of the 
observation. Whether the woman is ever married is omitted from this analysis as it is 
collinear with currently married over the earlier time periods. 
 
5.3.5 Female Labor Force Participation 
The probability a woman works for a wage in period t is given by 
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where 1=itw  if 0fwitT  and 0=itw  if 0=witT  for t = 1996 through 1999. Women who 
report they are working in any environment where they earn a wage are considered 
to be working for a wage, even if that wage is negative, as is the case for some self 
employed workers. WitQ is the vector of endogenous variables in the work equation, 
including household income, her full set of education indicators, if she has ever been 
married, if she is currently married, and the set of variables indicating the number of 
children in her household. WitE  contains the labor force status of the husband, as this 
status could affect the woman’s probability of working. 
 Time varying, exogenous instruments contained in WitZ contain indicators for 
the presence of agricultural jobs in the community, the presence of industrial jobs in 
the community, the main sources of employment in the community including farming, 
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manufacturing, construction, tourism, social services, and other, if the community is 
considered to be underdeveloped, and the average community wages for women 
and men in both agricultural and industrial jobs if those job types are present. 
 
5.3.6 Household Income 
Household income is a proxy variable for the socioeconomic status of a 
household. Four observations per household are calculated as the sum of historical 
income data for the husband and wife in each year, divided by 10xE6, and adjusted 
to 1997 prices using published CPI deflators. Income is modeled as  
(5.6) ( )IitIIitIIitIIitIitIit EZQXi ε+Β+Β+Β+Β+Β= 43210   
where t = 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. Income from laboring children is ignored in 
this analysis. IitE  is the vector of employment indicators of the husband and 
I
itQ  
contains the endogenous variables: Whether or not the woman works for a wage, 
her full set of education indicators, if she has ever been married, if she is currently 
married, and the set of variables indicating the number of children she has 
previously birthed. 
Time varying, exogenous instruments contained in IitZ =
W
itZ  will act as 
exclusion restrictions to further identify the model. 
 
5.3.7 Per-Capita Consumption 
 Per-capita consumption is measured in 1997 and 2000, and the 2000 value is 
assigned to the year 1999. The consumption equation is 
52 






where the natural log of per-capita consumption is the dependent variable, t = 1997 
and 1999, and CitZ =
I
itZ . Producer prices are correlated directly with the final sale 
price of consumption goods, but are not be correlated with women’s fertility 
heterogeneity. In the main equation, I make the assumption that a change in 
permanent income occurred as a result of the financial crisis, and assign 
consumption values from 1997 to the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, and assign 2000 
consumption data to 1999. 
 
5.4 Summary of the Empirical Model 
 Figure 5.1 displays a timeline of decisions each women faces throughout her 
lifetime. I have represented three different women. If a box is indicated by “-“ there is 
no corresponding woman-year observation within the empirical model for the 
indicated equation. Notice the conception, birth, and work equations are multiple 
spell hazards, while the schooling and marriage equations represent decisions into 
absorbing states. The income and consumption equations contain continuous 
dependent variables, represented by a real number, “#”. Also indicated by the figure 
is the relationship between the birth and conception equation. The main differences 
between the two are the inclusion of economic variables in the latter, and the time 
periods each equation covers. 
 Woman A is representative of the average woman defined by the mean 
summary statistics presented in Chapter 6. This woman enters school at age seven, 
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exits school after junior high school at age 16, marries at 19, and has two {or  three] 
children. One-third of her cohort work, so I represented her not working until 1999, 
when her third child is 1 year old.3 
 Woman B is at the younger end of the age distribution within the sample. She 
chooses to complete senior high school, thus exiting school when she is 19. She is 
never married during the period over which I observe her, and only enters in the 
marriage hazard equation. 
 Woman C is representative of the older cohort of Indonesian women. She 
enters the school system at age seven, continues school until she decides to get 
married, indicated in Figure 5.1 by exiting school and getting married in the same 
year. She also clearly has a desire for a large family. By the time the crisis hit, she 
already had given birth to 5 children, and had completed her target fertility. 
                                                 
3 A conception in 1997 would most likely result in a birth in 1998, correspondingly a one year old child 
in 1999 
 54
Figure 5.1:  Representation of a Dynamic Choice Set for Three Indonesian Women 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N Y N N 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Has a Conception 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N Y - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Has a Birth  
N N Y N N Y N N N Y N N Y N N Y N N - - - - 
N N N N N N N N N N Y - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Exited school  
N Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
N N N N N N N N N N N N Y - - - - - - - - - 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Ever Married 
N Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N N N Y 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Working  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N N N N 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - # # # # 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Household 
Income 
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - # # # # 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - # # # # 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Per Capita Consumption 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - # # # # 
Age of Woman A 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
Age of Woman B         7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
















































































































Key:  N: Event has not yet occurred, Y: Event occurs in this period -: No woman-year observation for this combination 
 # : Income and Consumption are continuous dependent variables, represented by a real number 
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5.5 The Likelihood Function 
 The theoretical model implies couples make fertility decisions in response to 
current and previous decisions regarding schooling, marriage, consumption, income, 
labor force participation, and the presence of other children. Changes in the current 
or expected income stream, among many other external influences, may affect the 
demand for additional children. The woman’s desire to work is negatively affected by 
her household responsibilities, and positively impacted by the increased demand for 
household resources. Prior decisions regarding schooling will have an impact on all 
future decisions and future opportunities. Estimating fertility during the financial crisis 
without considering the endogeneity of these critical factors would result in biased 
estimates. For this reason, all seven equations are jointly estimated using full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation procedures.    
 The joint distribution of the non-linear heterogeneity is estimated using a 
semi-parametric discrete factor method (DFM) (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Mroz 
and Guilkey, 1995; Mroz, 1999). DFM allows for a flexible specification of the 
unobserved heterogeneity without imposing restrictions such as joint normality 
(Mroz, 1999). In this application of DFM, I allow for time invariant non-linear 
unobserved heterogeneity at the individual and community level. Parameters for 
each equation are identified through the inherent non-linearity of the model (Mroz, 
1999), and further identification is achieved through the exclusion restrictions 
contained in the vectors JitZ for J = {E,M,B,W,I,C}. The error structure for the seven 



























































it νµρµρε ++=  where kcCkcCj µρµ =  and kiCkiCi µρω =  
 
The Jhρ , where { }kckih ,=  for individual or community and J refers to the equation, 
are parameters to be estimated which explain the level of correlation between the 
outcome of each equation and the distribution of community, kcµ , and individual, kiµ , 
level unobservable factors. Both Jkiω  and Jkcµ  are assumed to be time invariant for 
this analysis J∀ , although this assumption may not be true. In addition, there is a 
time variant disturbance added to each equation represented by jitν . I assume the jitν  
are distributed logistically for j = {F,E,M,B,W}, and Jitν  are distributed normally for J 
={ I,C}. All Jitν  are independent. 
 The distribution of the individual random effects with KI points of support is 
specified as: 
(5.8) ( ) ( )qIqCiqIiqWiqBiqMiqEiqFi πωωωωωωωωωωωωωω ======== 7654321 ,,,,,,Pr
 for q = 1…KI.  
 The distribution of the community random effects with KC points of support is 
specified as: 
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(5.9) ( ) ( )rCrCjrIjrWjrBjrMjrEjrFj πµµµµµµµµµµµµµµ ======== 7654321 ,,,,,,Pr
for r = 1…KC. 
 To obtain unbiased parameter estimates using FIML, I maximize the following 
unconditional likelihood function (A complete specification of the likelihood function 
is presented in Appendix B): 










































where ( ) iteEjEiEitWitititit ZXeeS µω ,,,,1|0Pr 1 === −  
 ( )( ) iteEjEiEitWititit ZXee −− ==−∗ 11 ,,,,1|0Pr1 µω  
( ) itmMjMiMitMitWitititit ZQXmmM µω ,,,,,0|1Pr 1 === −
 ( )( ) itmMjMiMitMitWititit ZQXmm −− ==−∗ 11 ,,,,,0|1Pr1 µω  
 
( ) BitnBjBiBitBititBitit ZQXnB µω ,,,,|1Pr ==  
( )( ) BitnBjBiBitBititBit ZQXn −=−∗ 1,,,,|1Pr1 µω  
( ) FitnFjFiFitFititFitit ZQXnF µω ,,,,|1Pr ==  
 ( )( ) FitnFjFiFitFititFit ZQXn −=−∗ 1,,,,|1Pr1 µω  
( ) itwWjWiWitWitWitititit EZQXwW µω ,,,,,|1Pr ==  
 ( )( ) itwWjWiWitWitWititit EZQXw −=−∗ 1,,,,,|1Pr1 µω   
 where 1=itw if 0fwitT and 0=itw if 0=witT  
( )CitCjCiCCitCCitCCitCitCit
C








KC Number of Community level mass points (7) 
PWkc Probability weight of mass point kc  
KI Number of Individual level mass points (16) 
PWki Probability weight of mass point ki  
C Number of communities (312) 
I Number of individuals (6821) 
T Number of time periods (32) 
Φ Standard normal probability density function  
Jσ
1  Standard deviation of equation J,     where J = {C,I} 
 
 
 Results from this estimation are presented in Chapter 7.  
 The identification of the parameters from the discrete factor method, which 
include probability weights (PWk for { }kckik ,= ), and factor loads ( Jkiω  and Jkcµ ) is 
achieved because we observe each individual within each community making the 
same decisions across multiple time periods. The choice of non-linear heterogeneity 
allows the product Jk
J µρ *  to be estimated, but estimation of the individual 
components is not possible. The discrete factor parameters result in an additional 
eight parameters for each community and individual mass point added to the model 
after the first mass point (1 mass point indicates no heterogeneity controls within the 
model), thus the final specification of seven community and sixteen individual mass 
points adds 168 additional parameters to be identified within the model. 




Data for this analysis comes from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, or IFLS. 
The IFLS is designed as a longitudinal, population representative sampling of 
Indonesian households and communities. The first Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS1) was conducted in 1993 and interviewed 22 thousand individuals in 7,224 
households across 13 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces. The second wave (IFLS2) was 
conducted in 1997 and relocated and re-interviewed at least one household member 
from a remarkable 94% of households interviewed in IFLS1. In 1998, a special 
wave, IFLS2+, interviewed 25% of IFLS2 respondents in order to capture immediate 
impacts of the then ongoing economic crisis4. The third wave (IFLS3) was conducted 
in 2000. IFLS3 covered all 321 enumeration areas (communities) and relocated and 
re-interviewed at least one household member from 96% of households interviewed 
in IFLS2. 91% of original IFLS1 households have complete panel responses. 
IFLS2 was concluded one month prior to the onset of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Because of this unintended “luck”, IFLS2 and IFLS3 data offer a unique 
opportunity to researchers to determine individual, household, and community  
 
                                                 
4 IFLS2+  has never been released to the public. 
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responses to economic changes because this dataset possesses a before and after 
picture of so many individuals.  
 “Book 4” interviews were administered to women between the ages of 15 and 
59 in 1993 who have ever been married, female panel respondents who enter the 
married state in later waves, or qualifying married women who enter the survey in 
later years (through marriage or age). Book 4 obtains complete fertility and marital 
histories as well as detailed information on contraception and breastfeeding. Within 
the fertility history is information about every single conception the woman recalls to 
the interviewer, and the outcome of the conception, be it a live birth, a miscarriage, a 
stillborn, or if the woman is currently pregnant during the interview. This data is used 




 The empirical model estimates the probability of conception for a married 
couple, therefore, the sample should include only those women at risk of pregnancy 
even though this significantly inhibits the sample size. 25 years of age is the average 
age of conception over the entire sample, therefore I expand coverage of women ten 
years in either direction to obtain an age range of 15 to 35 years old during 1996 
through 1999. This results in a sample of women most likely to conceive during the 
financial crisis. Of the 8270 women who completed the Book 4 survey module in 
IFLS3, 2635 are older than 38 and 20 are 15 years old in the year 2000 and thus are 
not included in the sample. 
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 Next, 325 currently unmarried women are dropped from the sample for two 
reasons. First, unmarried women have a much smaller probability of conception and 
may be less likely to report children born out of wedlock to the IFLS surveyors. 
Second, no data for a male partner is available. In addition, 387 married women’s 
husbands were absent from the household at the time of the survey and were not 
available for interview. These observations must also be dropped due to missing 
values for the husband’s data. Women whose husband is absent from the household 
are also theoretically not at risk of pregnancy. 
 From the remaining 4903 women, I construct a unique identifier for her 
husband in order to link his constant and time varying characteristics to the wife’s. 
An additional 25 women are dropped due to missing data on school openings, 
duration of marriage, subjective wellbeing, employment, and education. 196 women 
are dropped due to missing consumption data, and 305 husbands had missing 
values for education, employment, or income data. 
Because of the transient nature of the labor market in Indonesia, many 
individuals or households migrated from their original community to seek work away 
from their original community. The crisis compounded this issue, as households 
migrated to seek other employment opportunities. In the remaining sample of 4077 
women who are interviewed, roughly a third moved out of their original IFLS 
community between 1993 and 2000, and four times as many households changed 
communities in the three years after 1997 as did in the four years prior to 1997. 
Households who no longer reside in an IFLS enumeration area, but still reside in an 
IFLS province are preserved in the sample by extrapolating community level data 
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from their original 1997 community. 298 women who moved from an IFLS 
community prior to 1997 do not have community level data for 1997 or 2000 survey 
years and must be dropped from the sample.  
The wife and husband’s characteristics are then matched to the conception 
history file constructed from the book 4 interview. One woman from the sample is 
dropped because no conception history was provided during her interview. In 
addition to the remaining 4076 married women at risk of pregnancy, an additional 
2745 unmarried women of the same age cohort are included in the sample of the 
marriage hazard. They are included to more accurately estimate the probability of 
entering the marriage state. These women have not completed the book 4 
questions, but that information is not relevant to the marriage equation. 
 Table 6.1 summarizes the data characteristics. The dataset is expanded to 
include one observation per woman per year of her life beginning at age 7 and 
ending in 1999. The 4076 married women expand to 89,451 observations, and the 
2745 unmarried women contribute 35,062 observations. A total of 124,513 woman 
year observations of 6821 women, for an average of 18.3 observations per woman, 
with a maximum of 32 observations for the oldest women.    
Table 6.1 –  Data Characteristics 
Variable All Women Sample 15 - 38 
Total Women 10034 6821
  Married 7190 4076
  Unmarried 2844 2745
Households 7542 5653





6.3 Summary Statistics 
Tables 6.2 through 6.5 display summary statistics for the sample of women 
used in the analysis, and the entire sample of 8270 (7190 after data cleaning) 
women not constrained by the sample age limits. I compare these groups both to 
show certain trends in the younger cohort, as well as the representative nature of the 
limited sample. Dependent variables used in the seven equation model are shown in 
bold. 
Table 6.2 displays family characteristics. A total of 8300 conception events 
are recorded for the 4076 married women over their entire lives, for an average of 
2.04 pregnancies per woman. Based on the age group, many women have not yet 
started or completed family construction, therefore this number is well below the 
national total fertility rate, as can be seen in the number of children in 1996. Notice 
how the younger cohort is almost an entire child behind the older cohort. If we were 
to remove the younger women who bring down the average fertility rate, we would 
see a number very representative of the population average of 2.4.5  Next, notice 
raw conceptions per year spanning the financial crisis, also displayed in Figure 6.1. 
These numbers indicate a significant percentage change in the number of 
conceptions reported by year. The crisis first manifested itself in July of 1997, and 
became most prevalent towards the end of the year. Conception initially drops in 
1997, increases in 1998 and then explodes in 1999. It is possible the drop in births in 
1997 is an uncertainty response to the beginning of the crisis, followed by an 
increase in fertility as real wages decreased and mother’s opportunity costs of 
leaving the labor force diminished. 
                                                 
5 Recall this data was collected 11 years ago, so the TFR was higher than the current 2.4. 
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Table 6.2 –  Family Characteristics 
 All Women Sample 15 - 38 
Variable 
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
N 7190 4076 
Conceptions 1996 712 635 
   1997 569 518 
   1998 659 621 
   1999 939 901 
Conception 1996 – 1999 .123 .328 .164 .370
Conception 1970 – 1995 .202 .401 .225 .417
Number of Children in 1996 2.35 2.36 1.49 1.59
Has No Children in 1996 .417 .526 
Has 1 Child in 1996 .141 .348 .167 .373
Has 2 Children in 1996 .134 .341 .139 .346
Has 3 Children in 1996 .105 .307 .084 .277
Has 4 Children in 1996 .072 .258 .042 .201
Has 5 or more Children in 1996 .131 .338 .042 .201
Family Planning Available in 
Puskesmas when woman age 7 
.398 .490 .578 .494
Family Planning Available in 
Posyandu when woman age 7 
.121 .326 .176 .381
Family Planning Available in Private 
Facility when woman age 7 
.247 .431 .359 .480
Family Planning Available in 
Puskesmas in 1999 
.996 .062 .996 .060
Family Planning Available in 
Posyandu in 1999 
.881 .324 .873 .333
Family Planning Available in Private 
Facility in 1999 
.990 .097 .989 .104
Year Family Planning became 
available in Puskesmas 
1976 7.451 1976 7.378
Year Family Planning became 
available in Posyandu 
1987 7.305 1987 7.349
Year Family Planning became 
available in Private Facility 
1982 7.469 1982 7.485
Age of Menarche 14.19 2.86 14.01 1.78
Age of first marriage 19.69 4.97 19.48 4.28
Duration of Current Marriage 11.2 10.2 6.7 6.6
Age of First Birth 19.8 4.28 19.8 3.90
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In the full sample of all women in the IFLS, the mother’s average age of 
childbirth is 22 years old. In the 15-38 year old sample, the age has increased a full 
year to 23 years old. This figure is consistent with the hypothesis concerning the 
effects of increased female education, increased labor force participation, and 
postponed marriage delaying and reducing the fertility of Indonesian women. In both 
samples of women, the mother’s average age of first childbirth is 19.8 years old.  
The presence of facilities with family planning services has had an impact on 
fertility in Indonesia. Notice how the younger cohort has increased exposure to 
family planning facilities within their community at the time they are seven years old. 
This number continued to grow as program infiltration continued, as seen in the data 
for family planning currently present. Almost every community has some method of 
providing family planning services by 1999. 
Table 6.3 presents summary statistics on age, location, and religion. The 
younger women have younger husbands, however, the main purpose of this table is 
to show the representative nature of the younger cohort to the full sample.  
Table 6.4 displays the summary statistics for education of the woman and her 
husband. First, the set of education variables for the women show fewer women 
report never attending school or leaving primary school without graduating, and the 
percentage of women who achieve graduation milestones increases across the 
board for the younger cohort. The same trends emerge for the younger husbands. 
For both men and women, the younger cohort reports higher literacy rates, a 
younger age when first entering school, and a later age when exiting school.  
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Figure 6.1: Number of Conceptions by Year 
 
Figure 6.2: Household Income by Year 
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Table 6.3 –  Household Characteristics 
 All Women Sample 15 - 38 
Variable 
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Age of the Woman 34.379 9.867 28.958 6.228
Age of the Husband 39.994 20.867 34.009 7.782
Household Located in Urban Area .452 .498 .441 .497
North Sumatra Rural  .026 .160 .022 .147
North Sumatra Urban  .028 .165 .027 .163
West Sumatra  Rural  .031 .173 .032 .176
West Sumatra  Urban      .019 .136 .015 .121
South Sumatra Rural      .030 .172 .034 .181
South Sumatra Urban      .016 .125 .015 .121
Lampung Rural            .037 .189 .039 .194
Lampung Urban            .008 .092 .009 .095
DKI Jakarta Urban        .080 .271 .076 .265
West Java Rural          .090 .286 .094 .291
West Java Urban          .079 .269 .081 .273
Central Java Rural       .081 .273 .075 .264
Central Java Urban       .048 .214 .046 .210
DI Yogyakarta Rural      .020 .141 .019 .136
DI Yogyakarta Urban      .033 .179 .031 .174
East Java Rural          .096 .294 .103 .304
East Java Urban          .056 .230 .054 .226
Bali Rural               .037 .188 .035 .185
Bali Urban               .022 .145 .023 .151
West Nusa Tenggara Rural .045 .207 .049 .215
West Nusa Tenggara Urban .015 .123 .015 .120
South Kalimantan Rural   .028 .166 .031 .174
South Kalimantan Urban   .018 .133 .018 .133
South Sulawesi Rural     .026 .158 .026 .158
South Sulawesi Urban   .030 .171 .030 .170
Woman is Muslim .866 .341 .866 .341
Woman is Protestant .035 .184 .027 .162
Woman is Catholic .014 .117 .010 .100
Woman is Hindhu .056 .229 .054 .227
Woman is Buddhist .003 .059 .002 .044
Man is Muslim .887 .317 .897 .304
Man is Protestant .034 .181 .026 .161
Man is Catholic .014 .116 .010 .100
Man is Hindhu .056 .231 .056 .230
Man is Buddhist .003 .059 .002 .041
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Table 6.5 displays the economic variables used in the analysis. Female 
unemployment consistently fell from 1996 to 1999, which further solidifies claims the 
financial crisis did not produce unemployment. The decrease in unemployment likely 
results from a joint effect of women entering the labor force due to increasing gender 
equality, the aging of the sample, and survey recall ability. The husband’s data 
mimic the trends observed within the women. Women who report working for a wage 
steadily increases in contrast to the unemployment figures. The younger cohort of 
women shows larger percentage increases in labor force participation compared to 
the full sample, indicating they are more likely to begin careers at this age. The 
decrease in unemployment amongst the men implies the same is true for them. 
Figure 6.2 displays the nominal household income. Notice how it trends 
similarly to the number of conceptions displayed in Figure 6.1. Real wages show a 
consistent yearly decline for working women and men. Nominal wages continued to 
rise over this same time period. These figures display the true effect of the financial 
crisis at the individual level. By 2000, real wages had fully rebounded on average, 
but some sectors of the economy still lagged behind real 1996 levels (Strauss, 
2004).  
Consumption figures reflect the same effects of the financial crisis as wages: 
The increase in the price level. Nominal consumption expenditure doubled from 
1997 to 2000, as did per-capita consumption. 2000 consumption figures, when 
adjusted to 1997 rupiah, show average real consumption above pre-crisis levels. 
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Table 6.4 –  Education 
 All Women Sample 15 - 38
Variable 
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Woman Never Attended School .105 .307 .066 .248
Woman Did Not Graduate Primary School .245 .430 .200 .400
Woman Graduated Primary School .294 .456 .312 .463
Woman Graduated Junior High School .145 .352 .171 .376
Woman Graduated Senior High School .167 .373 .204 .403
Woman Graduated University or Higher .044 .204 .048 .213
Husband Never Attended School .070 .255 .050 .219
Husband Did Not Graduate Primary School .236 .425 .211 .408
Husband Graduated Primary School .275 .447 .273 .446
Husband Graduated Junior High School .141 .348 .147 .355
Husband Graduated Senior High School .218 .413 .255 .436
Husband Graduated University Or Higher .060 .238 .063 .243
Woman Can Read .824 .381 .882 .323
Woman Can Write .812 .391 .873 .333
Husband Can Read .887 .316 .913 .282
Husband Can Write .875 .331 .902 .297
Student Teacher Ratio in Secondary School 16.37 5.422 16.246 5.441
Student School Ratio in Secondary School 591.1 336.9 589.5 349.0
Student Teacher Ratio in Primary School 24.91 10.102 25.244 10.256
Student School Ratio in Primary School 215.8 102.6 218.1 102.5
Year Primary School opened 1959 16.632 1959 16.557
Year Junior High School opened 1974 13.277 1974 13.234
Year Senior High School opened 1978 13.541 1977 13.650
Age the woman started school  6.68 1.77 6.66 1.76
Age the husband started school  7.36 2.58 7.18 2.67
Age the woman ended school 16.29 4.81 16.56 4.61
Age the husband ended school 14.95 5.80  15.83 5.68
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Table 6.5 –  Economic Variables 
 All Women Sample 15 -38 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Woman Unemployed in 1996 .556 .497 .624 .484
Woman Unemployed in 1997 .526 .499 .592 .491
Woman Unemployed in 1998 .495 .500 .560 .496
Woman Unemployed in 1999 .461 .499 .520 .500
Woman works for wage in 1996 .313 .464 .263 .440
Woman works for wage in 1997 .340 .474 .292 .455
Woman works for wage in 1998 .368 .482 .319 .466
Woman works for wage in 1999 .397 .489 .350 .477
Woman’s wage in 1996 (Annually, 
only the working women) 
1028324 5479179 903390 6079295
Woman’s wage in 1997 1110111 5429896 989858 5965339
Woman’s wage in 1998 798859 3676298 720823 4182710
Woman’s wage in 1999 776978 3274861 698410 3536832
Husband Unemployed in 1996  .112 .316 .118 .322
Husband Unemployed in 1997 .088 .283 .086 .280
Husband Unemployed in 1998 .068 .252 .060 .237
Husband Unemployed in 1999 .054 .226 .040 .197
Husband’s wage in 1996 (Annually, 
only the working men) 
4608107 16400000 4314427 10500000
Husband’s wage in 1997 4883625 13500000 4718436 12100000
Husband’s wage in 1998 3670569 12700000 3587883 10300000
Husband’s wage in 1999 3207064 7608556 3283222 7707462
Per-Capita Consumption in 1997  1126202 1487995 1068934 1175117
Per-Capita Consumption in 2000  2262251 2594966 2292559 2629708
Real Per-Capita Consumption in 
2000 (1997 Rp) 
1159317 1343676 1156631 1326728
Nominal Total Household 
Consumption in 1997  
6381593 8140529 6062919 7577119
Nominal Total Household 
Consumption in 2000  
12200000 13700000 11600000 12900000
Community Subjective Wellbeing –
Worse 
.315 .465 .319 .466
   Better .102 .303 .102 .303
 Individual Subjective Wellbeing –  
Expect Worse 
.015 .121 .013 .112
   Expect Better .320 .466 .343 .475
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6.4 Challenges 
 As mentioned in chapter 5, the availability of data defined the empirical 
specification used for the analysis. The ideal model to answer this question would be 
a multiple spell hazard model where a woman makes fertility decisions in every year 
of her fertile life as a function of  time varying economic and demographic variables, 
however, the income and employment data collected during IFLS2 was not made 
available to the public. As a result, a dynamic retrospective picture of the entire 
wage profile for any individual is impossible to obtain prior to 1996, limiting the types 
of models available to analyze IFLS data. 
 




 To ascertain the effects of short term financial shocks on the demand for 
children, the empirical model from Chapter 5 is estimated using the data presented 
in Chapter 6. This analysis uses real per-capita consumption measured both before 
and after the financial crisis as a proxy for whether a particular household 
experienced a financial shock during the time period spanning the crisis, and then 
examines what effect these changes in real per-capita consumption have on the 
probability of conceiving a child in each year from 1996 through 1999. Coefficient 
estimates of economic indicators such as consumption and income variables provide 
an answer to this question.  
In this chapter I present the empirical results from two different analyses. 
First, I estimate a single equation model which predicts the probability of conception 
and does not control for any unobserved heterogeneity or random effects. The 
second is the estimation of the model discussed in a previous chapter which controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity and inter-equation error term correlations. The results 
from each analysis are presented separately and then compared in the final section 
of this chapter. I expect the results from the uncontrolled analysis to suffer from 
endogeneity biased coefficient estimates, and the heterogeneity controlled analysis 
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to correct for it. Comparing the two analyses will show the direction of any 
endogeneity bias in the uncontrolled model. The results of interest are obtained 
from the conception equation (equation 5.1), however, results for the remaining 
six equations: previous births, education, marriage, labor force participation, 
income, and consumption are also presented in an abridged form. The complete 
results from all analyses are available in Appendix A.  
 The next section presents results from a simple logistic regression of 
equation 5.1. This estimation is performed using the data analysis software 
package STATA (StataCorp, College Station TX). Following that is a discussion 
of the procedure to obtain the joint estimation coefficient estimates using full 
information maximum likelihood and the discrete factor method, and then joint 
estimation results are presented and discussed. Finally, a brief discussion of the 
differences between the two analysis is presented. 
 
7.2 Uncontrolled Results 
Preliminary statistical work was performed on the full dataset using the 
data analysis software package STATA. The model estimated is a multiple spell 
hazard model with a conception occurring in a given year by a woman as the 
dependent variable. The estimated model is given by equation 5.1. This model 
does not control for any heterogeneity or endogeneity, thus the remaining six 
equations are not estimated as part of this model. The results are displayed in 
Table 7.1. 
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This model was initially used to explore the possibility such economic 
effects did in fact exert an influence on fertility. The immediate result from this 
analysis is the extremely strong decrease in fertility noted during 1997 and 1998. 
This is accentuated by the sharp increase in fertility in 1999, possibly due to 
suppressed latent demand during the crisis. Such a difference in the reported  
conceptions over the span of these four years indicates a strong possibility the 
financial crisis was responsible. The year effect results motivated the second half 
of the project, indicating some effect of the financial crisis on fertility. 
Though the financial crisis appeared to play a negative role in the 
household’s short run decision to bear children through the significance of the 
consumption variable, structural factors played a significant role as well. The 
most important of these appears to be marital status and the number of children 
present in the household. Though this paper does not include target fertility as an 
explanatory variable, I believe from my own experience many households do 
plan for the number and timing of children, of course with the opportunity to delay 
conceptions given certain circumstances. Thus, notice the magnitude and 
significance of the marital status and number of children coefficients. Relative to 
having no children in the household, existing children predict a strong decrease 
in the probability of conception. Marital status carries the obvious positive sign. 
Ever married strongly predicts conception as well. 
A woman’s education is expected to be endogenous for reasons 
previously discussed. A woman currently attending school predicts an 
insignificant decrease in the probability of conception. The more education a 
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woman obtains, the more this predicts an increase in the probability of 
conception relative to having no education. A college education positively and 
significantly predicts the probability of conception, which runs counter-intuitive, 
since the more education a woman obtains, the more likely she would be 
expected to work and less likely to bear children.  
The husband’s education follows similar, but not exact patterns. If the 
husband is still in school, the couple is insignificantly less likely to conceive a 
child. This may be due to budget constraints, an inherent desire to avoid 
childcare tasks while in school, or the husband’s education status does not enter 
the conception decision process. The husband’s total education is insignificant 
with the exception of primary school graduation, which negatively affects the 
probability of conception.  
The presence of some hardship in a given year such as a death or illness 
of a family member, loss of a job, damage to crops, damages due to natural 
disasters such as earthquake fire and flood, and decreases in household income 
due to decreases in production or price level fluctuations negatively and 
significantly effects the probability of conception, indicating households are 
responsive to sudden and unexpected changes with respect to fertility.  
Employment of any sort by the woman carries the expected negative and 
significant sign relative to unemployment indicating women who perform any sort 
of labor related tasks are less likely to conceive a child than women who do not 
work, a very intuitive result. Employment by the husband carries a positive but 
insignificant effect on the probability of conception. This is expected, as the 
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husband’s labor force status shouldn’t change the households demand for 
children while holding income and consumption constant. 
Household income is insignificant, but household consumption is negative 
and significant, indicating children are inferior goods. Households who 
experience declines in per-capita consumption are much more likely to have 
children, while households who experience increases in per-capita consumption 
are less likely to conceive an additional child. 
Table 7.1: Uncontrolled Results: Conception Equation 
Conception Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -4.5999 *** 0.6134 -7.50
Year 1996 -0.2676 *** 0.0672 -3.98
Year 1997 -0.5701 *** 0.0676 -8.43
Year 1998 -0.4597 *** 0.0641 -7.17
Married  1.8730 *** 0.4959 3.78
Ever Married      1.4534 *** 0.4864 2.99
Mother has 1 child -1.6526 *** 0.0667 -24.77
Mother has 2 children -2.2530 *** 0.0869 -25.92
Mother has 3 children -2.2435 *** 0.1056 -21.25
Mother has 4 children -1.8926 *** 0.1248 -15.17
Mother has 5 or more children -1.9886 *** 0.1402 -14.18
Woman currently attends school -0.0896  0.1686 -0.53
Woman started but not graduate Primary School 0.0013  0.1152 0.01
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0118  0.1220 -0.10
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.0582  0.1282 0.45
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.1431  0.1327 1.08
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.2481  0.1734 1.43
Husband currently attends school -0.2025  0.2622 -0.77
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.0810  0.1097 -0.74
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.2213 * 0.1139 -1.94
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0994  0.1228 -0.81
Husband Graduated Senior High School -0.1019  0.1235 -0.82
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.0162  0.1633 0.10
Household Experienced a Hardship (Death, Sickness,..) -0.1885  0.0967 -1.95
Woman Works For a Wage -0.3470 *** 0.0611 -5.68
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker -0.3208 *** 0.0831 -3.86
Husband is Self Employed 0.0868  0.1438 0.60
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1127  0.2027 0.56
Husband works for the government 0.2026  0.1683 1.20
Husband works for a corporation 0.0693  0.1429 0.49
Household Income 0.0004  0.0187 0.02
Real Per Capita Consumption -0.1460 *** 0.0351 -4.16
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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7.3 Full Information Maximum Likelihood Using the Discrete Factor Method 
 The complete seven equation model was estimated simultaneously using 
the full information maximum likelihood discrete factor method (FIML DFM). 
Table 7.2 displays the likelihood function values for different combinations of 
community and individual level mass point specifications. Using Mroz’s (1999) 
suggestion to increase the amount of community and individual level mass points 
up to the point where the increase in the likelihood function value is less than the 
number of parameters added to the model, the reported results originate from the 
seven equation model discussed in the previous chapter with seven community 
sixteen individual level mass points. In a seven equation model, the addition of 
one mass point results in the addition of eight parameters; one heterogeneity 
term per equation, and a weight coefficient which determines the probability of 
individual i or community j falling within a particular mass point. Note from table 
7.2 additional parameters could have been added to increase the magnitude of 
the likelihood function, however the addition of a seventeenth individual or eighth 
community mass point did not under all specifications result in an increase of at 
least eight points in the likelihood function value.  
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TABLE 7.2: Likelihood Function Values 
Community Level Mass Points 
Likelihood 
Function 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 -86618.21         
2  -82452.35        
3   -81548.86       
4    -81298.02      
5     -80892.11 -80879.51 -80856.90   
6     -80802.36 -80690.30 -80668.73 -80665.18  
7     -80574.31 -80549.94 -80525.56 -80510.07 -80510.09 
8     -80522.05 -80503.80 -80342.21 -80316.75  
9     -80327.61 -80292.21 -80270.82 -80266.31  
10     -80278.19 -80244.91 -80233.13 -80230.13  
11     -80254.91 -80192.57 -80171.57 -80150.06 -80132.55 
12     -80155.71 -80097.34 -80073.50 -80052.48 -80032.25 
13     -80118.41 -80050.57 -80026.16 -80016.87 -79993.53 
14     -80083.85 -80029.55 -80012.00 -80006.55 -79972.96 
15     -80071.28 -80043.92 -80004.96 -79987.26 -79959.82 






























17     -80036.40 -79957.21 -79938.13 -79924.23 -79908.68 
* Blank cells imply that no estimation was performed for a particular combination of community and individual heterogeneity 
The cell in bold indicates the estimation of 16 individual and 7 community mass points which produced the results presented in this chapter. 
The final results reported here have a different likelihood function value than the specification in the table. The final specification fixed a small 
calculation error on the 2000 per-capita consumption variable in the database program which built the dataset being analyzed. Fixing this error 
resulted in a shift of approximately 300 points in the likelihood function at the maximum. The final likelihood function value is -80253.03.
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 The analysis of one community and one individual mass point, which is 
indicative of no heterogeneity controlls in the model produces identical results for the 
main equation as the uncontrolled results in section 7.1, as expected. The likelihood 
function value of the analysis was -86618, and the likelihood function value of the 
final specification was -79947, an increase in the likelihood function of 6670. Table 
7.3 summarizes the benefit of using the discrete factor method over not controlling 
for heterogeneity. 
 To test the identification of the model, I performed two model specification 
tests to prove the validity of the exclusion restrictions. In the first test, I removed the 
30 instruments from the supporting equations resulting in a decrease of 65 
parameters. The specification of the conception equation remained the same. The 
likelihood function value of this restricted model is -80999.43, resulting in a likelihood 
ratio test value of 1471.54, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis, implying the 
exclusion restrictions are significant as a group as included in the supporting 
equations, thus the exclusion restrictions are appropriate identifying instruments. 
The second test was to include all the exclusion restrictions in the specification of 
the conception equation, while leaving the specification of the six supporting 
equations the same. This resulted in an addition of 30 parameters to the model. The 
likelihood function value of this restricted model at its maximum is -80243.83. The 
resulting likelihood ratio test statistic equals 39.66, and as such, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, indicating the exclusion restrictions are insignificant as a group when 
specified in the conception equation, even though some of the coefficients are 
individually significant in the main equation. This test implies the exclusion 
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restrictions are appropriately omitted from the conception equation, as they are not 
significant predictors of fertility as a group. 
Table 7.3: Benefit of the Discrete Factor Method 
Model Parameters Likelihood Function 
No Heterogeneity, seven 
equations 
579 -86618.21 
7 Community, 16 Individual Mass 
Points 
747 -79947.64 
Difference +168 +6670.57 
 








Community Weight Parameters 1 0.0179
2 2.8526 *** 0.5175 5.51 2 .2569
3 2.3954 *** 0.5622 4.26 3 .2167
4 2.1355 *** 0.5600 3.81 4 .1927
5 2.1846 *** 0.5286 4.13 5 .1417
6 1.8099 *** 0.5913 3.06 6 .1180
7 1.1305 * 0.6415 1.76 7 .0538
Individual 
Individual Weight Parameters 1 0.0425
2 -0.7015 * 0.3717 -1.89 2 .0214
3 0.2899  0.7596 0.38 3 .0456
4 0.4994  0.3810 1.31 4 .0708
5 -1.8326 *** 0.4170 -4.39 5 .0070
6 -0.6286 * 0.3764 -1.67 6 .0245
7 0.7442 ** 0.3600 2.07 7 .0922
8 0.6161  0.5056 1.22 8 .0778
9 -1.5064 ** 0.6516 -2.31 9 .0073
10 1.9408 *** 0.3013 6.44 10 .3117
11 -0.6739  0.4552 -1.48 11 .0188
12 -1.2087 *** 0.4650 -2.60 12 .0128
13 -1.3355 *** 0.4546 -2.94 13 .0121
14 0.8000 ** 0.3888 2.06 14 .0968
15 1.0641 ** 0.4693 2.27 15 .1204
16 -0.0031  0.4012 -0.01 16 .0411
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
 As a final test of the model specification, I performed one additional test 
where all time dependent instrumental variables from past decisions are included in 
all future decisions. For example, the theoretical model predicts education decisions 
factor in to all future decisions, therefore the instruments from the education 
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equation are included in the marriage, work, previous births, and conception 
equations. After running this specification, I concluded that the current specification 
was sufficient in that no changes to parameter values were observed. The likelihood 
function value of this restricted model is -80218.18 with 776 parameters, resulting in 
a likelihood ratio test value of 90.96, which rejects the null hypothesis. Though this 
implies that the two models are statistically different, the parameter estimates of all 
coefficients of interest do not differ in sign, magnitude, or statistical significance. 
 Table 7.4 displays the heterogeneity weights. To determine the relative 
weights of seven community mass points, only six coefficients need be estimated, as 
the weights are restricted to sum to one. The second column displays the coefficient 
estimate of the model for the mass point indicated in the first column. The third and 
fourth columns display the standard errors and Z statistics respectively. The mass 
points are almost all significant, indicating the model is not over-parameterized. The 
final column displays the relative weights for each mass point in the fifth column. 
 
7.4 FIML DFM Results 
 The results presented here are obtained using the aforementioned discrete 
factor method to estimate the set of 747 parameters. The model was initially 
estimated using starting values of zero for all parameters except for the standard 
deviation of the continuous equations, which were normalized to one. The models 
were estimated until the first partial derivative took on a value smaller than     
9.0x10e-4. Once this was achieved, the estimation was considered complete. with 
one community, one individual, or both mass points added to the specification. The 
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model was then iterated again until the final specification was determined to optimize 
the parameter estimates. 
 The relevant results to the question concerning economic effects on 
conception are derived from the conception equation, which spans the financial 
crisis. Parameter results of interest are displayed in tables 7.5 through 7.11, with the 
full results for all seven equations and 747 parameters available in Appendix A. 
Following each equation, the heterogeneity parameters for each equation are 
displayed. These will not be discussed, but are included for completeness. 
 At the beginning of this project, I indicated three possible outcomes of an 
intra-household financial shock: The financial crisis may be responsible for an  
increase, decrease, or no change in fertility. In the literature review, I put forth 
various hypotheses concerning the different effects of certain variables, however, 
there always existed the possibility where fertility preferences are deeply rooted in 
structural beliefs concerning the number and timing of children, and are not affected 
by short run financial shocks. The answer to this question in the context of 
Indonesian households follows. 
7.4.1 Conceptions 
 Table 7.5 displays the main results of interest for this research project, as it 
contains the pertinent economic factors in the household spanning the course of the 
financial crisis. The main result of interest is the influence the financial crisis exerted 
on fertility. Similar to the uncontrolled results, household income exerted no effect 
when household consumption was also included in the model. Household 
consumption exerts a negative and significant influence on the probability of 
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conception, thus holding all else constant, children are inferior goods:  An increase 
in the available resources within the household results in a decrease in the 
probability of conception, resulting in fewer children per household. Although the 
significance of the consumption coefficient is very high, simulations displayed in 
Chapter 8 will show the effects of changes in consumption have very small relative 
and absolute effects on the predicted probability of conception. 
 Removing consumption from the model causes the income coefficient to 
remain positive and insignificant. Removing income from the baseline specification 
results in a significant coefficient estimate of consumption of -.2214, whereas the 
coefficient estimate of the baseline equation is -.2203. This indicates the inclusion of 
income in the model has very little effect on the outcome. This is also confirmed 
through simulations performed in Chapter 8. 
 The year dummies are significant, indicating fewer births in the three years 
prior to 1999 are still not entirely attributed to the variables within the system of 
equations. If the variables in the system captured all the economic and socio-
demographic impacts of the financial crisis, the coefficients on the year indicator 
variables would be insignificant. As can be observed, these indicators are all highly 
significant, implying other unobserved year specific effects not included in this 
specification are still present. One possible interpretation of this are time factors 
unrelated to the financial crisis, however, this scenario seems unlikely. No other 
events of such magnitude had macro- socio and economic effects on the entire 
region during this time. The second, and more likely is the year indicators are a 
proxy for remaining unobserved factors related to the crisis.  
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As also observed in the initial results, structural factors play the significant 
role in the decision to conceive a child. The most important of these appears to be 
marital status and the number of children. Notice again the magnitude and 
significance of the marital status and number of children coefficients. Relative to 
having no children in the household, existing children predict a strong decrease in 
the probability of conception, however, notice how the presence of only one child is 
much smaller in magnitude from the other coefficients. Recall the TFR in Indonesia 
is 2.4 children per woman. This confirms the prevalence of two and three child 
households. Once a household has two children, the probability of having additional 
children is lower. These results are confirmed in Chapter 8 through simulation 
experiments. The presence of family planning at thee posyandu when the woman is 
age seven significantly reduces the probability of conception. An interpretation of this 
is that the influence of family planning carries life-long impacts on women to delay 
the age of childbearing, as was found by Angeles et al. 2005. The current presence 
of family planning resources in the community predicts an increase in the probability 
of conception. Marital status carries the obvious positive sign. Ever married strongly 
predicts children as well. 
Employment by the woman carries oppositely signed coefficients relative to 
unemployment. Women who work for a wage insignificantly predict an increase in 
the probability of conception, whereas women who work as unpaid family workers 
predict a significant  decrease in the probability of conception. I argue at the margin, 
women who are expending similar energies towards the labor market in time 
respond differently based on the financial outcome of their labor. Women working 
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who are not earning a wage are less likely to bear children than unemployed women 
because of time commitments to the labor force. Women who are earning may have 
opportunities to receive time off to bear children, or work out arrangements with child 
caregivers, thus explaining the different response. Employment by the husband 
carries a positive but insignificant effect on the probability of conception. This is 
expected, as the husband’s labor force status shouldn’t change the households 
demand for children while holding income and consumption constant. 
A woman’s education is expected to be endogenous for reasons previously 
discussed. All education variables for the woman are insignificant, implying the level 
or status of education does not play a role in the decision to conceive a child. The 
husband’s education variables are also all insignificant. This is a main result 
obtained once heterogeneity is controlled for within the model. Education leads to 
different types of labor force participation, which results in higher wages, ultimately 
leading to increased consumption. Thus I would expect the education coefficients to 
be less significant in a model where heterogeneity is controlled. Angeles, Guilkey, 
and Mroz (2005) report the identical result using IFLS1 data from 1993. 
The presence of some hardship negatively and significantly predicts the 
probability of conception, indicating households are responsive to sudden and 
unexpected changes in either social or economic aspects. Adverse events cause the 
household to lower the likelihood of having another child in the immediate timeframe. 
Medium and long run effects of the crisis are discussed in Chapter 9.  
 The model surprisingly predicts higher probability of births in an urban setting. 
This is counter to expectations, where larger families tend towards more rural, 
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agricultural based areas. Province indicators interacted with the urban indicator, not 
displayed, control for endogenous program placement of family planning programs 
and province specific effects on family size and dynamics. Ten out of thirteen 
provinces indicate lower coefficient values on the urban interaction terms when 
comparing one province’s provinceXurban vs. provinceXrural coefficients, and 
therefore when examining the true marginal effect of urbanicity, provinces must be 
included in the analysis. Simulations will reveal the true marginal effect of urban 
dwelling on fertility. 
7.4.2 Number of Children 
 The second equation controls for previous births in the household prior to the 
financial crisis. As observed in the main conception equation, the number of children 
in the household is again the strongest predictor of the addition of children. Marriage 
carries the expected positive and significant sign. The presence of other children 
also exerts similar effects as in the conception equation. The duration of marriage 
significantly predicts an increase in the probability of birth, while the indicator for 
fertility and vicinity to the parents are insignificant. 
 The husband’s age plays a larger role in this equation. Men younger than age 
20 and older than 40 are less likely to father children, whereas those in the 21 to 39 
age group are more likely to father children, with those age 21 to 30 more likely to 
father children, although the coefficient is just barely insignificant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7.5: FIML Results: Conception Equation 
Conception Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -3.4808 *** 0.4722 -7.37
Year 1996 -0.2124 *** 0.0673 -3.16
Year 1997 -0.5349 *** 0.0712 -7.51
Year 1998 -0.4480 *** 0.0697 -6.43
Married  1.9391 *** 0.6050 3.21
Ever Married      1.8248 *** 0.6048 3.02
Mother has 1 child -2.0771 *** 0.1059 -19.61
Mother has 2 children -2.8535 *** 0.1371 -20.81
Mother has 3 children -2.9350 *** 0.1543 -19.02
Mother has 4 children -2.6822 *** 0.1831 -14.65
Mother has 5 or more children -2.8897 *** 0.1997 -14.47
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 0.0349  0.0732 0.48
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.1644 ** 0.0764 -2.15
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 -0.0143  0.0701 -0.20
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now 0.5065  0.4835 1.05
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.1070  0.0794 1.35
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now 0.4822 * 0.2653 1.82
Household in Urban area 0.5880 *** 0.1587 3.71
Woman currently attends school -0.0606  0.1775 -0.34
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School -0.0194  0.1206 -0.16
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0778  0.1205 -0.65
Woman Graduated Junior High School -0.0465  0.1374 -0.34
Woman Graduated Senior High School -0.0409  0.1415 -0.29
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.0037  0.1823 0.02
Husband currently attends school -0.1674  0.2760 -0.61
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.0376  0.1211 0.31
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.1520  0.1055 -1.44
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0265  0.1219 -0.22
Husband Graduated Senior High School -0.0932  0.1083 -0.86
Husband Graduated University or higher -0.0400  0.1582 -0.25
Woman Works For a Wage 0.1142  0.1375 0.83
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker -0.3132 *** 0.0875 -3.58
Husband is Self Employed 0.0049  0.1649 0.03
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.0881  0.2006 0.44
Husband works for the government 0.0726  0.1824 0.40
Husband works for a corporation -0.0096  0.1628 -0.06
Household Experienced a Hardship (Death, 
Sickness,…) -0.1712 * 0.0920 -1.86
Household Income 0.0162  0.0274 0.59
Household Consumption -0.0534  0.0684 -0.78
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7.5a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Conception Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 0.1194  0.3196 0.37
Point 3 -0.0321  0.3244 -0.10
Point 4 0.2979  0.3143 0.95
Point 5 -0.0114  0.3160 -0.04
Point 6 0.4958  0.3163 1.57
Point 7 0.4282  0.3641 1.18
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.5765  0.4686 -1.23
Point 3 0.2580  0.4241 0.61
Point 4 -0.4818  0.3651 -1.32
Point 5 0.7649 * 0.4488 1.70
Point 6 -4.5992 *** 0.8630 -5.33
Point 7 0.6089 * 0.3290 1.85
Point 8 0.2396  0.3659 0.66
Point 9 0.8205 * 0.4488 1.83
Point 10 0.4726  0.3025 1.56
Point 11 0.0962  0.4185 0.23
Point 12 -0.4168  0.6170 -0.68
Point 13 -0.8251  1.1670 -0.71
Point 14 0.2252  0.3324 0.68
Point 15 0.1767  0.3416 0.52
Point 16 -0.1543  0.3527 -0.44
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
 Coefficients estimated for the influence of the mother’s age were estimated at 
every discrete age level, creating an extensive age profile, however it is too 
inefficient to display these results here. The probability of conception peaks at age 
22, remains high around 26 to 28, and falls off sharply after age 30. Women younger 
than age 17 have much lower probabilities of conceiving a child than those age 30. 
 The year indicators contained in this table are strongly correlated with the age 
of the women in the sample, and the signs of the coefficients reflect that. Again, 
households in urban areas are more likely to have conceptions than those in rural 
areas.  
 The woman’s education results are more intuitive in this equation than the 
conception equation. Relative to no education, women with education are less likely 
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to conceive, consistent with hypotheses put forth regarding woman’s employment 
and labor force participation (income and employment variables are not estimated in 
this equation because no data is available). Women who graduated high school are 
significantly less likely to have births in the years prior to the financial crisis. The 
husband’s education trends entirely opposite to the woman’s. Husbands who have 
low education predict a lower probability of birth, whereas high school 
(insignificantly) or college (significantly) increases the probability of birth. The lack of 
income and employment data in this equation may cause the education variable to 
act as proxies for socio-economic status. If this is the case, then the result where the 
women’s education predicts a decrease in the probability of conception and the 
husband’s predicts an increase in the probability of conception is consistent with 
previous findings where the woman’s contribution to the household economy may be 
a strong negative determinant of the number of children the household will produce, 
while the husband’s income relative to conception indicates children to be normal 
goods. 
 Lagged education variables are displayed here because the conception 
resulting in the reported birth most likely resulted in the previous year. Women 
attending school this year or husbands attending school last year significantly predict 
a decrease in the probability of birth. 
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Table 7.6: FIML Results: Number of Children Equation 
Birth Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.4148 *** 0.6110 -3.95
Married  1.3197 *** 0.3598 3.67
Mother has 1 child -1.4870 *** 0.0588 -25.30
Mother has 2 children -1.9092 *** 0.0765 -24.94
Mother has 3 children -2.1417 *** 0.0964 -22.22
Mother has 4 children -2.1467 *** 0.1190 -18.03
Mother has 5 or more children -1.9791 *** 0.1348 -14.68
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 -0.0231  0.0468 -0.49
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.0814  0.0845 -0.96
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 0.0845  0.0651 1.30
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now -0.0502  0.0922 -0.55
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.0061  0.0475 0.13
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now -0.0713  0.0559 -1.28
Husband’s age 20 or younger -0.2619 ** 0.1026 -2.55
Husband’s age 21 to 30 0.0803 * 0.0486 1.65
Husband’s age 40 or older -0.2985 *** 0.0975 -3.06
Year is before 1976 0.6152  0.3974 1.55
Year is 1976 to 1980 0.2453 ** 0.1089 2.25
Year is 1981 to 1985 0.3759 *** 0.0602 6.24
Year is 1986 to 1990 0.1254 *** 0.0386 3.25
Household in Urban area 0.4386 *** 0.1002 4.38
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 0.0378  0.0767 0.49
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0838  0.0821 -1.02
Woman Graduated Junior High School -0.1233  0.0942 -1.31
Woman Graduated Senior High School -0.1496  0.0920 -1.63
Woman Graduated University or higher -0.0302  0.1502 -0.20
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.0623  0.0594 1.05
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0179  0.0705 -0.25
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0640  0.0791 -0.81
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0577  0.0759 0.76
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.2248 ** 0.1054 2.13
Woman attended school last year 0.1037  0.0985 1.05
Woman currently attends school -0.2742 ** 0.1242 -2.21
Husband attended school last year -0.2210  0.1489 -1.48
Husband currently attends school 0.2749 * 0.1669 1.65
Duration of marriage 0.1498 ** 0.0680 2.20
Woman is fertile 0.2275  0.2098 1.08
Woman lives near her parents -0.0555  0.0570 -0.97
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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7.4.3 Education 
 The education equation predicts the probability a woman exits school in a 
given year. The presence of a child in the household positively and significantly 
predicts a woman will exit school. The woman’s age indicators are relative to age 16  
Table 7.6a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Number of Children Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 0.2566  0.2143 1.20
Point 3 0.1788  0.2258 0.79
Point 4 0.4279 ** 0.2156 1.98
Point 5 0.1444  0.2161 0.67
Point 6 0.7953 *** 0.2185 3.64
Point 7 0.3338  0.2398 1.39
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.3644  0.4302 -0.85
Point 3 -0.2012  0.3497 -0.58
Point 4 -0.2213  0.3197 -0.69
Point 5 0.2135  0.3113 0.69
Point 6 -3.9604 *** 0.6338 -6.25
Point 7 -0.0001  0.3507 0.00
Point 8 -0.1740  0.3048 -0.57
Point 9 0.0682  0.4218 0.16
Point 10 0.1227  0.2558 0.48
Point 11 0.2324  0.4052 0.57
Point 12 0.1312  0.3132 0.42
Point 13 -0.3897  0.5349 -0.73
Point 14 0.1261  0.2866 0.44
Point 15 0.0808  0.2863 0.28
Point 16 0.1197  0.2740 0.44
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
to 20. Those younger than 16 are significantly less likely to exit school, and those 
older than 20 are much more likely to exit school, and discrete increases in the 
probability of exiting school are noted at ages 13 and 16, which coincides with 
women completing grammar school and high school respectively. 
 92
 The exogenous instruments in this equation are proxies for school quality in 
the communities where they reside. These ratios are student-teacher and student-
school in both primary and secondary schools. 
Table 7.7:  FIML Results: Education Equation 
Exit School Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant 3.5225 *** 0.3142 11.21
Mother has 1 child 0.9241 *** 0.1443 6.41
Woman’s age 7 -3.0888 *** 0.1337 -23.10
Woman’s age 8 -4.1622 *** 0.1644 -25.32
Woman’s age 9 -3.3670 *** 0.1276 -26.40
Woman’s age 10 -2.6003 *** 0.1011 -25.73
Woman’s age 11 -2.0932 *** 0.0957 -21.86
Woman’s age 12 -1.0930 *** 0.0806 -13.56
Woman’s age 13 -0.5750 *** 0.0746 -7.70
Woman’s age 14 -0.7340 *** 0.0704 -10.42
Woman’s age 15 -0.7827 *** 0.0794 -9.85
Woman’s age 21 to 25 0.3698 *** 0.1039 3.56
Woman’s age 26 to 30 0.0490  0.2639 0.19
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.5906  0.5268 -1.12
Woman’s age 36 and up 2.3777 *** 0.8989 2.65
Year is before 1976 -0.2030  0.1241 -1.64
Year is 1976 to 1980 -0.6293 *** 0.1065 -5.91
Year is 1981 to 1985 -1.1002 *** 0.1013 -10.86
Year is 1986 to 1990 -0.9822 *** 0.0948 -10.36
Year is 1991 to 1995 -0.7851 *** 0.0870 -9.02
Household in Urban area -0.3691 *** 0.1344 -2.75
Woman can read -1.9049 *** 0.2890 -6.59
Woman can write -1.2466 *** 0.2645 -4.71
Student Teacher Ratio in Secondary Sch 0.0613 * 0.0338 1.81
Student School Ratio in Secondary Sch -0.0596  0.2111 -0.28
Student Teacher Ratio in Primary Sch 0.0867 ** 0.0415 2.09
Student School Ratio in Primary Sch -0.2427 ** 0.0978 -2.48
School was available to woman in her 
community -0.1166 * 0.0667 -1.75
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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A higher student teacher ratio in secondary school, indicating a lower school quality, 
positively predicts a student will exit school. The same ratio in  primary school was of 
the same sign, but not significant. This is possibly explained by decreasing marginal 
returns to education. The marginal value of earlier years of education is higher, 
independent of school quality. Once the student is in high school, a school of lower 
quality may provide a lower marginal product of education, and thus the student 
exits school. The student-school ratios are insignificant, but negatively predict the 
propensity to exit school. Perhaps larger schools provide higher average resources 
per student because of economies of scale with regards to limited school resources 
and thus attract students. Having a school available in the vicinity of the community 
at the time when the woman would matriculate into that school is significant to the 
woman remaining in school. This indicates that transaction costs do play a role in 
the attainment of education, and students exit school when the transaction costs 
exceed the benefit of additional education. 
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Table 7.7a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Education Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.6696 *** 0.1649 -4.06
Point 3 -0.1291  0.2059 -0.63
Point 4 -1.0151 *** 0.2041 -4.97
Point 5 -0.3660 ** 0.1767 -2.07
Point 6 -0.0986  0.1862 -0.53
Point 7 0.5451 *** 0.1939 2.81
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.5966 ** 0.2718 -2.20
Point 3 -0.0746  0.2454 -0.30
Point 4 0.3208  0.2265 1.42
Point 5 -0.0099  0.2830 -0.04
Point 6 0.4997 * 0.2944 1.70
Point 7 0.2549  0.2210 1.15
Point 8 -0.1174  0.2390 -0.49
Point 9 -0.8139  0.6434 -1.27
Point 10 0.3006  0.2239 1.34
Point 11 -0.6449 ** 0.2657 -2.43
Point 12 -3.2773 *** 0.7294 -4.49
Point 13 0.4484  0.4526 0.99
Point 14 0.2446  0.2481 0.99
Point 15 0.0471  0.2267 0.21
Point 16 0.0427  0.2200 0.19
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7.8: FIML Results: Hazard of First Marriage 
First Marriage Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.6237 *** 0.3696 -7.10
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -0.4021 *** 0.0566 -7.10
Woman’s age 21 to 25 0.0157  0.0644 0.24
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.2194 ** 0.1120 -1.96
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.9848 *** 0.2071 -4.76
Woman’s age 36 and up -1.4229 *** 0.4906 -2.90
Year is before 1976 -1.0677 *** 0.1684 -6.34
Year is 1976 to 1980 -0.6959 *** 0.1042 -6.68
Year is 1981 to 1985 -0.5423 *** 0.0874 -6.21
Year is 1986 to 1990 -0.4621 *** 0.0688 -6.72
Year is 1991 to 1995 -0.4289 *** 0.0566 -7.58
Household in Urban area -0.3265 *** 0.1071 -3.05
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 0.8874 *** 0.0740 12.00
Woman Graduated Primary School 1.0459 *** 0.0748 13.98
Woman Graduated Junior High School 1.3442 *** 0.0791 16.99
Woman Graduated Senior High School 1.1318 *** 0.0848 13.34
Woman Graduated University or higher 1.2468 *** 0.1210 10.31
Woman can read -0.6412 *** 0.1764 -3.64
Woman can write 0.0356  0.1624 0.22
Woman attended school last year -0.1551 ** 0.0651 -2.38
Woman currently attends school -0.8656 *** 0.0804 -10.77
Schooling was available to woman -0.0825  0.0611 -1.35
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 -0.4071 *** 0.0523 -7.79
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.6773 *** 0.0676 -10.03
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 -0.4708 *** 0.0529 -8.89
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now 0.1602 * 0.0885 1.81
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.0896 * 0.0525 1.71
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now 0.1200 ** 0.0582 2.06
Woman is fertile 1.5251 *** 0.0837 18.23
Woman lives near her parents 0.5503 *** 0.0633 8.70
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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7.4.4 First Marriage 
 The marriage equation predicts the probability of first marriage. No 
characteristics of the husband are contained in this equation, so this is not billed as 
a matching model. Only characteristics of the woman are considered, and family 
planning and family characteristics act as exogenous instruments. Indonesia 
embarked on a massive campaign to incorporate family planning materials and 
education into the communities, and the women in this sample were the primary 
recipients of that effort. It appears from the results obtained here those programs 
were successful. The presence of family planning programs in the Puskesmas, 
Posyandu, and private facilities in the woman’s community when she resided at age 
seven all significantly decrease the probability of marriage. A decrease in the 
probability of marriage is representative of a delay in the age of first marriage; it 
does not indicate fewer women are getting married, although this may be the case. 
Many women in the sample are of the age where they will marry with high probability 
outside of the observed survey period. The presence of family planning available at 
the time of the marriage decision significantly and positively influences the marriage 
decision. The availability of contraception may be a driving force behind this 
decision. 
 Fertility of the woman is highly correlated to her age, and thus is positively 
associated with marriage. Women who live in the vicinity of her parents may have a 
motivation to leave the household, or have access to family support systems, this 
significantly and positively affects the decision to marry. 
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 The woman’s education variables are highly significant and positive, which 
implies completion of education milestones positively predicts marriage, as these 
indicators are all relative to no education. Summary statistics in Chapter 6 show 
women typically marry a few years after the completion of school. Literacy is a 
negative predictor of marriage.  
 Woman age 16 to 20 is the omitted category in the age analysis, and women 
age 21 to 25 had a insignificant but positive probability of marriage. All other age 
categories predict a significant decrease in the probability of marriage. This is 
consistent with the average age of first marriage. This is also consistent with the 
observed sample statistics. 
 The omitted year category in the analysis was 1996 through 1999. All other 
years prior to these years had a significant and decreased probability of marriage. 
Again, these year dummies correlate strongly to the age of the sample, and most 
likely do not contain any information about specific year effects. 
7.4.5 Women’s Employment 
 The employment equation predicts the probability of working in each of the 
four years spanning the financial crisis. Exogenous instruments for this analysis are 
producer prices, the presence of jobs in different industries, and the related wages 
for those industries. The price of gasoline positively and significantly predicts 
employment of the woman, whereas the price of sugar negatively and 
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Table 7.8a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Hazard of First Marriage 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.5073  0.3355 -1.51
Point 3 -0.1030  0.3404 -0.30
Point 4 -0.6416 * 0.3374 -1.90
Point 5 -0.5605 * 0.3416 -1.64
Point 6 -0.7394 ** 0.3396 -2.18
Point 7 -0.0250  0.3572 -0.07
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 -0.0985  0.2691 -0.37
Point 3 0.7311 *** 0.2119 3.45
Point 4 0.4722 *** 0.1730 2.73
Point 5 0.6770 ** 0.3309 2.05
Point 6 -0.0799  0.2735 -0.29
Point 7 0.0924  0.2035 0.45
Point 8 0.6194 *** 0.1747 3.55
Point 9 0.2298  0.3112 0.74
Point 10 0.3700 ** 0.1467 2.52
Point 11 0.0301  0.4075 0.07
Point 12 0.7769 *** 0.2144 3.62
Point 13 0.9977 ** 0.3929 2.54
Point 14 0.3076 * 0.1861 1.65
Point 15 0.4495 *** 0.1737 2.59
Point 16 -0.2917  0.1828 -1.60
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
significantly predicts the women will participate in the wage earning labor force. 
Industrial sector wages for women have no impact on the probability of working, 
however the presence of agricultural jobs and the wages received by women in 
those jobs significantly increases the probability a woman will work for a wage. 
 If a woman is married, she is less likely to work, and if she has children, she 
is more likely to work the more children she has. This result is counterintuitive; we 
would expect large households to require the mother to stay home and raise the 
children. It may be the demand for income in a large household is greater than the 
demand for the woman’s contribution to household 
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Table 7.9: FIML Results: Woman Works for a Wage 
Works For a Wage Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.6324  2.1692 -1.21
Married  -2.5518 ** 1.1566 -2.21
Ever Married      -0.7033  0.7076 -0.99
Mother has 1 child 0.2741  0.2891 0.95
Mother has 2 children 1.0852 ** 0.4382 2.48
Mother has 3 children 0.9156 ** 0.4568 2.00
Mother has 4 children 1.3829 ** 0.5580 2.48
Mother has 5 or more children 3.3816 *** 0.7010 4.82
Husband’s age 20 or younger -1.6668 ** 0.7402 -2.25
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.7372 ** 0.3298 -2.24
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.1381  0.3184 0.43
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -7.1817 *** 0.7121 -10.09
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -5.0327 *** 0.5019 -10.03
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -3.9973 *** 0.4118 -9.71
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -2.0101 *** 0.3350 -6.00
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.8693 *** 0.2757 -3.15
Year 1996 -1.7508 *** 0.3031 -5.78
Year 1997 -1.1853 *** 0.2817 -4.21
Year 1998 -0.5678 *** 0.1303 -4.36
Household in Urban area -1.0923 ** 0.4718 -2.32
Woman currently attends school -0.6166  0.4324 -1.43
Woman started but did not graduate Primary School 2.3067 *** 0.4265 5.41
Woman Graduated Primary School 1.4337 *** 0.4785 3.00
Woman Graduated Junior High School 1.1936  0.6122 1.95
Woman Graduated Senior High School 1.7060 *** 0.5050 3.38
Woman Graduated University or higher 2.9005 *** 0.6846 4.24
Husband currently attends school -0.4171  0.7998 -0.52
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.6061  0.4440 1.37
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.4495  0.5187 -0.87
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.3607  0.5404 -0.67
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.2009  0.5331 0.38
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.6601  0.6052 1.09
Husband is Self Employed 0.6531  0.5477 1.19
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.5957  0.6961 0.86
Husband works for the government 4.6449 *** 0.6845 6.79
Husband works for a corporation 0.7893  0.5006 1.58
Community is Underdeveloped -0.4543  0.2944 -1.54
Main source of income in community is Farming 0.8130 *** 0.3073 2.65
Average Community Price for Gasoline 0.6515 *** 0.1913 3.41
Average Community Price for Salt -0.1234  0.1511 -0.82
Average Community Price for Sugar -1.7672 * 0.9922 -1.78
Community employs in the Industrial Sector 0.0149  0.3142 0.05
Average community industrial wage for women -0.4148  0.4194 -0.99
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -1.3185 *** 0.2802 -4.71
Average community agricultural wage for women 1.4320 *** 0.4941 2.90
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7.9a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Woman Works for a Wage 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 1.9906  1.8548 1.07
Point 3 4.1569 ** 1.8829 2.21
Point 4 0.5573  1.9039 0.29
Point 5 3.4910 * 1.8391 1.90
Point 6 -0.1456  1.9033 -0.08
Point 7 0.6417  1.8961 0.34
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 12.0733 *** 1.2004 10.06
Point 3 -8.1463 *** 1.7036 -4.78
Point 4 10.5862 *** 0.7007 15.11
Point 5 -8.4985 *** 1.2229 -6.95
Point 6 2.4524 *** 0.7023 3.49
Point 7 -7.3108 *** 1.5440 -4.74
Point 8 5.4942 *** 0.5257 10.45
Point 9 -12.0589  19.7611 -0.61
Point 10 -10.6210 *** 0.9630 -11.03
Point 11 -2.0842  1.2889 -1.62
Point 12 5.8776 *** 1.0508 5.59
Point 13 -0.8986  0.8199 -1.10
Point 14 5.2666 *** 0.5198 10.13
Point 15 -0.6450  0.5970 -1.08
Point 16 8.0595 *** 0.7432 10.85
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
tasks, especially if other family resources are available such as other family member 
available to raise children. 
 The age of the woman indicates the younger the woman, the less likely she is 
to work. The woman is also less likely to work the younger the husband is. Urban 
households predict a woman is less likely to work relative to a rural household, also 
a very counterintuitive result. We should expect women in urban settings to be more 
likely to work. One possible explanation for this is labor opportunities for women in 
rural settings are driven by the availability of agricultural tasks. 
 Women with more education are more likely to work relative to women with 
no education, a very intuitive result. A husband’s education has no impact on the 
wife’s probability of working. The industry where the husband is employed does not 
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affect the woman’s employment, unless the husband works as a government 
employee, which significantly increases the woman’s probability of working for a 
wage.  
7.4.6 Household Income 
 The exogenous instruments in the income equation consisted of producer 
prices and characteristics of the labor force in the community where the woman 
resides. Of the instruments in the analysis, five are significant. A community which 
predominates in farming has a significant decrease in income. Communities which 
predominate in social services have significantly higher income. Communities with 
either industrial or agricultural jobs have significantly lower income, and agricultural 
wages for women are positively and significantly related to income. Industrial wages 
for women are also positively related to household income, but not quite significant 
at the ten percent level. Higher wages offered to women will increase their 
propensity to work, and will therefore increase household income. 
 There are significant year effects, most likely due to the crisis. With inflation 
as it was throughout the crisis, real incomes were significantly higher in 1996 and 
1997 relative to 1998 and 1999. Recall the crisis did not begin until July of 1997, and 
there would be some lag for the effects to trickle down to each community. Effects at 
the community level marketplace were most apparent by 
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Table 7.10: FIML Results: Income Equation 
Income Estimate Error Z 
Constant 0.4028  0.3520 1.14
Year 1996 0.9554 *** 0.0548 17.42
Year 1997 0.2582 *** 0.0477 5.41
Year 1998 0.0097  0.0186 0.52
Married  -1.3969 *** 0.2870 -4.87
Ever Married      0.3383  0.2610 1.30
Mother has 1 child 0.0881 * 0.0490 1.80
Mother has 2 children 0.2012 *** 0.0597 3.37
Mother has 3 children 0.2946 *** 0.0759 3.88
Mother has 4 children 0.2809 *** 0.0942 2.98
Mother has 5 or more children 0.3999 *** 0.1276 3.13
Husband’s age 20 or younger -0.0350  0.0950 -0.37
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0730 ** 0.0350 -2.09
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.0555  0.0396 1.40
Woman’s age 11 to 15 0.0145  0.1390 0.11
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -0.1630 * 0.0902 -1.81
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -0.1290 * 0.0681 -1.90
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.1105 ** 0.0541 -2.04
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.1179 *** 0.0424 -2.78
Household in Urban area 0.3349 *** 0.0841 3.98
Woman currently attends school -0.0228  0.1029 -0.22
Woman started but did not graduate Primary School -0.2081 *** 0.0717 -2.90
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0123  0.0736 -0.17
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.1229  0.0803 1.53
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.2270 *** 0.0847 2.68
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.5228 *** 0.1027 5.09
Husband currently attends school -0.2010  0.1493 -1.35
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.1184  0.0735 -1.61
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0406  0.0714 -0.57
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0081  0.0818 -0.10
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0252  0.0774 0.33
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.1416  0.1145 1.24
Woman Works For a Wage 1.2119 *** 0.0799 15.16
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1299 ** 0.0550 2.36
Husband is Self Employed 4.1109 *** 0.1354 30.35
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.6447 *** 0.2151 3.00
Husband works for the government 4.2656 *** 0.1475 28.91
Husband works for a corporation 4.0825 *** 0.1376 29.66
Community is Underdeveloped -0.0806 ** 0.0368 -2.19
Main source of income in community is Farming -0.0776 * 0.0410 -1.90
Main source of income in community is Manufacturing 0.0105  0.0309 0.34
Main source of income in com is Building Construction 0.0376  0.0403 0.93
Main source of income in com is Large Retail / Tourism 0.0192  0.0594 0.32
Main source of income in com is Social Services 0.0681 ** 0.0347 1.96
Community employs in the Industrial Sector -0.0614  0.0490 -1.25
Average community industrial wage for men -0.0418  0.0457 -0.91
Average community industrial wage for women 0.0771  0.0598 1.29
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -0.1543 *** 0.0474 -3.26
Average community agricultural wage for men 0.0290  0.0362 0.80
Average community agricultural wage for women 0.1414 ** 0.0641 2.20
Estimated Standard Deviation 1.1574    
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Table 7.10a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Income Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 1.1155 *** 0.1771 6.30
Point 3 0.7913 *** 0.1891 4.18
Point 4 0.7798 *** 0.1935 4.03
Point 5 0.7918 *** 0.1927 4.11
Point 6 0.5759 *** 0.1779 3.24
Point 7 0.7401 *** 0.1877 3.94
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 2.3095 *** 0.2835 8.15
Point 3 1.2801 *** 0.1762 7.26
Point 4 0.0269  0.2008 0.13
Point 5 -3.6362 *** 0.2332 -15.59
Point 6 0.3302  0.2215 1.49
Point 7 -0.7779 *** 0.2046 -3.80
Point 8 0.7421 *** 0.2276 3.26
Point 9 3.1913 *** 0.2645 12.07
Point 10 0.9012 *** 0.1726 5.22
Point 11 -1.5058 *** 0.2326 -6.47
Point 12 0.3235  0.2478 1.31
Point 13 2.3331 *** 0.3620 6.45
Point 14 -0.2388  0.3074 -0.78
Point 15 0.3766 ** 0.1854 2.03
Point 16 1.8748 *** 0.2362 7.94
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
early 1998, which is confirmed by the dummy variables. 1998 was not significantly 
different from 1999. 
  Marriage has a significantly negative impact on household income.6  The 
presence of children seems to increase the demand for income, as households with 
more children seem to earn higher incomes. Recall there are no child wages 
included in the model, therefore that is not a possible explanation unless the parents 
report their child’s earnings in their own income. No attempt was made to explore 
this possibility.  
 An increase in the age of the husband and wife each predict higher 
household income, best explained by a human capital formation argument.  
                                                 
6 Draw your own conclusions from this. 
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Households in urban areas earn more than their rural counterparts, further 
supporting the argument for the agriculture instruments, which predict lower 
earnings in agricultural areas, located in rural communities. Women who finish 
senior high school or graduate from a university have significantly higher household 
income than those who did not attend school, most easily explained by a larger 
contribution to household income through higher wages offered to the higher 
educated wife. The husband’s education is surprisingly insignificant, at all levels of 
education. 
 A woman working for a wage is positively and significantly associated with 
household income. Less interesting, but more puzzling is the significance of those 
unpaid women still predicting a higher household income. The model restricts 
woman who report themselves as unpaid family workers, but report a positive wage 
to be recoded as working for a wage. Thus there is some other phenomenon 
occurring with the husband’s income. Perhaps husbands who have higher income 
are economically stable enough to allow for opportunities for their wives to perform 
other duties in the household, or more likely, from a survey standpoint, the husband 
is claiming the economic benefit reaped by the wife in their survey responses. 
 The husband’s employment is as expected highly positive and significant, 
with the highest paid employees reporting government employment, followed by self 
employment, and then corporate employees.  
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7.4.7 Per-Capita Consumption 
 The final equation in the seven equation model predicts the level of 
household consumption. As in the income equation, this continuous equation’s 
coefficients are interpretable from the perspective of sign, significance and 
magnitude. The exogenous time varying instruments in this model are the producer 
prices and community employment characteristics as measured before and after the 
crisis. The indicator for community development predicts underdeveloped 
communities to experience significantly lower consumption.  Communities with a 
focus on agriculture have significantly lower household consumption, yet women’s 
wages in the agricultural sector predict higher household consumption.  
   Because consumption is measured only in 1997 and 2000, the later which 
acts as a proxy for consumption in 1999, there are only half as many observations in 
the data as there are for income and employment. Because of this, an indicator for 
1999 is the omitted category, and the indicator for 1997 is significantly positive, 
indicating higher consumption before the crisis. 
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Table 7.11: FIML Results: Consumption Equation 
Per-Capita Consumption Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant 4.3029 *** 0.2106 20.43
Year 1997 0.0696 ** 0.0312 2.23
Household Income 0.0015  0.0089 0.17
Married  0.0193  0.1225 0.16
Ever Married      -0.2445 ** 0.1081 -2.26
Mother has 1 child -0.0665 * 0.0361 -1.84
Mother has 2 children -0.0136  0.0505 -0.27
Mother has 3 children -0.0247  0.0690 -0.36
Mother has 4 children -0.1162  0.0850 -1.37
Mother has 5 or more children -0.2421 ** 0.0991 -2.44
Husband’s age 20 or younger 0.0137  0.0702 0.20
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0995 *** 0.0298 -3.34
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.0317  0.0281 1.13
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -0.3447 *** 0.0746 -4.62
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -0.2780 *** 0.0646 -4.30
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -0.2428 *** 0.0572 -4.25
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.1495 *** 0.0433 -3.45
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.0693 ** 0.0293 -2.37
Household in Urban area 0.5130 *** 0.0658 7.79
Woman currently attends school 0.1834 *** 0.0596 3.08
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School -0.0480  0.0375 -1.28
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0196  0.0376 -0.52
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.0846 * 0.0449 1.88
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.1057 ** 0.0494 2.14
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.3347 *** 0.0791 4.23
Husband currently attends school 0.0288  0.1328 0.22
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.0891 * 0.0463 -1.92
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0695  0.0504 -1.38
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0575  0.0542 -1.06
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0764  0.0525 1.46
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.1763 ** 0.0765 2.30
Woman Works For a Wage 0.0193  0.0485 0.40
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker 0.0446  0.0301 1.48
Husband is Self Employed 0.1186 * 0.0689 1.72
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1270 * 0.0766 1.66
Husband works for the government 0.2339 *** 0.0747 3.13
Husband works for a corporation -0.0065  0.0675 -0.10
Community is Underdeveloped -0.1473 *** 0.0279 -5.28
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -0.1290 *** 0.0372 -3.47
Average community agricultural wage for men -0.0058  0.0415 -0.14
Average community agricultural wage for 
women 0.2005 *** 0.0518 3.87
Estimated Standard Deviation 0.5674    
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7.11a: Heterogeneity Parameters: Consumption Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Community Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 0.5762 *** 0.0977 5.90
Point 3 0.3501 *** 0.0909 3.85
Point 4 0.2378 ** 0.1096 2.17
Point 5 -0.0224  0.0979 -0.23
Point 6 0.2030 ** 0.0919 2.21
Point 7 0.0939  0.1319 0.71
Individual Point 1 Normalized to Zero 
Point 2 1.6097 *** 0.2555 6.30
Point 3 1.5294 *** 0.1659 9.22
Point 4 0.7710 *** 0.1362 5.66
Point 5 0.7582 *** 0.1502 5.05
Point 6 0.8853 *** 0.1893 4.68
Point 7 0.5525 *** 0.1192 4.64
Point 8 1.3874 *** 0.1937 7.16
Point 9 1.1800 *** 0.2357 5.01
Point 10 0.6814 *** 0.0957 7.12
Point 11 1.4465 *** 0.1512 9.57
Point 12 0.6438 *** 0.1967 3.27
Point 13 0.7022 *** 0.1544 4.55
Point 14 0.6427 *** 0.1463 4.39
Point 15 0.9395 *** 0.0781 12.03
Point 16 0.5258 *** 0.1702 3.09
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
 Marriage predicts a decline in per-capita consumption.7  The model has 
controlled for household size through the number of children indicators, and so it 
may seem those who live alone may have higher consumption. This is consistent 
with Caldwell’s theories of societies becoming more consumption driven, and thus 
focusing more on economic advancement rather than the family. An increasing 
number of children present in the household decreases the amount of per-capita 
consumption. Again, this is very intuitive and predicted by the theoretical model: A 
larger number of individuals in the household naturally dilutes the available 
resources available to all other members of the household. This also validates that 
children in Indonesia are overall an economic burden, and not a short term supply of 
                                                 
7 Same as footnote 1 
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income producing labor, as can be the case in underdeveloped countries. If the 
parents in the household have consumption driven aspirations, as most individuals 
do, a decline in fertility seems an obvious method with which to increase available 
intra-household resources. 
 The husband’s age is insignificant at all levels. The woman’s age is positively 
predictive of per-capita consumption, with all age levels lower than the over thirty 
five category significantly lower. Households in urban areas have significantly higher 
consumption. This is also consistent with Caldwell’s theories where individuals more 
interested in success and economic advancement naturally migrated towards cities 
and urban areas, creating more economic opportunities and advancement.  
 The education of the parents is for the most part insignificant compared to the 
omitted category (no education) with the exception of university degrees. Both men 
and women who graduate from college have significantly higher per-capita 
consumption, proving the value of higher education. 
 The employment status of the woman and her husband are positively 
correlated with household consumption, as is household income, however, 
surprisingly none of these variables are significant at even the 10% level. Only if the 




7.5 Comparison of Methods 
 Inclusion of the six additional equations and sixteen individual and seven 
community heterogeneity mass points eliminated some of the bias caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity. This section compares the coefficients from the main 
conception equation as they were estimated with no heterogeneity controls and 
FIML DFM (heterogeneity controlled). Overwhelmingly, the coefficient estimates 
were extremely similar. It is worthwhile to note here the few major implications of 
controlling for heterogeneity. 
 The inclusion of previous births accounts for household demand for children.  
The marriage equation controls for the sample selection problem in the model where 
only women who were ever married participated in the survey and as such were 
included in the dataset. The remaining 4 equations; education, employment, income, 
and consumption are all intended to control for endogeneity bias these variables 
may have on the probability of birth and other variables in the model. 
 Coefficients on the year effects, marriage variables, education, husband’s age 
and employment, the urban indicator, household income, and the hardship indicator 
are all indistinguishable between the two different models.  
 Per-capita consumption is no longer significant in the controlled model, 
though the magnitude and sign of the coefficient estimate is relatively unchanged, 
further indicating that changes in consumption have very small effects on fertility. 
 Table 7.12 displays the most notable differences between the two analyses. 
First is the woman’s employment, which was predicted to be highly endogenous in 
this fertility model. In the uncontrolled model, a woman working for a wage is 
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predicted to have significantly lower probability of conceiving a child, whereas in the 
DFM model, where the endogeneity of the women’s employment is controlled for 
through the exogenous producer price and employment characteristic instruments, 
the woman’s employment status no longer plays a significant role in the decision to 
conceive a child. The unpaid family worker characteristic is identical between the 
two models. 
 The next notable differences are the indicators for the number of children 
already present in the household. Though the sign and significance is unchanged 
between the two models, the magnitude of the coefficients in the DFM model are 
consistently higher in magnitude, predicting a more dramatic decline in the 
probability of conception in the DFM model when considering existing children in the 
household. This is confirmed through simulations using both sets of parameters, and 
is reported in Chapter 8. 
 Finally, the education of the woman is very different between the models. In 
the uncontrolled model, all education variables predict an increase in the probability 
of conception relative to no education. The more education a woman obtained, the 
higher the probability of conception. In the controlled model, higher education, 
although insignificant, takes on the expected negative sign, indicating higher 
education predicts a decrease in fertility. 
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Constant -3.4808 *** -4.5999 *** 
Year 1996 -0.2124 *** -0.2676 *** 
Year 1997 -0.5349 *** -0.5701 *** 
Year 1998 -0.4480 *** -0.4597 *** 
Household Income 0.0162  0.0004  
Household Consumption -0.0534  -0.1460 *** 
Household Experienced a Hardship (Death, Sickness,…) -0.1712 * -0.1885  
Married  1.9391 *** 1.8730 *** 
Ever Married      1.8248 *** 1.4534 *** 
Mother has 1 child -2.0771 *** -1.6526 *** 
Mother has 2 children -2.8535 *** -2.2530 *** 
Mother has 3 children -2.9350 *** -2.2435 *** 
Mother has 4 children -2.6822 *** -1.8926 *** 
Mother has 5 or more children -2.8897 *** -1.9886 *** 
Household in Urban area 0.5880 *** 0.5502 *** 
Woman started but did not graduate Primary School -0.0194  0.0013  
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0778  -0.0118  
Woman Graduated Junior High School -0.0465  0.0582  
Woman Graduated Senior High School -0.0409  0.1431  
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.0037  0.2481  
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.0376  -0.0810  
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.1520  -0.2213 * 
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0265  -0.0994  
Husband Graduated Senior High School -0.0932  -0.1019  
Husband Graduated University or higher -0.0400  0.0162  
Woman Works For a Wage 0.1142  -0.3470 *** 
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker -0.3132 *** -0.3208 *** 
Husband is Self Employed 0.0049  0.0868  
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.0881  0.1127  
Husband works for the government 0.0726  0.2026  
Husband works for a corporation -0.0096  0.0693  
* = Significant at the 10% level;** = Significant at the 5% level;*** = Significant at the 1% level 
 




 Logit models such as the one estimated in this dissertation produce 
coefficient estimates that are interpretable with regards to direction and statistical 
significance, however the magnitudes of these coefficients are not immediately 
quantitatively interpretable with respect to the dependent variable. In order to 
calculate the marginal effects of the coefficients obtained through the full information 
maximum likelihood estimation using the discrete factor method, simulations must 
be run.  
To perform these uni-variate simulations, the following tasks are executed:  
First, a single characteristic variable within the original dataset is modified to a single 
value for the entire sample. For example, to estimate the marginal effects of 
unemployment, all the employment variables for every woman in the sample are 
simultaneously set to zero. Second, the coefficient estimates produced by the DFM 
estimation are perturbed according to a multivariate normal distribution. Third, the 
predicted probability of conception is calculated by year, individual, and for each 
combination of community and individual heterogeneity. Finally, the estimated 
heterogeneity weights are used to calculate a probability weighted average of each 
probability of conception for the four years spanning the financial crisis, with the
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overall probability of conception computed as a simple average of each of the 
individual year estimates. This calculation is iterated ten thousand replications, and 
the resulting normally distributed probabilities are averaged and reported in the 
following tables.  
 The first simulation was performed with no alterations to the data, and is 
denoted the base case. This base case utilizes the predicted parameters and 
heterogeneity coefficients from the DFM results reported in chapter 7 with 16 
individual and 7 community mass points. This estimation predicted the women in the 
sample, who are aged 15 to 35 in 1996, have an average per year probability of 
conceiving a child of 19.3%. Notice the sharp decline in fertility predicted in 1997, 
measured as an absolute 3% decline in fertility, or in relative terms, a 16% decline in 
the probability of conception in the year the crisis began. Recall from earlier 
discussions the catalyst which caused the financial crisis emerged in July of 1997. 
The initial decline from 1996 to 1997 may either be noise in the model, or may be 
due to the crisis, though we would expect the true marginal effects of the crisis to be 
understated in the data because the crisis began in July and lagged in its effects on 
individuals, thus the true impacts of the crisis were only felt for a fraction of 1997. 
Fertility increases in 1998 back to the levels observed in1996. The number of 
conceptions explodes in 1999, a relative 38% increase, or an absolute 6.8% 
increase from the previous year, either from delayed births from previous years, or a 
true increase in the probability of conception as a result of the financial crisis.  
 These baseline measurements provide the true predicted probability of 
conception based on the data and the estimated coefficients. All subsequent 
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simulations provide a means to determine marginal effects of specific parameters. 
Within each analysis, the baseline results are reported in the table as a comparator 
to the results derived from each simulation. Section 8.2 focuses on the simulations 
of economic variables in the conception equation. Section 8.3 discusses household 
endogenous variables which have been previously discussed as critical factors in 
the conception decision, and section 8.4 provides a brief comparison of endogenous 
variables showing different results between the controlled and uncontrolled analysis.   
 
8.2 Simulations of Economic Variables 
 The theoretical model is based on a change in real income from before to 
after the crisis, and is proxied for by real per-capita consumption measured in 1997 
(before the crisis) and again in 2000, after the effects of the crisis had dissipated. 
Table 8.1 displays the results of the uni-variate analysis of fixing per-capita 
consumption at various levels. Average per-capita consumption is 1.1 million Rp, 
therefore the first simulation simulates very poor households. Imposing a level of 
consumption of 16,318 (The lowest recorded level of consumption in the model is 
17,189 Rp) results in a probability of conception of 21%, a 2% absolute relative 
increase from baseline. Increasing consumption to levels equal to the highest 
consumption recorded in the sample of 28.7 million Rp decreases the probability of 
conception by 2%. Absolute levels of consumption, though insignificant, do exert an 
influence on the probability of conception, lending further to the claim children are 
inferior in this sample. Plotting the average change in conception with respect to the 
log of per-capita consumption results in a linear series with a slope of -.43, which 
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implies a change in the probability of conception of roughly one-half of one percent 
given a change of one in the log of per-capita consumption. The overall result 
obtained from this analysis shows the magnitude of the fertility increase given a 
decline in per-capita consumption is very small, and conversely, the decrease given 
an increase in consumption is also quite small. The results of this analysis display 
how changes in consumption have a small impact on the overall fertility within the 
household. 
 95% confidence intervals are included in tables 8.1 and 8.1a, but are omitted 
for the subsequent tables, as the results show over 10,000 iterations, the sampling 
error is quite small, resulting in well confined intervals. Table 8.1a displays the 
results of simulations where the per-capita consumption of a household is altered by 
a discrete percentage. Again, this analysis shows how negative changes in the 
household economy result in very small increases in the probability of conception. 




Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Baseline 19.05% 18.26% 15.49% 17.90% 24.56%
16,318 21.45% 20.6% ± 0.17 17.61% ± 0.17 20.21% ± 0.16 27.4% ± 0.16 
59,874 20.61% 19.77% ± 0.15 16.86% ± 0.15 19.39% ± 0.15 26.41% ± 0.14 
442,413 19.37% 18.56% ± 0.13 15.77% ± 0.13 18.2% ± 0.13 24.94% ± 0.11 
3,269,017 18.29% 17.52% ± 0.14 14.85% ± 0.14 17.17% ± 0.14 23.62% ± 0.13 
24,154,953 17.34% 16.6% ± 0.17 14.06% ± 0.17 16.27% ± 0.16 22.43% ± 0.16 
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Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Baseline 19.05% 18.26% 15.49% 17.90% 24.56%
-1% 19.06% 18.26% +/- 0.13 15.5% +/- 0.13 17.9% +/- 0.12 24.56% +/- 0.11 
-5% 19.08% 18.28% +/- 0.13 15.52% +/- 0.13 17.92% +/- 0.12 24.59% +/- 0.11 
-10% 19.11% 18.31% +/- 0.13 15.55% +/- 0.13 17.95% +/- 0.12 24.63% +/- 0.11 
-15% 19.14% 18.35% +/- 0.13 15.57% +/- 0.13 17.98% +/- 0.12 24.67% +/- 0.11 
-20% 19.18% 18.38% +/- 0.13 15.6% +/- 0.13 18.02% +/- 0.12 24.71% +/- 0.11 
-25% 19.21% 18.41% +/- 0.13 15.63% +/- 0.13 18.05% +/- 0.12 24.75% +/- 0.11 
-50% 19.45% 18.64% +/- 0.13 15.84% +/- 0.13 18.28% +/- 0.13 25.04% +/- 0.11 
 
 Table 8.2 displays the changes to the probability of conception based on 
percentage changes to the household income. As can be seen in the table, income 
changes have no effect on the probability of conception, as was also predicted in 
chapter 7 by the consistent insignificance of the income coefficient estimate under 
different model specifications. 
Table 8.2: The Effects of Imposing Income Changes 
Income Change (%) All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
5% 19.2% 18.5% 15.6% 17.9% 24.8%
10% 19.2% 18.5% 15.5% 17.9% 24.8%
15% 19.2% 18.4% 15.5% 17.9% 24.8%
20% 19.1% 18.4% 15.5% 17.9% 24.7%
30% 19.1% 18.4% 15.5% 17.8% 24.7%
50% 19.0% 18.3% 15.4% 17.7% 24.6%
75% 18.8% 18.1% 15.2% 17.6% 24.3%
99% 18.1% 17.4% 14.6% 16.8% 23.4%
 
 Table 8.3 displays the impact of a loss to the household. This variable 
includes individual economic and non-economic losses. The simulation results show 
houses who report a loss of any sort in the survey are likely to have an average 
1.7% absolute decrease in the probability of conception. 
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Table 8.3: The Effects of a Loss to the Household 
Income Change (%) All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
No Loss 19.4% 18.5% 15.7% 18.3% 25.1%
Loss 17.7% 16.9% 14.3% 16.7% 23.1%
 
8.3 Simulations of Household Variables 
 In addition to analysis of the economic variables, I performed simulations on 
structural household variables. The results presented in chapter 7 indicate some of 
these variables may exert a larger impact on fertility than the economic variables. I 
next altered the number of children present in the household. The coefficients on the 
number of children have consistently carried tremendous magnitudes and 
significance relative to other variables in the model regardless of the specification of 
the model. Therefore I expected this simulation to display the largest effects on the 
probability of conception. As displayed in table 8.4, this was exactly the case. 
Households without any children entering the period of interest in 1996 have greater 
than a 50% annual chance of having their first child. Following the first child, the 
probability of having additional children falls off rapidly after the birth of the first child, 
and continues to decline with the addition of more children, with the minor exception 
of the state of having four children:  The probability of having a fifth child is higher 
than the probability of having a fourth child, indicating some large family effects, 
possibly indicating a bimodal distribution of children, with the second mode at some 
family size larger than four children.  
 Very similar to the total number of children in the household simulation, I 
instead added children to the previous number of existing children. The most 
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Table 8.4: The Effects of Modifying the Number of Children Present in the 
Household 
Number of Children 
in the Household 
All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
0 Kids 51.8% 48.5% 45.6% 50.5% 62.6%
1 Kid 18.1% 17.4% 14.5% 16.5% 24.1%
2 Kids 10.4% 10.0% 8.2% 9.3% 14.0%
3 Kids 10.1% 9.7% 8.0% 9.0% 13.6%
4 Kids 11.9% 11.4% 9.4% 10.7% 16.0%
5 Kids 10.2% 9.9% 8.1% 9.2% 13.8%
 
notable result from this analysis, displayed in table 8.5, is how the probability of 
conception quickly falls to the lower bound around 10% per year with the addition of 
only one child, indicating many households may be close to or have already 
achieved their target fertility. 
Table 8.5: The Effects of Increasing the Number of Children Present in the 
Household 
Add to the number of 
children in the 
household 
All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
+ 1 Kid 11.6% 11.2% 9.1% 10.5% 15.7%
+ 2 Kids 10.6% 10.2% 8.4% 9.5% 14.3%
+ 3 Kids 10.7% 10.3% 8.4% 9.6% 14.4%
+ 4 Kids 10.5% 10.1% 8.3% 9.4% 14.1%
+ 5 Kids 10.2% 9.9% 8.1% 9.2% 13.8%
 
 Table 8.6 displays the effects of modifications to the woman’s age. The 
woman’s current age was modified by adding varying years to her current age. 
Adding one or two years to the current age results in no change in the probability of 
conception. Aging the woman by more than five years decreases the probability of 
conception by a small amount, indicating births are distributed across a wide range 
of ages throughout the sample of women.   
 Table 8.7 displays the effects of setting all women’s labor force participation 
status to unemployed. This does not change their probability of conception as  
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Table 8.6: The Effects of the Woman’s Age 
Age All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
+ 1 year 19.5% 18.6% 15.7% 18.4% 25.2%
+ 2 year 19.4% 18.7% 15.8% 18.2% 24.9%
+ 5 year 19.1% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.4%
+ 10 year 17.8% 17.3% 14.6% 16.8% 22.5%
+ 20 year 15.0% 14.4% 12.1% 14.1% 19.4%
 
compared to the baseline analysis. If all women are working for a wage, then the 
probability increases by one absolute percentage point. However, the largest change 
is observed for those women working without earning a wage. These women predict 
a relative 16 percent decrease, or an absolute 3% decrease in the probability of 
conception. This provides further evidence for the claim that at the margin, women 
devoting energies to the labor force are more likely to have children if they are 
formally compensated. 
Table 8.7: The Effects of Woman’s Employment Status 
Woman’s 
Employment All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
Unemployed 19.1% 18.4% 15.4% 18.0% 24.7%
Unpaid Family Worker 16.1% 15.5% 12.9% 15.1% 21.0%
Working for Wage 20.8% 20.0% 16.9% 19.6% 26.7%
 
 Table 8.8 displays the endogenous education variables. In the coefficient 
estimate results, the insignificance of the education variables was determined, and 
through this simulation, it can be seen the marginal effects on the probability of 
conception are negligible. 
 The next simulation, displayed in table 8.9 provides the effects of marital 
status on the probability of conception. Never married women have the expected 
very low probability of conception. Women ever married, but currently not married 
have a probability of conception roughly one third that of married women. 
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Table 8.8: The Effects of Woman’s Education 
Woman Ed All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
No education 20.0% 19.2% 16.2% 18.9% 25.9%
Some Primary Ed 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.2% 25.0%
Grad Prim 18.8% 18.0% 15.1% 17.6% 24.3%
Grad Jr. High 19.4% 18.6% 15.7% 18.3% 25.1%
Grad Sr. High 19.4% 18.6% 15.7% 18.3% 25.1%
Grad College 20.6% 19.7% 16.7% 19.4% 26.4%
 
Table 8.9: The Effects of Marital Status 
Marriage All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
No marriage 2.8% 3.4% 2.5% 2.5% 3.0%
Currently Married 27.2% 31.6% 24.8% 24.5% 28.1%
Ever married, not 
currently married 10.3% 12.4% 9.1% 9.1% 10.7%
 
 As discovered in chapter 7, the urban indicator produced a coefficient 
estimate which was counterintuitive. I felt it was important to report the results of the 
simulation on the urban indicator, because it truly was surprising that urban 
households predicted a higher probability of conception, simply because urban 
households generally have smaller families than rural households, whose economy 
is traditionally dominated by agriculture. In this dataset however, it is urban 
households who indicate a higher absolute probability of conception by 2%, as 
observed in table 8.10. The marginal effect of this coefficient is small, but still 
significant. One possible interpretation of this, though totally unsubstantiated, is that 
because urban households were more impacted by the crisis, the urban indicator is 
in some way another proxy for the financial crisis, and thus urban households 
increased their fertility as a response to the crisis. 
Table 8.10: The Effects of Urban Vs. Rural 
Residence All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.3% 18.5% 15.6% 18.1% 24.9%
All Rural  18.2% 17.4% 14.7% 17.2% 23.7%
All Urban 20.2% 19.3% 16.4% 19.0% 26.0%
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8.4 Simulation comparisons using Uncontrolled Results 
 As a final comparison, simulations on the variables whose coefficients varied 
between the heterogeneity controlled and uncontrolled models were performed 
using the heterogeneity uncontrolled coefficient estimates. The results from these 
analyses give an idea of the changes to the marginal effects of the coefficients from 
the uncontrolled analysis to the heterogeneity controlled analysis. Below I present 
the results of those simulations and discuss the differences between them and the 
heterogeneity controlled results presented in the previous section. The baseline 
results were recalculated using the procedure discussed above, but with the 
uncontrolled heterogeneity coefficients presented in section 7.2. The baseline 
probability differed from the original baseline probability by 0.2% points, indicating 
the two models are comparable using this method. 
 Heterogeneity uncontrolled and controlled results presented differing 
significances of the effects of per-capita consumption on the probability of 
conception. I first compare the effects of varying per capita consumption using the 
uncontrolled heterogeneity results to see what effects these modifications have 
compared to the heterogeneity controlled model. The analysis shows a similar 
increase in the probability of conception following a decrease in consumption, 
however the magnitude of this shift is miniscule. A 50% decrease in per-capita 
consumption indicates a .5% decrease in the probability of conception. The 
difference in the probability between the poorest group and the richest group is a 
5.8% decrease in the uncontrolled results versus a 3.1% decrease in the 
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heterogeneity controlled results. Controlling for the heterogeneity within the model 
caused a decrease in the marginal effect of consumption. 
 Table 8.11 presents the marginal effects from the number of children currently 
in the household on the probability of conceiving another child. As previously 
discussed, these variables exerted the largest effects on the entire model. The 
effects using the uncontrolled model produced more muted effects. For example, no 
children indicates a probability of 43.3%, but with the heterogeneity controlled 
coefficients, the probability was higher at 51.8%. At the opposite end of the scale, 
having five or more children in the household predicts a decline in probability to 
13.6%, whereas in the controlled model, this probability was lower, at 10.2%. This is 
all consistent with the findings in chapter 7, where the magnitudes of the coefficients 
on the family size variables in the controlled model were larger than in the 
uncontrolled model. 
Table 8.11: The Effects of Modifying the Number of Children Present in the 
Household Using Uncontrolled Coefficients 
Number of Children 
in the Household 
All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Baseline 19.1% 18.3% 15.5% 17.9% 24.6%
0 Kids 43.3% 41.0% 37.3% 41.6% 53.4%
1 Kid 17.3% 16.5% 13.9% 15.8% 22.8%
2 Kids 11.4% 10.9% 9.1% 10.4% 15.2%
3 Kids 11.6% 11.1% 9.2% 10.5% 15.4%
4 Kids 14.5% 13.9% 11.6% 13.2% 19.2%
5 Kids 13.6% 13.1% 10.9% 12.4% 18.1%
 
 The next set of variables which appeared significantly different between the 
controlled and uncontrolled analyses was the set of woman’s employment variables. 
The most notable difference observed in table 8.12 is the predicted probability for 
those women working for a wage. In this uncontrolled model, the probability is much 
lower than the baseline and unemployed predicted probabilities. It is also 
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significantly lower than the predicted probability when all women are working for a 
wage using the heterogeneity controlled model which controls for the endogeneity of 
the woman’s labor force participation. In this uncontrolled mode the marginal effects 
of working for a wage cause a decline in the probability of conception, whereas in 
the controlled model, working for a wage is slightly higher than baseline and 
unemployed.  
 Table 8.13 displays the effects of the woman’s education variables. These 
endogenous variables were shown to have different coefficient estimates between 
the controlled and uncontrolled models. The uncontrolled model indicates larger 
marginal effects on the probability of conception as predicted through the set of 
education variables. This quantifies the claims made in chapter 7 which stated the 
education of the woman becomes insignificant once the endogeneity of education 
was controlled for in the multi-equation model.   
 The simulations using the uncontrolled coefficients produced the expected 
results based on the analysis in section 7.4. The controlled model produced larger 
marginal effects on the variables indicating the household size, and smaller marginal 
effects on education and employment, indicating the heterogeneity controls 
eliminated the effects of education and employment, while placing more emphasis 
on household structural factors such as household composition. This could indicate 
fertility plans are not subject to sudden changes in short run economic shocks at the 




Table 8.12: The Effects of Woman’s Employment Status Using Uncontrolled 
Coefficients 
Woman’s 
Employment All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.1% 18.3% 15.5% 17.9% 24.6%
Unemployed 20.6% 19.7% 16.7% 19.4% 26.6%
Unpaid Family Worker 17.3% 16.5% 13.9% 16.2% 22.5%
Working for Wage 16.9% 16.1% 13.6% 15.8% 22.0%
 
Table 8.13: The Effects of Woman’s Education Using Uncontrolled Coefficients 
Woman Ed All Years 1996 1997 1998 1999
Baseline 19.1% 18.3% 15.5% 17.9% 24.6%
No education 18.4% 17.7% 14.9% 17.3% 23.8%
Some Primary Ed 18.6% 17.9% 15.1% 17.5% 24.0%
Grad Prim 18.5% 17.7% 14.9% 17.3% 23.8%
Grad Jr. High 19.1% 18.4% 15.5% 18.0% 24.6%
Grad Sr. High 20.3% 19.6% 16.5% 19.1% 26.0%
Grad College 22.0% 21.2% 18.0% 20.7% 27.9%
 
 
 CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The Asian Financial Crisis impacted Indonesians across the archipelago. This 
study specifically examines how couples altered their fertility plans in reaction to 
financial shocks. Most studies which examine income effects on fertility are 
performed on a macro scale and thus do not adequately control for the confounding 
effects of increases in child quality accompanying economic development. This 
study examines households over a short period in which the economic landscape 
exhibited large fluctuations. I assume child quality is held constant due to the rapid 
nature of the onset and departure of the financial crisis eliminating the opportunity 
for households to adjust child quality levels. 
 I first developed a simple theoretical model which predicts that the desired 
number of children will decrease as the mother’s education rises, which causes her 
future earning potential in the labor force to rise. Additional children negatively 
impact the mother’s leisure time, consumption, sibling quality, the mother’s ability to 
work. which consequently decreases household income, per-capita consumption, 
quality of other children, and negatively impacts the mother’s future wage potential 
by decreasing her current workforce experience. The model leaves the 
determination of the income effect with respect to the quantity of children uncertain 
and to be answered as an empirical question.  
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 To estimate the effects of the financial crisis, I employed this theoretical 
model to motivate the development of a seven equation empirical model to estimate 
the probability of conception during each of the four years surrounding the Asian 
financial crisis. The main equation is modeled as a multiple spell hazard where the 
dependent variable is whether or not a woman conceived a child in a given year, 
assuming a logistic distribution of the error term. The remaining six equations model 
previous live births of the mother, education and employment of the mother, marital 
status, household income, and per-capita consumption.  
 To identify changes in fertility behavior in response to individual financial 
shocks, measured by changes in per capita consumption and household income, I 
estimated the empirical model using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, an 
individual level economic and socio-demographic dataset. The survey followed 4076 
women from age seven through 1999, resulting in over 124-thousand woman-year 
observations in the dataset, with over 16 thousand woman-year observations from 
1996 through 1999. I used time varying data constructed from all three waves of the 
IFLS to construct a dynamic picture of each woman’s life with regards to education, 
marital status, conceptions and births, income and employment, and several 
community level variables, some of which serve as exogenous exclusion restrictions 
to aid in identification of the model.  
 The model framework is designed to estimate the probability of conception 
while controlling for sample selection and the endogeneity of education, female labor 
force participation, income, and consumption. To control for the heterogeneity in the 
model, the seven equations are simultaneously estimated using the full information 
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maximum likelihood discrete factor method estimation technique. The model was 
specified with 16 individual and 7 community level heterogeneity mass points. The 
entire model contained 747 parameters and was estimated using a proprietary 
estimation package coded in FORTRAN.  
 Household income imposes no effects on conception, uncontrolled results 
indicate households with a decrease in per-capita consumption are more likely to 
conceive children, however this coefficient is not significant in the heterogeneity 
controlled model, though the sign and magnitude remain the same. Households who 
experience a hardship predict a significant decline in the probability of conception. 
Simulations predict changes in the log of per-capita consumption impose no effect 
on the probability of conception, specifically a one percent change in the log of per-
capita consumption results in no noticeable change in the probability of conception. 
Therefore children appear to be neither inferior goods nor normal goods during the 
four years surrounding the financial crisis in Indonesia.  
 Economic effects may exert a small but existent impact on the probability of 
conceiving a child, however, the probability of conceiving an additional child is most 
determined by the existence of other children in the household, the mother’s age, 
and marital status. Though this model does not incorporate target fertility as a 
variable, I believe target fertility plays a large role in any family’s fertility decision, 
and thus families plan for the number and spacing of children, and in the absence of 
catastrophic events, indicated by the household loss variable, or tremendous shifts 
in real income (proxied for by per-capita consumption), these plans remain largely 
unchanged, as indicated by the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on 
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existing children. Families with less significant positive or negative impacts to their 
economies appear to have no altered fertility response due to the economic crisis.  
 Controlling for the endogenous variables in the model resulted in a decrease 
in the significance of consumption, education, and employment with regards to the 
probability of conception. The presence of other children in the household 
coefficients increased in magnitude. From this, I conclude that fertility preferences 
are more structurally rooted in cultural factors and permanent economic factors than 
in short run financial shocks. The results are robust to alternate specifications of the 
model, and the model identification is enhanced by exclusion restrictions which are 
correlated with explanatory variables in the main equations, but not with the 
probability of conception. 
 This dissertation provides a thorough examination of the climate in Indonesia 
during the financial crisis with regards to changes in fertility preferences. I confirm 
many of the significant findings of Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz (2005), and provide an 
additional perspective on the woman’s fertility decision with regards to short term 
financial shocks. Policy makers are interested in knowing the determinants of 
fertility, as many societies will be faced with questions of how to deal with aging 
populations as fertility rates in first world countries continue to fall. This work may 
indicate to policy makers around the world how the populations served react to 
changing financial climates with regards to fertility.  
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APPENDIX I 





Table A.1: Uncontrolled Results: Conception Equation 
Conception Estimate  Std Error Z 
Constant -4.5999 *** 0.6134 -7.50
Married  1.8730 *** 0.4959 3.78
Ever Married      1.4534 *** 0.4864 2.99
Household Income 0.0004  0.0187 0.02
Household Consumption -0.1460 *** 0.0351 -4.16
Household Experienced a Hardship (Death, 
Sickness,…) -0.1885  0.0967 -1.95
Woman Works For a Wage -0.3470 *** 0.0611 -5.68
Mother has 1 child -1.6526 *** 0.0667 -24.77
Mother has 2 children -2.2530 *** 0.0869 -25.92
Mother has 3 children -2.2435 *** 0.1056 -21.25
Mother has 4 children -1.8926 *** 0.1248 -15.17
Mother has 5 or more children -1.9886 *** 0.1402 -14.18
Husband’s age 20 or younger 0.1163  0.1551 0.75
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0051  0.0693 -0.07
Husband’s age 40 or older -0.3026 *** 0.0903 -3.35
Woman’s age 13 -1.0689  0.6695 -1.60
Woman’s age 14 -1.7248 *** 0.5569 -3.10
Woman’s age 15 -0.1148  0.2613 -0.44
Woman’s age 16 0.0382  0.2225 0.17
Woman’s age 17 0.0364  0.2011 0.18
Woman’s age 18 0.2906  0.1840 1.58
Woman’s age 19 0.0238  0.1794 0.13
Woman’s age 20 0.1364  0.1694 0.80
Woman’s age 21 0.1415  0.1627 0.87
Woman’s age 22 -0.1044  0.1634 -0.64
Woman’s age 23 0.1194  0.1567 0.76
Woman’s age 24 0.3316 ** 0.1501 2.21
Woman’s age 25 0.1621  0.1510 1.07
Woman’s age 26 0.2553 * 0.1443 1.77
Woman’s age 27 0.0177  0.1476 0.12
Woman’s age 28 0.1657  0.1412 1.17
Woman’s age 29 0.3415 ** 0.1379 2.48
Woman’s age 31 0.2291  0.1421 1.61
Woman’s age 32 -0.0143  0.1553 -0.09
Woman’s age 33 -0.0941  0.1581 -0.60
Woman’s age 34 -0.1055  0.1574 -0.67
Woman’s age 35 -0.0763  0.1616 -0.47
Woman’s age 36 -0.4979 ** 0.1954 -2.55
Woman’s age 37 -0.6150 ** 0.2420 -2.54
Year 1996 -0.2676 *** 0.0672 -3.98
Year 1997 -0.5701 *** 0.0676 -8.43
Year 1998 -0.4597 *** 0.0641 -7.17
Household in Urban area 0.5502 *** 0.1328 4.14
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Conception, cont. Estimate  Std Error Z 
North Sumatra Rural Area     0.9303 *** 0.1843 5.05
North Sumatra Urban Area     0.0819  0.1708 0.48
West Sumatra  Rural Area      0.8510 *** 0.1551 5.49
West Sumatra  Urban Area      0.5420 *** 0.1921 2.82
South Sumatra Rural Area      0.8500 *** 0.1522 5.59
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.2093  0.2266 -0.92
Lampung Rural Area            0.4115 *** 0.1527 2.70
Lampung Urban Area            0.0338  0.2671 0.13
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.4835 *** 0.1206 4.01
West Java Rural Area          0.0475  0.1174 0.40
West Java Urban Area          0.5167 *** 0.1291 4.00
Central Java Rural Area       0.0052  0.1477 0.03
Central Java Urban Area       0.3825 * 0.2074 1.84
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.1120  0.1640 -0.68
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.0397  0.1378 -0.29
East Java Rural Area          0.4493 * 0.2565 1.75
East Java Urban Area          0.0173  0.2315 0.07
Bali Rural Area               0.5050 *** 0.1515 3.33
Bali Urban Area               -0.1512  0.2319 -0.65
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.2752  0.1827 1.51
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area 0.1070  0.2070 0.52
South Kalimantan Rural Area   0.4075 ** 0.1782 2.29
South Kalimantan Urban Area   0.0791  0.1696 0.47
Woman is Protestant -0.4058  0.3045 -1.33
Woman is Catholic 0.5775  0.4842 1.19
Woman is Hindhu 1.0047 *** 0.3105 3.24
Woman is Buddhist -1.1776  0.8025 -1.47
Man is Protestant 0.7054 ** 0.3044 2.32
Man is Catholic -0.3537  0.5066 -0.70
Man is Hindhu -0.8188 *** 0.2757 -2.97
Man is Buddhist 0.6359  0.9836 0.65
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 0.0013  0.1152 0.01
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0118  0.1220 -0.10
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.0582  0.1282 0.45
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.1431  0.1327 1.08
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.2481  0.1734 1.43
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.0810  0.1097 -0.74
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.2213 * 0.1139 -1.94
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0994  0.1228 -0.81
Husband Graduated Senior High School -0.1019  0.1235 -0.82
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.0162  0.1633 0.10
Woman can read 0.0962  0.2156 0.45
Woman can write 0.0127  0.2058 0.06
Husband can read 0.4796 ** 0.2238 2.14
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Conception, cont. Estimate  Std Error Z 
Husband can write -0.3933 * 0.2107 -1.87
Woman attended school last year 0.0752  0.1426 0.53
Woman currently attends school -0.0896  0.1686 -0.53
Husband attended school last year 0.1356  0.2274 0.60
Husband currently attends school -0.2025  0.2622 -0.77
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker -0.3208 *** 0.0831 -3.86
Husband is Self Employed 0.0868  0.1438 0.60
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1127  0.2027 0.56
Husband works for the government 0.2026  0.1683 1.20
Husband works for a corporation 0.0693  0.1429 0.49
Community Subjective Wellbeing - Worse -0.0039  0.0666 -0.06
Community Subjective Wellbeing - Better -0.0926  0.0960 -0.96
Households in Community in general are worse 
now 0.0384  0.0972 0.39
Households in Community in general are better 
now -0.0569  0.0982 -0.58
Households in Community  better and worse now -0.0415  0.1236 -0.34
Individual Subjective Wellbeing – Expect Worse 0.1997  0.2057 0.97
Individual Subjective Wellbeing – Expect Better -0.0233  0.0507 -0.46
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 0.0034  0.0638 0.05
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.1663 ** 0.0731 -2.27
Family Planning Available in Private Facility when 
woman age 7 -0.0097  0.0584 -0.17
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now 1.3658 ** 0.5614 2.43
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.1252  0.0821 1.52
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now 0.4476 * 0.2530 1.77
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Table A.2: FIML Results: Conception Equation 
Conception Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -3.4808 *** 0.4722 -7.37
Married  1.9391 *** 0.6050 3.21
Ever Married      1.8248 *** 0.6048 3.02
Household Income 0.0162  0.0274 0.59
Household Consumption -0.0534  0.0684 -0.78
Household Experienced a Hardship (Death, 
Sickness,…) -0.1712 * 0.0920 -1.86
Woman Works For a Wage 0.1142  0.1375 0.83
Mother has 1 child -2.0771 *** 0.1059 -19.61
Mother has 2 children -2.8535 *** 0.1371 -20.81
Mother has 3 children -2.9350 *** 0.1543 -19.02
Mother has 4 children -2.6822 *** 0.1831 -14.65
Mother has 5 or more children -2.8897 *** 0.1997 -14.47
Husband’s age 20 or younger 0.0017  0.1655 0.01
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0630  0.0744 -0.85
Husband’s age 40 or older -0.2931 *** 0.0973 -3.01
Woman’s age 13 -1.6761 *** 0.6498 -2.58
Woman’s age 14 -2.3180 *** 0.6056 -3.83
Woman’s age 15 -0.6593 ** 0.2804 -2.35
Woman’s age 16 -0.4742 ** 0.2221 -2.14
Woman’s age 17 -0.4460 ** 0.2037 -2.19
Woman’s age 18 -0.1514  0.1900 -0.80
Woman’s age 19 -0.3871 ** 0.1951 -1.98
Woman’s age 20 -0.2031  0.1829 -1.11
Woman’s age 21 -0.1322  0.1655 -0.80
Woman’s age 22 -0.3329 ** 0.1640 -2.03
Woman’s age 23 -0.0801  0.1665 -0.48
Woman’s age 24 0.1893  0.1528 1.24
Woman’s age 25 0.0417  0.1594 0.26
Woman’s age 26 0.1628  0.1507 1.08
Woman’s age 27 -0.0153  0.1547 -0.10
Woman’s age 28 0.1360  0.1618 0.84
Woman’s age 29 0.3317 ** 0.1356 2.45
Woman’s age 31 0.2258  0.1436 1.57
Woman’s age 32 -0.0007  0.1519 -0.01
Woman’s age 33 -0.0977  0.1611 -0.61
Woman’s age 34 -0.0870  0.1485 -0.59
Woman’s age 35 -0.0396  0.1558 -0.25
Woman’s age 36 -0.4556 ** 0.2013 -2.26
Woman’s age 37 -0.5573 ** 0.2341 -2.38
Year 1996 -0.2124 *** 0.0673 -3.16
Year 1997 -0.5349 *** 0.0712 -7.51
Year 1998 -0.4480 *** 0.0697 -6.43
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Conception, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Household in Urban area 0.5880 *** 0.1587 3.71
North Sumatra Rural Area     0.7537 *** 0.2322 3.25
North Sumatra Urban Area     0.1427  0.1560 0.92
West Sumatra  Rural Area      0.8590 *** 0.1408 6.10
West Sumatra  Urban Area      0.6093 *** 0.1668 3.65
South Sumatra Rural Area      0.7805 *** 0.2041 3.82
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.0466  0.2535 -0.18
Lampung Rural Area            0.6308 *** 0.1556 4.06
Lampung Urban Area            0.0796  0.2043 0.39
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.5447 *** 0.1452 3.75
West Java Rural Area          0.0499  0.1188 0.42
West Java Urban Area          0.4523 *** 0.1635 2.77
Central Java Rural Area       -0.0235  0.1808 -0.13
Central Java Urban Area       0.3962 * 0.2185 1.81
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.2178  0.1618 -1.35
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      0.0156  0.1441 0.11
East Java Rural Area          0.3099  0.2743 1.13
East Java Urban Area          -0.2410  0.2351 -1.03
Bali Rural Area               0.5302 *** 0.1454 3.65
Bali Urban Area               -0.0314  0.2534 -0.12
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.1960  0.1550 1.26
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area 0.0764  0.2194 0.35
South Kalimantan Rural Area   0.4149 * 0.2405 1.73
South Kalimantan Urban Area   0.0667  0.1996 0.33
Woman is Protestant -0.4202  0.3004 -1.40
Woman is Catholic 0.4838  0.4882 0.99
Woman is Hindhu 1.2223 *** 0.3852 3.17
Woman is Buddhist -0.1532  0.6042 -0.25
Man is Protestant 0.7028 ** 0.3023 2.33
Man is Catholic -0.3932  0.4723 -0.83
Man is Hindhu -0.8696 *** 0.3383 -2.57
Man is Buddhist -0.6043  0.7382 -0.82
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School -0.0194  0.1206 -0.16
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0778  0.1205 -0.65
Woman Graduated Junior High School -0.0465  0.1374 -0.34
Woman Graduated Senior High School -0.0409  0.1415 -0.29
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.0037  0.1823 0.02
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.0376  0.1211 0.31
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.1520  0.1055 -1.44
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0265  0.1219 -0.22
Husband Graduated Senior High School -0.0932  0.1083 -0.86
Husband Graduated University or higher -0.0400  0.1582 -0.25
Woman can read 0.2769  0.2622 1.06
Woman can write -0.1188  0.2582 -0.46
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Conception, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Husband can read 0.3219  0.2245 1.43
Husband can write -0.3430  0.2115 -1.62
Woman attended school last year 0.0893  0.1422 0.63
Woman currently attends school -0.0606  0.1775 -0.34
Husband attended school last year 0.1084  0.2376 0.46
Husband currently attends school -0.1674  0.2760 -0.61
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker -0.3132 *** 0.0875 -3.58
Husband is Self Employed 0.0049  0.1649 0.03
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.0881  0.2006 0.44
Husband works for the government 0.0726  0.1824 0.40
Husband works for a corporation -0.0096  0.1628 -0.06
Community Subjective Wellbeing - Worse -0.0206  0.0773 -0.27
Community Subjective Wellbeing - Better -0.0868  0.0971 -0.89
Households in Community in general are worse 
now 0.0124  0.1206 0.10
Households in Community in general are better 
now -0.0627  0.1244 -0.50
Households in Community  better and worse 
now -0.0744  0.1350 -0.55
Individual Subjective Wellbeing – Expect Worse 0.2753  0.2043 1.35
Individual Subjective Wellbeing – Expect Better -0.0217  0.0544 -0.40
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 0.0349  0.0732 0.48
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.1644 ** 0.0764 -2.15
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 -0.0143  0.0701 -0.20
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now 0.5065  0.4835 1.05
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.1070  0.0794 1.35
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now 0.4822 * 0.2653 1.82
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Table A.3: FIML Results: Number of Children Equation 
Birth Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.4148 *** 0.6110 -3.95
Married  1.3197 *** 0.3598 3.67
Mother has 1 child -1.4870 *** 0.0588 -25.30
Mother has 2 children -1.9092 *** 0.0765 -24.94
Mother has 3 children -2.1417 *** 0.0964 -22.22
Mother has 4 children -2.1467 *** 0.1190 -18.03
Mother has 5 or more children -1.9791 *** 0.1348 -14.68
Husband’s age 20 or younger -0.2619 ** 0.1026 -2.55
Husband’s age 21 to 30 0.0803 * 0.0486 1.65
Husband’s age 40 or older -0.2985 *** 0.0975 -3.06
Woman’s age 11 -1.3139 *** 0.3682 -3.57
Woman’s age 12 -0.9151 *** 0.2882 -3.18
Woman’s age 13 -0.7461 *** 0.2769 -2.69
Woman’s age 14 -0.4855 ** 0.2025 -2.40
Woman’s age 15 -0.2320  0.1966 -1.18
Woman’s age 16 -0.0128  0.1660 -0.08
Woman’s age 17 -0.0241  0.1644 -0.15
Woman’s age 18 0.3055 * 0.1597 1.91
Woman’s age 19 0.1926  0.1536 1.25
Woman’s age 20 0.2509 * 0.1442 1.74
Woman’s age 21 0.3178 ** 0.1350 2.35
Woman’s age 22 0.3529 *** 0.1304 2.71
Woman’s age 23 0.2993 ** 0.1314 2.28
Woman’s age 24 0.1505  0.1324 1.14
Woman’s age 25 0.2723 ** 0.1273 2.14
Woman’s age 26 0.2804 ** 0.1227 2.29
Woman’s age 27 0.1789  0.1335 1.34
Woman’s age 28 0.2669 * 0.1392 1.92
Woman’s age 29 0.0751  0.1471 0.51
Woman’s age 31 -0.0522  0.1612 -0.32
Woman’s age 32 -0.0232  0.1695 -0.14
Woman’s age 33 0.0031  0.1905 0.02
Woman’s age 34 -0.9345 ** 0.3887 -2.41
Woman Age 7 to 10 -1.7113 *** 0.4662 -3.67
Year is before 1976 0.6152  0.3974 1.55
Year is 1976 to 1980 0.2453 ** 0.1089 2.25
Year is 1981 to 1985 0.3759 *** 0.0602 6.24
Year is 1986 to 1990 0.1254 *** 0.0386 3.25
Household in Urban area 0.4386 *** 0.1002 4.38
North Sumatra Rural Area     0.7142 *** 0.2048 3.49
North Sumatra Urban Area     0.4410 *** 0.1167 3.78
West Sumatra  Rural Area      0.3070 *** 0.0944 3.25
West Sumatra  Urban Area      0.4100 *** 0.1239 3.31
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Birth, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
South Sumatra Rural Area      0.3126 *** 0.1098 2.85
South Sumatra Urban Area      0.3151 ** 0.1474 2.14
Lampung Rural Area            0.3837 *** 0.1142 3.36
Lampung Urban Area            0.3894 *** 0.0949 4.10
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.3101 *** 0.1069 2.90
West Java Rural Area          -0.0182  0.0944 -0.19
West Java Urban Area          0.0669  0.1171 0.57
Central Java Rural Area       -0.1593  0.1017 -1.57
Central Java Urban Area       0.2364 * 0.1403 1.69
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.3020 *** 0.0837 -3.61
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.2017  0.1273 -1.59
East Java Rural Area          0.7011 *** 0.1750 4.01
East Java Urban Area          0.1144  0.1597 0.72
Bali Rural Area               0.7666 *** 0.1158 6.62
Bali Urban Area               0.1915  0.1468 1.30
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.2820 ** 0.1123 2.51
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area -0.1218  0.2349 -0.52
South Kalimantan Rural Area   0.6571 *** 0.1525 4.31
South Kalimantan Urban Area   0.0626  0.1301 0.48
Woman is Protestant -0.1407  0.2321 -0.61
Woman is Catholic 0.2441  0.5642 0.43
Woman is Hindhu 0.3746  0.5106 0.73
Woman is Buddhist -0.2601  0.4359 -0.60
Man is Protestant 0.2256  0.2135 1.06
Man is Catholic -0.2039  0.5447 -0.37
Man is Hindhu -0.6761  0.4678 -1.45
Man is Buddhist 0.1677  0.4632 0.36
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 0.0378  0.0767 0.49
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0838  0.0821 -1.02
Woman Graduated Junior High School -0.1233  0.0942 -1.31
Woman Graduated Senior High School -0.1496  0.0920 -1.63
Woman Graduated University or higher -0.0302  0.1502 -0.20
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.0623  0.0594 1.05
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0179  0.0705 -0.25
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0640  0.0791 -0.81
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0577  0.0759 0.76
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.2248 ** 0.1054 2.13
Woman can read 0.0338  0.1323 0.26
Woman can write -0.0515  0.1334 -0.39
Husband can read -0.2801 * 0.1583 -1.77
Husband can write 0.2810 * 0.1508 1.86
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Birth, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Woman attended school last year 0.1037  0.0985 1.05
Woman currently attends school -0.2742 ** 0.1242 -2.21
Husband attended school last year -0.2210  0.1489 -1.48
Husband currently attends school 0.2749 * 0.1669 1.65
Duration of marriage 0.1498 ** 0.0680 2.20
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 -0.0231  0.0468 -0.49
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.0814  0.0845 -0.96
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 0.0845  0.0651 1.30
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now -0.0502  0.0922 -0.55
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.0061  0.0475 0.13
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now -0.0713  0.0559 -1.28
Woman is fertile 0.2275  0.2098 1.08
Woman lives near her parents -0.0555  0.0570 -0.97
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Table A.4: FIML Results: Education Equation 
Exit School Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant 3.5225 *** 0.3142 11.21
Mother has 1 child 0.9241 *** 0.1443 6.41
Woman’s age 7 -3.0888 *** 0.1337 -23.10
Woman’s age 8 -4.1622 *** 0.1644 -25.32
Woman’s age 9 -3.3670 *** 0.1276 -26.40
Woman’s age 10 -2.6003 *** 0.1011 -25.73
Woman’s age 11 -2.0932 *** 0.0957 -21.86
Woman’s age 12 -1.0930 *** 0.0806 -13.56
Woman’s age 13 -0.5750 *** 0.0746 -7.70
Woman’s age 14 -0.7340 *** 0.0704 -10.42
Woman’s age 15 -0.7827 *** 0.0794 -9.85
Woman’s age 21 to 25 0.3698 *** 0.1039 3.56
Woman’s age 26 to 30 0.0490  0.2639 0.19
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.5906  0.5268 -1.12
Woman’s age 36 and up 2.3777 *** 0.8989 2.65
Year is before 1976 -0.2030  0.1241 -1.64
Year is 1976 to 1980 -0.6293 *** 0.1065 -5.91
Year is 1981 to 1985 -1.1002 *** 0.1013 -10.86
Year is 1986 to 1990 -0.9822 *** 0.0948 -10.36
Year is 1991 to 1995 -0.7851 *** 0.0870 -9.02
Household in Urban area -0.3691 *** 0.1344 -2.75
North Sumatra Rural Area     0.0553  0.2745 0.20
North Sumatra Urban Area     0.0680  0.1505 0.45
West Sumatra  Rural Area      -0.2354  0.1473 -1.60
West Sumatra  Urban Area      -0.3879 * 0.2029 -1.91
South Sumatra Rural Area      -0.1651  0.1929 -0.86
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.5960 *** 0.2005 -2.97
Lampung Rural Area            0.1102  0.1383 0.80
Lampung Urban Area            0.1287  0.1881 0.68
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.4540 *** 0.1167 3.89
West Java Rural Area          -0.1333  0.1493 -0.89
West Java Urban Area          0.1218  0.1586 0.77
Central Java Rural Area       0.0674  0.1989 0.34
Central Java Urban Area       -0.8081 *** 0.1921 -4.21
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.1507  0.1371 -1.10
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.0563  0.1519 -0.37
East Java Rural Area          0.2293  0.1905 1.20
East Java Urban Area          -0.0368  0.2247 -0.16
Bali Rural Area               -0.1177  0.1595 -0.74
Bali Urban Area               -0.3089  0.2027 -1.52
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Exit School, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.3049  0.2429 1.26
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area 0.2620  0.2461 1.07
South Kalimantan Rural Area   -0.2133  0.2200 -0.97
South Kalimantan Urban Area   -0.1861  0.1516 -1.23
Woman is Protestant -0.6614 *** 0.1804 -3.67
Woman is Catholic -0.4289 * 0.2262 -1.90
Woman is Hindhu -0.2569 ** 0.1246 -2.06
Woman is Buddhist 0.3555  0.5616 0.63
Woman can read -1.9049 *** 0.2890 -6.59
Woman can write -1.2466 *** 0.2645 -4.71
Student Teacher Ratio in Secondary Sch 0.0613 * 0.0338 1.81
Student School Ratio in Secondary Sch -0.0596  0.2111 -0.28
Student Teacher Ratio in Primary Sch 0.0867 ** 0.0415 2.09
Student School Ratio in Primary Sch -0.2427 ** 0.0978 -2.48
School was available to woman in her 
community -0.1166 * 0.0667 -1.75
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Table A.5: FIML Results: Hazard of First Marriage 
First Marriage Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.6237 *** 0.3696 -7.10
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -0.4021 *** 0.0566 -7.10
Woman’s age 21 to 25 0.0157  0.0644 0.24
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.2194 ** 0.1120 -1.96
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.9848 *** 0.2071 -4.76
Woman’s age 36 and up -1.4229 *** 0.4906 -2.90
Year is before 1976 -1.0677 *** 0.1684 -6.34
Year is 1976 to 1980 -0.6959 *** 0.1042 -6.68
Year is 1981 to 1985 -0.5423 *** 0.0874 -6.21
Year is 1986 to 1990 -0.4621 *** 0.0688 -6.72
Year is 1991 to 1995 -0.4289 *** 0.0566 -7.58
Household in Urban area -0.3265 *** 0.1071 -3.05
North Sumatra Rural Area     -0.4896 * 0.2726 -1.80
North Sumatra Urban Area     -0.4395 *** 0.1408 -3.12
West Sumatra  Rural Area      -0.3699 ** 0.1534 -2.41
West Sumatra  Urban Area      -0.2780 * 0.1688 -1.65
South Sumatra Rural Area      -0.0657  0.1030 -0.64
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.2395  0.1569 -1.53
Lampung Rural Area            0.3201 ** 0.1312 2.44
Lampung Urban Area            0.0372  0.2233 0.17
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.1741 * 0.1051 1.66
West Java Rural Area          -0.0424  0.1135 -0.37
West Java Urban Area          -0.0171  0.1202 -0.14
Central Java Rural Area       0.0151  0.1169 0.13
Central Java Urban Area       -0.2119  0.1411 -1.50
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.0720  0.1319 -0.55
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      0.0204  0.1052 0.19
East Java Rural Area          -0.1095  0.2086 -0.53
East Java Urban Area          -0.0835  0.2309 -0.36
Bali Rural Area               -0.6369 *** 0.1436 -4.44
Bali Urban Area               -0.5547 *** 0.1857 -2.99
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area -0.0537  0.1716 -0.31
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area 0.1717  0.2719 0.63
South Kalimantan Rural Area   -0.4668 *** 0.1467 -3.18
South Kalimantan Urban Area   -0.3834 ** 0.1636 -2.34
Woman is Protestant -0.3372 *** 0.1284 -2.63
Woman is Catholic -0.2404  0.1696 -1.42
Woman is Hindhu -0.2570  0.1689 -1.52
Woman is Buddhist -0.3823  0.3847 -0.99
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 0.8874 *** 0.0740 12.00
Woman Graduated Primary School 1.0459 *** 0.0748 13.98
Woman Graduated Junior High School 1.3442 *** 0.0791 16.99
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First Marriage, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Woman Graduated Senior High School 1.1318 *** 0.0848 13.34
Woman Graduated University or higher 1.2468 *** 0.1210 10.31
Woman can read -0.6412 *** 0.1764 -3.64
Woman can write 0.0356  0.1624 0.22
Woman attended school last year -0.1551 ** 0.0651 -2.38
Woman currently attends school -0.8656 *** 0.0804 -10.77
Schooling was available to woman -0.0825  0.0611 -1.35
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas when 
woman age 7 -0.4071 *** 0.0523 -7.79
Family Planning Available in Posyandu when 
woman age 7 -0.6773 *** 0.0676 -10.03
Family Planning Available in Private Facility 
when woman age 7 -0.4708 *** 0.0529 -8.89
Family Planning Available in Puskesmas now 0.1602 * 0.0885 1.81
Family Planning Available in Posyandu now 0.0896 * 0.0525 1.71
Family Planning Available in Private Facility now 0.1200 ** 0.0582 2.06
Woman is fertile 1.5251 *** 0.0837 18.23
Woman lives near her parents 0.5503 *** 0.0633 8.70
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Table AI.6: FIML Results: Woman Works for a Wage 
Works For a Wage Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant -2.6324  2.1692 -1.21
Married  -2.5518 ** 1.1566 -2.21
Ever Married      -0.7033  0.7076 -0.99
Mother has 1 child 0.2741  0.2891 0.95
Mother has 2 children 1.0852 ** 0.4382 2.48
Mother has 3 children 0.9156 ** 0.4568 2.00
Mother has 4 children 1.3829 ** 0.5580 2.48
Mother has 5 or more children 3.3816 *** 0.7010 4.82
Husband’s age 20 or younger -1.6668 ** 0.7402 -2.25
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.7372 ** 0.3298 -2.24
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.1381  0.3184 0.43
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -7.1817 *** 0.7121 -10.09
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -5.0327 *** 0.5019 -10.03
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -3.9973 *** 0.4118 -9.71
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -2.0101 *** 0.3350 -6.00
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.8693 *** 0.2757 -3.15
Year 1996 -1.7508 *** 0.3031 -5.78
Year 1997 -1.1853 *** 0.2817 -4.21
Year 1998 -0.5678 *** 0.1303 -4.36
Household in Urban area -1.0923 ** 0.4718 -2.32
North Sumatra Rural Area     2.9455 *** 0.8228 3.58
North Sumatra Urban Area     -2.6228 *** 0.6579 -3.99
West Sumatra  Rural Area      1.6452 * 0.9613 1.71
West Sumatra  Urban Area      0.4962  0.5009 0.99
South Sumatra Rural Area      -1.4448 *** 0.5390 -2.68
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.6290  0.6510 -0.97
Lampung Rural Area            -4.8371 *** 0.6173 -7.84
Lampung Urban Area            1.9704 ** 0.9758 2.02
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        -0.2403  0.3891 -0.62
West Java Rural Area          -0.1528  0.6217 -0.25
West Java Urban Area          1.3921 ** 0.5943 2.34
Central Java Rural Area       2.3909 *** 0.6250 3.83
Central Java Urban Area       0.0422  0.4396 0.10
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      3.1070 *** 0.6832 4.55
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.4685  0.4693 -1.00
East Java Rural Area          -1.6353 ** 0.7676 -2.13
East Java Urban Area          2.6931 *** 0.9187 2.93
Bali Rural Area               -1.1095 *** 0.4064 -2.73
Bali Urban Area               -3.8194 *** 0.6831 -5.59
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area -1.7681 ** 0.7255 -2.44
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area -1.1577  2.7217 -0.43
South Kalimantan Rural Area   -3.2746 *** 0.5207 -6.29
South Kalimantan Urban Area   -3.8564 *** 0.7511 -5.13
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Works For a Wage, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Woman is Protestant 3.8898 *** 0.6978 5.58
Woman is Catholic -1.7799 ** 0.7982 -2.23
Woman is Hindhu -1.5548 ** 0.7221 -2.15
Woman is Buddhist -4.0393 *** 0.7246 -5.58
Man is Protestant -2.0017 ** 0.8516 -2.35
Man is Catholic 1.8337 ** 0.9159 2.00
Man is Hindhu 3.1382 *** 0.7843 4.00
Man is Buddhist 2.0122  1.2858 1.57
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School 2.3067 *** 0.4265 5.41
Woman Graduated Primary School 1.4337 *** 0.4785 3.00
Woman Graduated Junior High School 1.1936  0.6122 1.95
Woman Graduated Senior High School 1.7060 *** 0.5050 3.38
Woman Graduated University or higher 2.9005 *** 0.6846 4.24
Husband did not graduate primary school 0.6061  0.4440 1.37
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.4495  0.5187 -0.87
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.3607  0.5404 -0.67
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.2009  0.5331 0.38
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.6601  0.6052 1.09
Woman can read -3.7188 *** 1.1150 -3.34
Woman can write 3.5057 *** 1.0101 3.47
Husband can read 2.0462 *** 0.6776 3.02
Husband can write 0.2840  0.7025 0.40
Woman attended school last year 0.0691  0.3947 0.18
Woman currently attends school -0.6166  0.4324 -1.43
Husband attended school last year 1.5191 ** 0.6468 2.35
Husband currently attends school -0.4171  0.7998 -0.52
Husband is Self Employed 0.6531  0.5477 1.19
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.5957  0.6961 0.86
Husband works for the government 4.6449 *** 0.6845 6.79
Husband works for a corporation 0.7893  0.5006 1.58
Community is Underdeveloped -0.4543  0.2944 -1.54
Main source of income in community is Farming 0.8130 *** 0.3073 2.65
Main source of income in community is 
Manufacturing 0.2321  0.1799 1.29
Main source of income in com is Building 
Construction -0.0749  0.2112 -0.36
Main source of income in com is Large Retail / 
Tourism -0.1584  0.3658 -0.43
Main source of income in com is Social Services 0.1923  0.2066 0.93
Main source of income in com is Other (Mining, 
Utility, Transportation, Finance, Other) 0.0890  0.3036 0.29
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Works For a Wage, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Average Community Price for Gasoline 0.6515 *** 0.1913 3.41
Average Community Price for Salt -0.1234  0.1511 -0.82
Average Community Price for Sugar -1.7672 * 0.9922 -1.78
Community employs in the Industrial Sector 0.0149  0.3142 0.05
Average community industrial wage for men in 0.1238  0.3378 0.37
Average community industrial wage for women -0.4148  0.4194 -0.99
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -1.3185 *** 0.2802 -4.71
Average community agricultural wage for men -0.2607  0.4295 -0.61
Average community agricultural wage for 
women 1.4320 *** 0.4941 2.90
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Table AI.7: FIML Results: Income Equation 
Income Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant 0.4028  0.3520 1.14
Married  -1.3969 *** 0.2870 -4.87
Ever Married      0.3383  0.2610 1.30
Woman Works For a Wage 1.2119 *** 0.0799 15.16
Mother has 1 child 0.0881 * 0.0490 1.80
Mother has 2 children 0.2012 *** 0.0597 3.37
Mother has 3 children 0.2946 *** 0.0759 3.88
Mother has 4 children 0.2809 *** 0.0942 2.98
Mother has 5 or more children 0.3999 *** 0.1276 3.13
Husband’s age 20 or younger -0.0350  0.0950 -0.37
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0730 ** 0.0350 -2.09
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.0555  0.0396 1.40
Woman’s age 11 to 15 0.0145  0.1390 0.11
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -0.1630 * 0.0902 -1.81
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -0.1290 * 0.0681 -1.90
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.1105 ** 0.0541 -2.04
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.1179 *** 0.0424 -2.78
Year 1996 0.9554 *** 0.0548 17.42
Year 1997 0.2582 *** 0.0477 5.41
Year 1998 0.0097  0.0186 0.52
Household in Urban area 0.3349 *** 0.0841 3.98
North Sumatra Rural Area     -0.2212 * 0.1210 -1.83
North Sumatra Urban Area     -0.2122 ** 0.0970 -2.19
West Sumatra  Rural Area      -0.1013  0.2081 -0.49
West Sumatra  Urban Area      -0.1380  0.1563 -0.88
South Sumatra Rural Area      -0.2212 ** 0.1116 -1.98
South Sumatra Urban Area      -0.1907 * 0.1124 -1.70
Lampung Rural Area            -0.1927  0.1214 -1.59
Lampung Urban Area            -0.4532 *** 0.1550 -2.92
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.0583  0.0764 0.76
West Java Rural Area          -0.1425 * 0.0783 -1.82
West Java Urban Area          -0.0560  0.0826 -0.68
Central Java Rural Area       -0.3561 *** 0.0790 -4.51
Central Java Urban Area       -0.5018 *** 0.0971 -5.17
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.4622 *** 0.0740 -6.25
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.4143 *** 0.1129 -3.67
East Java Rural Area          -0.4562 *** 0.1323 -3.45
East Java Urban Area          -0.4770 *** 0.1373 -3.48
Bali Rural Area               0.0241  0.1076 0.22
Bali Urban Area               -0.2703 ** 0.1277 -2.12
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.1870  0.1246 1.50
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area -0.0012  0.1974 -0.01
South Kalimantan Rural Area   -0.0114  0.1274 -0.09
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Income, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
South Kalimantan Urban Area   -0.3598 *** 0.0972 -3.70
Woman is Protestant -0.0054  0.1606 -0.03
Woman is Catholic 0.0335  0.2647 0.13
Woman is Hindhu -0.1538  0.2477 -0.62
Woman is Buddhist 0.4335  0.3445 1.26
Man is Protestant -0.0696  0.1661 -0.42
Man is Catholic -0.0043  0.3113 -0.01
Man is Hindhu 0.3270  0.2777 1.18
Man is Buddhist 0.6170 ** 0.2750 2.24
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School -0.2081 *** 0.0717 -2.90
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0123  0.0736 -0.17
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.1229  0.0803 1.53
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.2270 *** 0.0847 2.68
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.5228 *** 0.1027 5.09
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.1184  0.0735 -1.61
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0406  0.0714 -0.57
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0081  0.0818 -0.10
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0252  0.0774 0.33
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.1416  0.1145 1.24
Woman can read 0.1698  0.1743 0.97
Woman can write 0.0605  0.1616 0.38
Husband can read 0.2872  0.2711 1.06
Husband can write -0.1169  0.2483 -0.47
Woman attended school last year 0.0935  0.0918 1.02
Woman currently attends school -0.0228  0.1029 -0.22
Husband attended school last year 0.1762  0.1139 1.55
Husband currently attends school -0.2010  0.1493 -1.35
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1299 ** 0.0550 2.36
Husband is Self Employed 4.1109 *** 0.1354 30.35
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.6447 *** 0.2151 3.00
Husband works for the government 4.2656 *** 0.1475 28.91
Husband works for a corporation 4.0825 *** 0.1376 29.66
Community is Underdeveloped -0.0806 ** 0.0368 -2.19
Main source of income in community is Farming -0.0776 * 0.0410 -1.90
Main source of income in community is 
Manufacturing 0.0105  0.0309 0.34
Main source of income in com is Building 
Construction 0.0376  0.0403 0.93
Main source of income in com is Large Retail / 
Tourism 0.0192  0.0594 0.32
Main source of income in com is Social Services 0.0681 ** 0.0347 1.96
Main source of income in com is Other (Mining, 
Utility, Transportation, Finance, Other) 0.0390  0.0544 0.72
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Income, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Average Community Price for Gasoline -0.0099  0.0192 -0.52
Average Community Price for Salt -0.0016  0.0235 -0.07
Average Community Price for Sugar 0.1501  0.2098 0.72
Community employs in the Industrial Sector -0.0614  0.0490 -1.25
Average community industrial wage for men -0.0418  0.0457 -0.91
Average community industrial wage for women 0.0771  0.0598 1.29
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -0.1543 *** 0.0474 -3.26
Average community agricultural wage for men 0.0290  0.0362 0.80
Average community agricultural wage for 
women 0.1414 ** 0.0641 2.20
Theta (Standard Deviation) 0.1461 *** 0.0147 9.93
Estimated Standard Deviation 1.1574    
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Table AI.8: FIML Results: Consumption Equation 
Per-Capita Consumption Estimate Std Error Z 
Constant 4.3029 *** 0.2106 20.43
Married  0.0193  0.1225 0.16
Ever Married      -0.2445 ** 0.1081 -2.26
Household Income 0.0015  0.0089 0.17
Woman Works For a Wage 0.0193  0.0485 0.40
Mother has 1 child -0.0665 * 0.0361 -1.84
Mother has 2 children -0.0136  0.0505 -0.27
Mother has 3 children -0.0247  0.0690 -0.36
Mother has 4 children -0.1162  0.0850 -1.37
Mother has 5 or more children -0.2421 ** 0.0991 -2.44
Husband’s age 20 or younger 0.0137  0.0702 0.20
Husband’s age 21 to 30 -0.0995 *** 0.0298 -3.34
Husband’s age 40 or older 0.0317  0.0281 1.13
Woman’s age 11 to 15 -0.3447 *** 0.0746 -4.62
Woman’s age 16 to 20 -0.2780 *** 0.0646 -4.30
Woman’s age 21 to 25 -0.2428 *** 0.0572 -4.25
Woman’s age 26 to 30 -0.1495 *** 0.0433 -3.45
Woman’s age 31 to 35 -0.0693 ** 0.0293 -2.37
Year 1997 0.0696 ** 0.0312 2.23
Household in Urban area 0.5130 *** 0.0658 7.79
North Sumatra Rural Area     -0.0642  0.0746 -0.86
North Sumatra Urban Area     -0.3931 *** 0.0649 -6.06
West Sumatra  Rural Area      0.1325  0.1163 1.14
West Sumatra  Urban Area      -0.2301 ** 0.1079 -2.13
South Sumatra Rural Area      -0.2151 *** 0.0663 -3.25
South Sumatra Urban Area      0.0447  0.0967 0.46
Lampung Rural Area            0.0499  0.0561 0.89
Lampung Urban Area            -0.3320 *** 0.0862 -3.85
DKI Jakarta Urban Area        0.3439 *** 0.0561 6.13
West Java Rural Area          -0.1741 *** 0.0634 -2.75
West Java Urban Area          0.2011 *** 0.0630 3.19
Central Java Rural Area       -0.4049 *** 0.0686 -5.91
Central Java Urban Area       0.0460  0.1310 0.35
DI Yogyakarta Rural Area      -0.3599 *** 0.0732 -4.92
DI Yogyakarta Urban Area      -0.5211 *** 0.1091 -4.78
East Java Rural Area          0.0819  0.0974 0.84
East Java Urban Area          -0.3729 *** 0.1305 -2.86
Bali Rural Area               0.0317  0.0781 0.41
Bali Urban Area               -0.2878 *** 0.0970 -2.97
West Nusa Tenggara Rural Area 0.1935 *** 0.0510 3.79
West Nusa Tenggara Urban Area -0.2987 *** 0.1025 -2.92
South Kalimantan Rural Area   0.0332  0.0670 0.50
South Kalimantan Urban Area   -0.4206 *** 0.0735 -5.73
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Per-Capita Consumption, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Woman is Protestant -0.0309  0.0933 -0.33
Woman is Catholic 0.0302  0.1637 0.19
Woman is Hindhu -0.0908  0.0927 -0.98
Woman is Buddhist 0.2857  0.2511 1.14
Man is Protestant -0.0001  0.0938 0.00
Man is Catholic 0.0994  0.1808 0.55
Man is Hindhu -0.0089  0.0589 -0.15
Man is Buddhist 0.0710  0.3392 0.21
Woman started but did not graduate Primary 
School -0.0480  0.0375 -1.28
Woman Graduated Primary School -0.0196  0.0376 -0.52
Woman Graduated Junior High School 0.0846 * 0.0449 1.88
Woman Graduated Senior High School 0.1057 ** 0.0494 2.14
Woman Graduated University or higher 0.3347 *** 0.0791 4.23
Husband did not graduate primary school -0.0891 * 0.0463 -1.92
Husband Graduated Primary School -0.0695  0.0504 -1.38
Husband Graduated Junior High School -0.0575  0.0542 -1.06
Husband Graduated Senior High School 0.0764  0.0525 1.46
Husband Graduated University or higher 0.1763 ** 0.0765 2.30
Woman can read 0.1151  0.1126 1.02
Woman can write 0.0147  0.1058 0.14
Husband can read 0.1450  0.1110 1.31
Husband can write 0.0456  0.1029 0.44
Woman attended school last year -0.0515  0.0506 -1.02
Woman currently attends school 0.1834 *** 0.0596 3.08
Husband attended school last year 0.0584  0.1214 0.48
Husband currently attends school 0.0288  0.1328 0.22
Woman is Unpaid Family Worker 0.0446  0.0301 1.48
Husband is Self Employed 0.1186 * 0.0689 1.72
Husband is Unpaid Family Worker 0.1270 * 0.0766 1.66
Husband works for the government 0.2339 *** 0.0747 3.13
Husband works for a corporation -0.0065  0.0675 -0.10
Community is Underdeveloped -0.1473 *** 0.0279 -5.28
Main source of income in community is Farming -0.0122  0.0400 -0.31
Main source of income in community is 
Manufacturing -0.0155  0.0225 -0.69
Main source of income in com is Building 
Construction 0.0144  0.0292 0.49
Main source of income in com is Large Retail / 
Tourism -0.0407  0.0552 -0.74
Main source of income in com is Social Services 0.0301  0.0277 1.09
Main source of income in com is Other (Mining, 
Utility, Transportation, Finance, Other) 0.0325  0.0562 0.58
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Per-Capita Consumption, cont. Estimate Std Error Z 
Average Community Price for Gasoline 0.0192  0.0317 0.61
Average Community Price for Salt 0.0257  0.0196 1.31
Average Community Price for Sugar -0.0292  0.1411 -0.21
Community employs in the Industrial Sector 0.0066  0.0398 0.17
Average community industrial wage for men -0.0015  0.0453 -0.03
Average community industrial wage for women 0.0525  0.0515 1.02
Community employs in the Agricultural Sector -0.1290 *** 0.0372 -3.47
Average community agricultural wage for men -0.0058  0.0415 -0.14
Average community agricultural wage for 
women 0.2005 *** 0.0518 3.87
Theta (Standard Deviation) -0.5667 *** 0.0149 -37.95






COMPLETE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
 


































































































































































































































































































KC = Number of Community level mass points 
PWkc = Probability weight of mass point kc 
KI = Number of Individual level mass points 
PWki = Probability weight of mass point ki  
C = Number of communities 
 
I = Number of individuals 
T = Number of time periods (T = 32, implies year 1999) 
Φ = Standard normal probability density function 
jσ
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